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Abstract
Identifying and Preventing Large-scale Internet Abuse
by
Kevin Borgolte
The widespread access to the Internet and the ubiquity of web-based services make it easy to com-
municate and interact globally. Unfortunately, the software and protocols implementing the func-
tionality of these services are often vulnerable to attacks. In turn, an attacker can exploit them to
compromise, take over, and abuse the services for her own nefarious purposes. In this dissertation,
we aim to better understand such attacks, and we develop methods and algorithms to detect and
prevent them, which we evaluate on large-scale datasets.
First, we detail Meerkat, a system to detect a visible way in which websites are being compro-
mised, namely website defacements. They can inﬂict signiﬁcant harm on the websites’ operators
through the loss of sales, the loss in reputation, or because of legal ramiﬁcations. Meerkat requires
no prior knowledge about the websites’ content or their structure, but only the Uniform Resource
Identiﬁer (URI) at which they can be reached. By design, Meerkat mimics how a human analyst
decides if a website was defaced when viewing it in a browser, by using computer vision techniques.
Thus, it tackles the problem of detecting website defacements through their attention-seeking na-
ture, their goal and purpose, rather than code or data artifacts that they might exhibit. In turn, it is
much harder for an attacker to evade our system, as she needs to change her modus operandi. When
Meerkat detects a website as defaced, the website can automatically be put into maintenance mode
or restored to a known good state.
An attacker, however, is not limited to abuse a compromised website in a way that is visible to
the website’s visitors. Instead, she can misuse the website to infect its visitors with malicious soft-
xi
ware (malware). Although malware is well studied, identifying malicious websites remains a major
challenge in today’s Internet. Second, we introduce Delta, a novel, purely static analysis approach
that extracts change-related features between two versions of the same website, uses machine learn-
ing to derive a model of website changes, detects if an introduced change was malicious or benign,
identiﬁes the underlying infection vector based on clustering, and generates an identifying signa-
ture. Furthermore, due to the way Delta clusters campaigns, it can uncover infection campaigns
that leverage speciﬁc vulnerable applications as a distribution channel, and it can greatly reduce the
human labor necessary to uncover the application responsible for a service’s compromise.
Third, we investigate the practicality and impact of domain takeover attacks, which an attacker
can similarly abuse to spread misinformation or malware, and we present a defense on how such
takeover attacks can be rendered toothless. Speciﬁcally, the new elasticity of Internet resources, in
particular Internet protocol (IP) addresses in the context of Infrastructure-as-a-Service cloud ser-
vice providers, combined with previously made protocol assumptions can lead to security issues. In
Cloud Strife, we show that this dynamic component pairedwith recent developments in trust-based
ecosystems (e.g., Transport Layer Security (TLS) certiﬁcates) creates so far unknown attack vectors.
For example, a substantial number of stale domain name system (DNS) records points to readily
available IP addresses in clouds, yet, they are still actively attempted to be accessed. Often, these
records belong to discontinued services that were previously hosted in the cloud. We demonstrate
that it is practical, and time and cost-efficient for attackers to allocate the IP addresses to which stale
DNS records point. Further considering the ubiquity of domain validation in trust ecosystems, an
attacker can impersonate the service by obtaining and using a valid certiﬁcate that is trusted by all
major operating systems and browsers, which severely increases the attackers’ capabilities. The at-
tacker can then also exploit residual trust in the domain name for phishing, receiving and sending
emails, or possibly distributing code to clients that load remote code from the domain (e.g., load-
ing of native code by mobile apps, or JavaScript libraries by websites). To prevent such attacks, we
xii
introduce a new authentication method for trust-based domain validation that mitigates staleness is-
sues without incurring additional certiﬁcate requester effort by incorporating existing trust into the
validation process.
Finally, the analyses of Delta, Meerkat, and Cloud Strife havemade use of large-scale measure-
ments to assess our approaches’ impact and viability. Indeed, security research in general has made
extensive use of exhaustive Internet-wide scans over the recent years, as they can provide signiﬁcant
insights into the state of security of the Internet (e.g., if classes of devices are behaving maliciously,
or if they might be insecure and could turn malicious in an instant). However, the address space of
the Internet’s core addressing protocol (Internet Protocol version 4; IPv4) is exhausted, and a mi-
gration to its successor (Internet Protocol version 6; IPv6), the only accepted long-term solution, is
inevitable. In turn, to better understand the security of devices connected to the Internet, in par-
ticular Internet of Things devices, it is imperative to include IPv6 addresses in security evaluations
and scans. Unfortunately, it is practically infeasible to iterate through the entire IPv6 address space,
as it is 296 times larger than the IPv4 address space. Without enumerating hosts prior to scanning,
we will be unable to retain visibility into the overall security of Internet-connected devices in the
future, and we will be unable to detect and prevent their abuse or compromise. To mitigate this
blind spot, we introduce a novel technique to enumerate part of the IPv6 address space by walking
DNSSEC-signed IPv6 reverse zones. We show (i) that enumerating active IPv6 hosts is practical
without a preferential network position contrary to common belief, (ii) that the security of active
IPv6 hosts is currently still lagging behind the security state of IPv4 hosts, and (iii) that unintended
default IPv6 connectivity is a major security issue.
xiii
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Introduction
The widespread access to the Internet and the ubiquity of Internet-connected services has made it
easy to communicate and interact globally. Unfortunately, the software and protocols implementing
the services’ functionality are often vulnerable to attacks because of software or design bugs, legacy
code, not being maintained, entirely new classes of vulnerabilities, a disconnect in what they are
supposed to do and what they are actually doing, or just evolution in how they are being used. In
turn, attackers can exploit them for their own nefarious purposes, to turn a proﬁt from criminal
enterprises, or to wreak havoc for fun. Today, such abuse on the Internet is rampant and users must
tread carefully to not be defrauded, scammed, extorted, misled, inﬂuenced, or have their (private)
data siphoned off and misused.
One attack plaguing the Internet is the defacement and vandalism of websites, which is an attack
that disrupts the operation of companies and organizations, tarnishes their brand, and affects web-
sites of all sizes, from those of large corporations to the websites of single individuals [16, 17, 18].
In a website defacement, an attacker replaces the content of a legitimate website with some of her
own content. A website might be defaced for many different reasons and in many different ways.
For example, an attacker might deface the website by brute-forcing the administrator’s credentials,
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by leveraging a SQL injection to introduce content or code, or by hijacking the domain name. Ul-
timately, however, all defacements have one common characteristic: The defacer leaves a message
that is shown to the visitors of the website instead of the legitimate content, changing the visual
appearance of the website.
Although nearly all defacers vandalize websites for their “15 minutes of fame,” and to get a plat-
form to publicize their message, their messages vary. Some of them hope to embarrass the websites
operators, others make a political or religious statement, and others again do it for “bragging rights.”
For instance, in the beginning of November 2014, as reported by the BBC [19], attackers defaced
the website of the Keighley Cougars, a professional rugby club from England. The defacers modi-
ﬁed the website so that visitors were greeted with a message in support of the terrorist organization
“Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/Syria” (ISIL/ISIS) (see Figure 1.1). In another example, in late
2012, defacers close to the Syrian regime defaced the homepage of the prominent Qatari television
network Al Jazeera, and instead of news articles, visitors were shown a message alleging Al Jazeera
of “spreading false fabricated news.”
A prime example that quantiﬁes the actual impact of defacements is the Telegraph, a major UK
daily newspaper, which was defaced in September 2011. The Telegraph is the third most-visited
website in the United Kingdom, according to MajesticSEO, and it is the 21st most visited website
in the United States, according to Alexa. Each month, its homepage is visited over 125 million
times (48 times per second), and, since reports state that the defacement lasted around three hours,
an estimated more than 500,000 visitors saw the defacement instead of the legitimate website.1
Unfortunately, detecting website defacement abuse has not received much attention from the
scientiﬁc community, while, at the same time, defacements have become more prominent. The
number of reported defacements has been exceeding the number of reported phishing pages since
1The number of visitors was likely much higher because the website was defaced on a Sunday afternoon local time
in the United Kingdom.
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(a) Normal, non-defaced version (b) Defaced version
Figure 1.1: Screenshots of the Keighley Cougars website, its normal version and after it was defaced
in an attack onNovember 2, 2014 by the defacer groupTeamSystemDz, who is using the defacement
to show support for the terrorist organization Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/Syria (ISIL/ISIS).
October 2006 by a factor of seven on average, and reached up to 33.39 defacements being reported
to Zone-H2 per phishing page reported to PhishTank3 (see Figure 1.2). Similarly, while a mere 783
veriﬁed defacements were reported on average each day to Zone-H in 2003, the number of reports
increased to 3,258 veriﬁed defacements per day for the year 2012, to over 4,785 veriﬁed defacements
being reported each day to Zone-H in 2014. This corresponds to an increase of websites being
defaced by 46.87% from 2012 to 2014 alone [20].
Defacements, however, are only one possible attack. An attacker can also exploit server-side vul-
nerabilities to inject malicious code snippets, called infection vectors, which, in turn, attack the web-
site’s visitors through drive-by install, download, or mining attacks. In drive-by mining attacks, the
malicious code monetizes the compromise by abusing the visitors’ computational resources to mine
2Zone-H [20] is an Internet archive containing only defaced websites, all reported defacements are mirrored locally
and manually veriﬁed [21]. Upon manual inspection, a reported defacement is removed from the archive if it does not
constitute a defacement, or it is marked as veriﬁed.
3PhishTank is the largest public clearinghouse of data about phishing scams, users report potential phishing scams
and other users agree or disagree with the submitter, resulting in a user-assigned phishing score. Phishing pages are not
being veriﬁed by expert analysts.
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cryptocurrencies [22]. On the other hand, drive-by install and download attacks exploit client-side
vulnerabilities to download or install malicious software (malware), or con the user into installing
malware herself [23]. Once the malware has gained a foothold on the user’s device, amongst other
threats, it can steal a user’s private data, like credit card numbers or social security information, or at-
tempt to extort the user by encrypting her ﬁles and only disclosing the decryption key upon payment
of a ransom. Furthermore, if an attacker ﬁnds a server-side vulnerability that affects multiple web-
sites (possibly thousands), she can automate the exploitation, search for other vulnerable websites,
and launch a carefully crafted infection campaign to maximize the number of potential victims.
Reports by the security company Sophos [24, 25] show that in 2012 over 80% of all websites at-
tacking users were compromised legitimate websites, such as those of trade associations, nightclubs,
television companies or elementary schools. All of these websites had been altered, in one way or
another, to attack visitors. In another case, a range of websites hosting documentation for software
developers were modiﬁed to serve carefully crafted infection vectors that exploited client-side vul-
nerabilities, which were then leveraged as the ﬁrst stepping stone in sophisticated attacks against
Twitter [26], Facebook’s engineering team [27], and Apple [28].
Today’s challenges in detecting such infection vectors are that websites have become more dy-
namic and that their static content changes regularly, that is, the underlying infection vector might
not be easily detectable by analysis tools, or even by well-trained human security analysts. Adding
new content to the website, showing different, personalized advertisements, or even comments left
by visitors are legitimate modiﬁcations. Unwanted modiﬁcations on the other hand, that is, changes
from which a user might want herself to be protected, include the aforementioned defacements or
the insertion of an infection vector. Yet, any modiﬁcation, legitimate or unwanted, resets what we
know about the website’s behavior and forces us to reanalyze it for maliciousness, either through an
automatic detection system, or by manually inspecting any new content prior to its inclusion into
the website. Even worse, prior work in the area of web evolution [29, 30, 31, 32, 33] suggests that
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websites do not change in well-deﬁned and long intervals, but that they evolve constantly through
small changes, and, if one takes into account personalized advertisements, a change might happen at
every visit, which, in turn, makes it necessary to analyze the websites on each visit.
The state of the art in protecting a user frommaliciousweb-based content ismainly implemented
through blacklists, which are queried before the website is rendered or retrieved by the browser. The
Google Safe Browsing list [23] is likely the most prominent example. By deﬁnition, blacklists are
reactive, which is an undesirable property for a protection mechanism because a malicious website
can potentially stay undetected for an extended period. Furthermore, each website compromised
as part as an infection campaign needs to be identiﬁed and added to the blacklist separately, even
though the websites attack visitors in the same, well-known way.
This is particularly problematic because Internet services have become much more elastic with
the introduction of Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) and other as-a-Service offerings, such as those
of the popular cloud service providers Amazon Web Services (AWS) or Microsoft Azure. Indeed,
clouds have changed the entire landscape of system operations on the Internet because their elastic-
ity allows operators to rapidly allocate and use resources as needed at the stroke of a key, without
any prior commitment. While this elasticity is beneﬁcial to the clouds’ users and being credited
for spurring innovation, attackers receive the same beneﬁts, which means that they can evade reac-
tive protection, such as blacklists, more easily. Even worse, the clouds’ elasticity introduced new
blind spots and made way for entirely new attacks that exploit previously ignored effects of resource
sharing, which, for example, allow attackers to circumvent authentication to other cloud users’ re-
sources [34], or steal their cryptographic private keys [35].
In order to better assess the ramiﬁcations of these new blind spots and to understand the In-
ternet’s global state of security, the security community adopted Internet-wide security scans as a
measurement method. These measurements allow us, for instance, to estimate the global impact of
insecure conﬁgurations, shared cryptographic keys, or the scale of vulnerable software installations.
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However, the increasing growth of the Internet will render state-of-the-art methods, which rely on
exhaustive host scanning, soon unsuitable for accurate measurements: They are limited to the cur-
rent version of the Internet protocol (version 4; IPv4), but IPv4’s address space is exhausted, and the
migration to version 6 of the Internet protocol (IPv6) is inevitable. In fact, some networks, such as
the network of T-Mobile US [36], which is the third largest wireless carriers in the United States,
are IPv6-only already. These networks cannot be scanned and analyzed by current approaches be-
cause the IPv6 address space is 296 times larger than the IPv4 address space. In turn, to retain the
capability of large-scale measurements of Internet abuse and abuse potential, we need to ﬁnd new
measurement techniques. Worse yet, IPv6 introduces additional attack surface that is ripe for abuse
by miscreants because hosts previously accessible only in private networks might suddenly become
publicly accessible, and they might not be secured properly, as it is often the case for Internet of
Things devices. Indeed, a study comparing IPv6 and IPv4 security of roughly 300,000 servers and
routers already indicated that IPv6 security posture is worse than its IPv4 counterpart [37]. Without
access to the corresponding measurement techniques, we will lose the ability to understand future
large-scale Internet abuse.
In this dissertation, we aim to better understand and address large-scale Internet abuse, and to
improve visibility into the unknowns of the Internet, with the ultimate goal of making the Internet
safer. We make the following contributions in the area of Internet abuse:
• We develop two techniques to identify occurring abuse on the Internet:
– We develop Meerkat, a novel analysis method to automatically detect website deface-
ment attacks (Chapter 2). Our analysis method does not rely on manual feature engi-
neering or domain knowledge about website defacements, but it learns high-level fea-
tures from data automatically. Meerkat detects a superset of defacement attacks com-
pared to prior work, and it is more accurate.
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– WedevelopDelta, a new approach to automatically discover known and unknownweb-
basedmalware infection campaigns, assess their impact and scale, and facilitate root cause
analysis (Chapter 3). Our approach leverages that malicious behavior requires modiﬁca-
tions to be made, which Delta identiﬁes, extracts, and analyzes.
• We present Cloud Strife, a mitigation to prevent existing abuse potential, which is caused by the
increased elasticity of clouds (Chapter 4) Our mitigation stops the novel IP address use-after-
free attack, which we discovered, from being successfully exploited for TLS-based services,
for example, for phishing, impersonation attacks, or malware distribution.
• We introduce a new technique to uncover future abuse potential, that is, a technique to enumer-
ate actively used IPv6 addresses for security scanning by pruning unused parts of the IPv6
address space (Chapter 5). We then use our technique to evaluate the security posture of IPv6-
connected devices.
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Figure 1.2: Defacements reported to Zone-H and phishing pages reported to PhishTank, per month
from January 2000 to including October 2014. The drops in reported defacements in February
2002, February 2009, and March 2009 are because Zone-H was under maintenance, and they did
not accept new reports. No data is available from PhishTank earlier than October 2006, when it was
launched. The trend of an increasing number of defacements per month, as well as the gap in the
number of defacements to the number of phishing pages of a factor of up to 33x are evident.
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Detecting Website Defacements
In this chapter, we approach the problem of defacement detection from a previously unexplored an-
gle: We use computer vision techniques to recognize if a website was defaced, similarly to how a
human analyst decides if a websitewas defacedwhen viewing it in a browser. We introduceMeerkat,
a defacement detection system that requires no prior knowledge about the website’s content or its
structure, but only the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) at which it can be accessed. Upon detec-
tion of a defacement, the system notiﬁes the website operator that her website is defaced, who can
then take appropriate action. To detect defacements, Meerkat automatically learns high-level fea-
tures from screenshots of defaced websites by combining recent advances in machine learning with
techniques from computer vision. These features are then used to create models that allow for the
detection of newly-defaced websites.
We show the practicality of Meerkat on the largest website defacement dataset to date, com-
prised of 10,053,772 defacements observed between January 1998 and May 2014, and 2,554,905
legitimate websites. Overall, Meerkat achieves true positive rates between 97.422% and 98.816%,
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false positive rates between 0.547% and 1.528%, and Bayesian detection rates1 between 98.583% and
99.845%, thus signiﬁcantly outperforming existing approaches.
2.1 Motivation and Contributions
The defacement and vandalism of websites is an attack that disrupts the operation of companies and
organizations, tarnishes their brand, and plagueswebsites of all sizes, from those of large corporations
to the websites of single individuals [16, 17, 18].
In a website defacement, an attacker replaces the content of a legitimate website with some of
her own content. A website might be defaced for many different reasons and in many different ways:
An attacker might deface the website by brute-forcing the administrator’s credentials, by leveraging
a SQL injection to introduce content or code, or by hijacking the domain name. Ultimately, how-
ever, all defaced websites share one characteristic: The defacer leaves a message that is shown to the
website’s visitors instead of the legitimate content, changing the visual appearance of the website.
Unfortunately, reliably detecting such website defacements is challenging, as there are many ways
in which an attacker can tamper with the website’s appearance, including re-routing the traffic to a
different website, which does not affect the legitimate website’s content directly in any way.
According to the Malaysian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), 26.04% of all re-
ported incidents in 2013 were website defacements, but only 1.5% of the reported incidents were
defacements in 2003, and 10.81% were website defacements in 2007 [38, 39]. This surge and the
increase in defacements and cyber-vandalism is generally attributed to the rise of hacktivist groups,
like anonymous or LulzSec [40, 41], but also gained traction through the escalation of national and
international conﬂicts [42, 43]. Although the scientiﬁc consensus is that the attacks employed to de-
face a website are rather primitive [40], hacktivist groups as well as other politically and religiously-
1The Bayesian detection rate is the likelihood that if we detect a website as defaced, it actually is defaced, that is,
P(true positive|positive).
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motivated defacers have been extremely successful recently: In February 2015, Google Vietnamwas
defaced by Lizard Squad and remained defaced for several hours [44]; in January 2015, the website
of Malaysia Airlines was defaced by Cyber Caliphate [18]; in late 2014, the defacer group Team Sys-
tem Dz defaced over 1,700 websites to speak out against the actions of the US in the Syrian civil war
and to advocate for ISIS/ISIL [17]; in April 2014, over 100 websites belonging to the government
and major companies in Zambia were defaced by Syrian and Saudi Arabian defacers to voice against
the Western world’s “meddling” in the Syrian civil war [45]; in January 2014, the website of the
popular mobile game Angry Birds was defaced in protest of governmental spying by the NSA and
GHCQ [46]; and in October 2013, a Pakistani defacer group gained access to the domain registrars
of Suriname, Antigua & Barbados, and Saint Lucia and defaced the regional websites of Audi, AVG,
BlackBerry, BMW, Canon, Coca-Cola, Fujitsu, Hitachi, Honda, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Samsung,
Symantec, Rolls-Royce, Vodafone, and other companies for “bragging rights” [47]. Yet, website
vandalism is still being played down as a problem, instead of being acknowledged and addressed.
Overall, attackers conﬁrmedly defaced over 53,000 websites ranked on Alexa’s, MajesticSEO’s,
and QuantCast’s top 1 million lists in 2014, which shows that not only websites that are consider-
ing “low-hanging fruit” are being defaced, but that high-proﬁle ones are being attacked alike (see
Table 2.1). While the list of prominent defacements goes on [19, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56],
it is important to note that most techniques to deface a website, like code and data injection attacks,
improper access control, or DNS hijacking and poisoning, have been well-studied and protection
mechanisms have been proposed by prior work [57, 58]. However, it is also extremely hard to pro-
tect against all defacement attacks simultaneously and at scale. Even worse, organizations are often
responsible for hundreds (or thousands) of different websites, with different levels of security [40].
A single insecure website that is defaced, however, can inﬂict signiﬁcant harm on the organization:
in qualitative terms because of the loss of reputation, and in quantitative terms because of the cost of
having to investigate and remove the defacement.
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Month Website
Alexa MajesticSEO QuantCast Page Views
per Month ÈUS Global TLD1 Global US
Nov 2014
princeton.edu 999 3,412 17 273 3,444 796,000
volvo.com 54,607 57,046 3,757 7,323 568,058 -
cca.gov.in2 146,0393 780,660 - - - -
Aug 2014 openelec.tv 7,226
4 48,754 184 93,894 - -
omicsonline.org 7,5613 42,030 5,068 63,924 - -
Jul 2014
ct.gov 2,454 10,976 72 2,054 3,548 809,000
us.to 2,8465 28,100 18 11,061 - -
sunnewsonline.com 686 9,958 31,315 58,277 236,740 -
newsmoments.in 3,725 39,262 - - - -
Jun 2014 wordpress.net 3,5227 41,295 1,410 28,021 321,317 -
May 2014 arynews.tv 72
8 5,308 949 536,436 - -
sundaytimes.lk 1209 38,591 6 39,866 209,083 -
Mar 2014 taylorswift.com 3,560 23,425 12,161 23,608 15,678 1.2 milliongbjobs.com 79810 9,181 - - - -
Dec 2013 openssl.net 5,994 16,409 80 933 - -
Oct 2013
avg.com 117 155 471 854 - 37 million
aljazeera.net 2511 1,831 37 920 2,196 28 million
bitdefender.com 5,934 5,898 1,132 2,094 3,963 1.4 million
avira.com 2412 1,108 1,275 2,361 6,081 480,000
leaseweb.com 3594 4,035 23,585 44,451 230,626 -
metasploit.com 124,365 175,570 33,537 59,816 120,839 -
2011-201314
telegraph.co.uk 2113 225 3 107 613 125 million
ups.com 71 231 319 549 101 40 million
nationalgeographic.com 483 1,006 94 139 125 37 million
acer.com 4,060 6,042 - - 1,995 2.9 million
theregister.co.uk 2,737 3,457 443 14 11,327 1 million
vodafone.com 7,05213 20,625 5,833 2,980 101,624 -
Table 2.1: Recent high-proﬁle websites that were defaced, with their respective page rank according to Alexa, MajesticSEO, andQuantCast, and their
monthly page impressions. These defacements were reported to Zone-H and include a major logistics company (UPS), computer and information
security vendors (BitDefender, Avira, AVG, MetaSploit), news websites (Al Jazeera, Ary News, News Moments, Sunday Times, Sun News Online,
Telegraph, TheRegister), a scientiﬁc society (National Geographic), a hardware vendor (Acer), theworld’s second largest telecommunications provider
(Vodafone), a singer-songwriter/actress (Taylor Swift), the state of Connecticut (ct.gov), an Indian federal ministry (cca.gov.in), an auto-mobile com-
pany (Volvo), an ivy-league university (Princeton), well-known open source projects (OpenSSL, OpenELEC), and a hosting provider (Leaseweb).
Missing ﬁelds represent unavailable data, data is unavailable due to being kept secret by the website operators or requiring subscriptions to Alexa,
MajesticSEO or QuantCast.
1 Top-level domain rank 2 Government of India, Ministry of Communications & Information Technology 3 Rank in India
4 Rank in Netherlands 5 Rank in Indonesia 6 Rank in Nigeria 7 Rank in Bulgaria 8 Rank in Pakistan 9 Rank in Sri Lanka
10 Rank in China 11 Rank in Yemen 12 Rank in Iran 13 Rank in United Kingdom 14 Selected high-proﬁle website defacements from
Fortune 50 and Global 500 companies between 2011 to 2013
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Prior work on website defacements detection focused on detecting unauthorized changes to the
web server, for example, via host-based intrusion detection systems or ﬁle-based integrity checks.
However, most previous approaches lack the capabilities to detect the most prevailing defacement
techniques used today: code or data injection attacks, and DNS hijacking. This is because these
attacks do not actually modify the code or conﬁguration of the website, but instead they introduce
new content or redirect the user to a different website.
Although defacements can inﬂict serious harm on the website operator, a two-month study by
Bartoli et al. [59] shows thatmanywebsite operators still react slowly to defacements with an average
response time of over 72 hours. Moreover, their study ﬁnds that mere 24% of the defaced websites
were restored within one day, about 50% defacements were removed within the ﬁrst week, while
more than 37% of the websites remained defaced for over two weeks. Overall, their ﬁndings suggest
that prior website defacement protection techniques and detection methods have not been widely
adopted, likely because they are not comprehensive and miss some classes of attacks.
The logical ﬁrst step to reduce the harm inﬂicted by defacements on the website operator is to
provide her means to quickly and comprehensively detect if her website has been defaced, so that she can
put the website in maintenance mode or restore its content to a known good state. As such, an au-
tomatic, accurate, thorough, and lightweight defacement detection system that monitors websites,
notiﬁes the website’s operator, and acts as an early warning system is desired. In this chapter, we in-
troduce such a system,Meerkat, which is a monitoring system that automatically detects if a website
has been defaced. Meerkat detects website defacements by rendering the website in a browser, like a
human visitor would, and deciding, based on features learned exclusively from screenshots of deface-
ments and legitimate websites observed in the past, if the website’s look and feel is that of a defaced or a
legitimate website. If the website is detected as being defaced, the system notiﬁes the operator, who,
in turn, can, depending on the conﬁdence in Meerkat’s decision, put the website (automatically) in
maintenance mode or restore a known good state to reduce the damage.
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We make the following contributions:
• We introduceMeerkat, a website defacement detection system that learns a high-level feature
set from the visual representation of the website, that is, it learns a compressed representation
of the look and feel of website defacements and legitimate websites. Based on the learned fea-
tures, the system then produces a model to differentiate between defaced and legitimate web-
sites, which it uses to detect website defacements in the wild. In addition, the system notiﬁes
the website’s operator upon detection.
• We evaluate Meerkat on the largest website defacement dataset to date, spanning 10,053,772
website defacements observed between January 1998 to May 2014, and 2,554,905 legitimate
and (supposedly) not defacedwebsites from theAlexa,MajesticSEO, andQuantCast top 1mil-
lion lists.
In the remainder of this chapter, we describe how Meerkat works in detail (Section 2.2), evaluate
our system on the largest defacement dataset to date (Section 2.3), discuss some limitations ofwebsite
defacement detection systems (Section 2.4), and, ﬁnally, we conclude (Section 2.5).
2.2 Approach
The approach Meerkat takes to detect website defacements is fundamentally different from prior
work for three reasons. First, while the system does leverage machine learning for classiﬁcation, it
does not rely on handpicked features that were selected based on prior domain knowledge, that is,
it requires no feature engineering. Instead, Meerkat relies on recent advances in machine learning,
stacked autoencoders, to learn high-level features directly from data. Second, Meerkat does not
require the website operator to supply any information other than the domain name at which her
website can be accessed. We designed our system in this way because other defacement detection
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systems that require the operator to deﬁne keywords and other metadata, provide a reference version
of her website, or describe the website’s legitimate content, have rarely been adopted. By reducing
the effort required from the website operator to actually use a defacement detection system, we
hope to improve on this situation. Finally, Meerkat approaches defacement detection visually. The
system analyzes the look and feel of the website and how a user would experience it by rendering it
in a web browser and analyzing a screenshot of the website, instead of analyzing its source code or
content.
Approaching the problem of detecting website defacements visually has several advantages over
analyzing the source code or content of a website. Some defacements rely heavily on JavaScript and
Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) to stylize the defacement, which all must be analyzed in an overarch-
ing browser context, and others again rely heavily on images. In fact, similar to spam, phishing, and
many scams, defacements often do not contain much textual content, but include images to display
text instead [60], thus they trivially evade text-based detection approaches. Furthermore, the source
code of two websites can be vastly different, yet they appear the same to the human eye when ren-
dered in a browser. Therefore, leveraging prior work, to analyze the DOM tree, the website’s code,
or parts thereof, is unlikely to be successful when trying to detect website defacements accurately,
which is whywe opted for a perceptual approach that does not suffer from the aforementioned prob-
lems.
Following, we describe howMeerkat learns from defacements and legitimate websites, and how
it detects defacements in the wild. Next, we motivate the structure of our deep neural network
brieﬂy, then, we discuss the concept and motivation of ﬁne-tuning the network, then, we provide
some notes on our implementation, and, last, we brieﬂy recap how Meerkat can be deployed in
practice.
15
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2.2.1 Training and Detection
Before Meerkat can be trained, two crucial parameters must be selected that determine how and
from what data the system learns the look and feel of defacements:
Window Size.
Meerkat is not trained onwhole screenshots ofwebsites, but on awindow“into” eachwebsite
(i.e., only a part of the screenshot), thus we must select the size of these representative windows.
Some important considerations must be made before picking the size of the windows that we
extract.
A small window can be more accurate because it might only contain the exact representative
part of the defacement but not any noise, like an irrelevant background color. However, if
the windows are too small, the systemwill also have more false positives because the windows
are not representative of defacements; instead, they are representative for only parts of the
defacements, which might also occur in legitimate websites.
On the other hand, when using larger windows, it will take signiﬁcantly longer to train the
network initially, but the network might learn a more accurate model. However, if the win-
dows are too large, then the system will learn about speciﬁc kinds of defacements in-detail
and overﬁt. For example, the system might learn that two defacements are different, while
the two defacements are actually the same but have a slightly different, dynamically-generated
background image.
Considering the trade-offs for different window sizes, for our implementation, we decided to
extract windows that are 160160 pixels in size. Our evaluation later shows that this window
size works well in practice to detect website defacements (Section 2.3). We brieﬂy explored
other window sizes, like 3030, which fared worse.
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Window Extraction Strategy.
The strategy to extract the representative window from a screenshot is fundamental to learn
the look and feel of defacements and legitimatewebsites. If thewindows are extracted according
to some poorly chosen strategy, then we expect the classiﬁcation accuracy to be poor as well.
For instance, if the strategy always extracts the part of a website that is just a plain background,
then the system will only detect plain backgrounds. Therefore, it is crucial that the window
extraction strategy is chosen well, and we compare some suitable strategies, like extracting
the window always from the center or at random, later (Section 2.2.1).
After selecting these parameters carefully, the system can be trained. This is where most of the
complexity of Meerkat lies. The training phase works as follows:
1. We collect a considerable amount of labeled legitimate websites and defacements, and we ex-
tract their graphic representation (i.e., a screenshot of the browser window; Section 2.2.1).
2. For each sample, we extract the 160160 representative window from each screenshot ac-
cording to the selected extraction strategy (see Section 2.2.1).
3. The representative windows are ﬁrst used to learn the features of our approach, and then to
learn the model for classiﬁcation, for which we use a neural network (see Section 2.2.2).
Once the neural network is trained, Meerkat detects defacements in the wild. Its detection phase
consists of only two steps, on which we expand later:
1. The website is visited with a browser to retrieve a representative screenshot (Section 2.2.1).
2. A slidingwindow approach is used to check if the website is defaced and, if so, an alert is raised
(Section 2.2.1).
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Screenshot Collection
The ﬁrst step to detect if a website has been defaced based on its look and feel is to collect a screenshot
of how thewebsite looks for a normal visitor. Meerkat visits thewebsite with a browser that renders
thewebsite like any other browser would, and takes a screenshot once the browser ﬁnished rendering
the website. In our implementation, we use PhantomJS to collect the screenshots of the websites.
PhantomJS is a headless browser based on the WebKit layout engine that renders websites (nearly)
identical to Safari or Google Chrome. PhantomJS also executes included JavaScript code, renders
Cascading Style Sheets (CSS), and includes dynamic content, such as advertisements, like a browser
that a human would use.
Another important aspect in collecting a representative screenshot of a website with a headless
browser is the resolution of the simulated screen. The resolution of the display is important when
collecting screenshots because many websites render differently for different screen sizes, such as for
mobile devices, tablets, small laptops, or large displays. In our case, we decided to ﬁx the resolution
to 1600900 pixels, which is a display resolution often found in budget and mid-range laptops.
Window Extraction Techniques
For training the system, after collecting the screenshots, we need to extract a representative window
from each screenshot so that we can train the neural network to detect defacements. Various tech-
niques can be used to extract the representative window, which can be grouped into deterministic
and non-deterministic techniques. Hereinafter, we discuss the trade-offs for four possible techniques:
(i) selecting the center window, (ii) selecting n non-overlapping windows according to some mea-
sure (explained later), (iii) uniformly selecting the window at random, and (iv) randomly sampling
the window’s center from a Gaussian distribution for the x and y dimension separately.
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Deterministic Window Extraction The most straightforward deterministic technique is to al-
ways extracts the window from the center of the screenshot of the website. However, this makes
evading the system trivial. Generally, if an attacker can accurately predict the window that will be
extracted, he can force the system to learn about defacements poorly, and, in turn, deteriorate clas-
siﬁcation performance drastically. Therefore, such a simple technique is unsuitable for a detection
system in an adversarial context.
Alternatively, one can extract the window according to some measure. Identifying the most
representative window according to a measure (e.g., the Shannon entropy), however, forces us to
compute it for all possible windows and then pick the top ranking one. In turn, for a 1600900
screenshot and a 160160window, wewould need to evaluate over one million candidate windows
for each sample in the dataset. In total, for our dataset, this would require over 13 trillion computa-
tions of the measure just to extract the representative windows. Clearly, this is impractical.
Nonetheless, a deterministic selection strategy based on a clever measure can increase the accu-
racy of the system, and it can also be extended trivially to extract multiple top-ranking windows at
no additional cost. However, using more than one window per sample increases the dataset size by
a factor of n and prolongs training time. Therefore, n would have to be chosen carefully.
Taking into account the trade-offs the different deterministic extraction strategies bear (increased
training and detection time, ease of evasion, or computationally impractical) and considering that
a comprehensive evaluation of them would require at least an order of magnitude of additional ex-
periments,2 we decided to select a non-deterministic extraction strategy that follows intuition and
is based on user interface and user experience design principles instead. This selection makes our
classiﬁcation performance a lower bound: Other window extraction strategies might be more accu-
2Performing these additional experimentswould require at least sixmonths just in computational time on our current
GPU infrastructure, which is why we decided against performing them.
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rate and/or robust, but (at the same time) they also incur signiﬁcant additional cost at training and
detection time.
Non-deterministicWindowExtraction Arelatively straightforward non-deterministic strategy
to extract a window from a screenshot is to select it uniformly at random. However, one cannot
simply take any point from the website’s screenshot as the center of the window. Instead, it must
be sampled so that the whole window contains only valid data, forcing us to sample its center from
the interval [80,1520] for x and [80,820] for y (these intervals are speciﬁc to the screenshot size
(1600900) and window size (160160)). Therefore, pixels at the border have a slightly lower
probability to occur in a window than those in the center. Although this is an unintended side effect,
it has negligible impact in practice because the center of a website is more likely to be descriptive
anyways. Alternatively, we could create an “inﬁnite” image bywrapping the screenshot at its borders,
whichwould, however, yield artifacts becausewewould combine parts of the top of thewebsitewith
parts of the bottom (and left and right, respectively), resulting in windows that do not occur on the
real website, which, in turn, might disturb or confuse detection.
Alternatively to selecting the window’s center uniformly at random, one can sample it from
any other distribution, discretizing the sampled point. For instance, from a Gaussian distribution to
extract windows frommostly the center of the screenshot, but not extracting from it exclusively. A
focus on the center of the website is often desirable because it is likely to be more descriptive of the
website’s look and feel. For robustness, however, we also want to the system to not learn exclusively
from the center but to also learn about defacements that occur at the border of thewebsite. Therefore,
for our implementation, we extract a single window per website with a Gaussian extraction strategy
with x = 800 and x = 134.63975 for x and y = 450 and y = 61.00864 for y , so that the
windows at the border of the screenshot have a lower probability to be sampled but are not ignored
completely. If x and y values outside of the screenshot are sampled, we simply resample the value
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for x or y respectively. We selected these speciﬁc  and  values so that we sample values outside
of the screenshot only with likelihood 0.0001%.
Defacement Detection
After Meerkat has been trained on a set of extracted windows, it can detect if a website has been
defaced. Detecting website defacements with Meerkat is conceptually simple:
1. We visit the website that we want to check with our browser, and we take a screenshot of the
rendered website (see Section 2.2.1).
2. We apply a standard sliding window detection approach on the screenshot we took to check
if a part of the screenshot is detected as being defaced, similarly to prior work in image classi-
ﬁcation [61].
3. If a window is detected to be a defacement by Meerkat, we raise an alert and inform the
website operator that her website has been defaced.
Note that Meerkat does not compare a possibly-defaced website to an older, legitimate version of it,
and, thus, does not need to analyze or store an older version. Instead, it detects defacements solely
by examining how the current version looks like.
Exclusively to improve performance, instead of starting in a corner of the screenshot, our system
starts in the center and moves outward. This behavior is motivated by the fact that the center of
the website is likely more descriptive, and our training set was focused on the center region of the
screenshots. This does not mean, however, that Meerkat misses defacements that are at the border
of a website, they will be detected when the sliding window reaches the actually-defaced part, the
border. The same is also true if a website is only partially defaced: once the sliding window reaches
the defaced area, Meerkat detects that the website is defaced.
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Figure 2.1: Meerkat architecture
Additionally, a special case worth mentioning is that a legitimate website might show a large
promotional screen or an advertisement with the same intention of a website defacer: attracting at-
tention. In turn, such a promotional screen might be similar in its look and feel to that of a website
defacement. While Meerkat might currently (theoretically) mislabel them as defacements, our eval-
uation shows that they do not matter much (Section 2.3). Furthermore, if they start to matter at one
point in the future, it is straightforward to consider them: the defacement engine can make use of
an advertisement blocker, and the website operator could whitelist the system to not be shown any
promotional screens.
2.2.2 Neural Network Structure
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss the design of our deep neural network and how the different layers
of the network interact with the input image. The structure of our deep neural networkwas notably
inspired by prior work by Le at al. [62], Krizhevsky et al. [63], Sermanet et al. [61], and Girshick et
al. [64]. We refer to them for further details.
The main components of our deep neural network are autoencoders, which we stack on top of
each other, and a standard feed-forward neural network. Autoencoders are a special type of neural
network that are used for unsupervised learning. The goal of an autoencoder is to ﬁnd a compressed,
possibly approximated encoding/representation of the input, which can be used to remove noise
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from the input, or, when autoencoders are stacked, they can learn high-level features directly from
the input, like where edges in an image are, or if cats or human faces are part of an image [62].
Overall, the structure of our deep neural network is based on the following idea: First, we use
a stacked autoencoder to denoise the input image and learn a compressed representation of both
defaced and legitimate websites, that is, we leverage the stacked autoencoder to learn high-level
features, similar to Le et al. [62]; and, second, we utilize a feed-forward neural networkwith dropout
for classiﬁcation, similar to Krizhevsky et al. [63].
The initial layer of our stacked autoencoder is composed of local receptive ﬁelds. This layer
is motivated by the need to scale the autoencoders to large images [65, 66, 62, 67, 68], this layer
groups parts of the image to connect to the next layer of the autoencoder, instead of allowing the
whole image to be used as input to each node of the following layer. It takes 20,164 (1422) sub-
images of size 1818 as input, extracted at a stride of 1 from the 160160 representative window
(see Figure 2.1; note that each pixel in each sub-image has three dimensions for the three colors: red,
green, and blue). The second layer of our stacked autoencoder employs L2 pooling to denoise local
deformations of the image and to learn invariant features [69, 67, 70, 71]. Finally, the last layer of
our autoencoder performs local contrast normalization for robustness [72].
The output of the stacked autoencoder is then used as the input to a feed-forward neural network
with dropout that provides a 2-way softmax output. The 2-way softmax output corresponds to
the two classes that we want to detect: defaced websites and legitimate websites. We use dropout
in our deep neural network to prevent overﬁtting of the network, and to force it to learn more
robust features by preventing neurons to rely on other neurons of the network being available (i.e.,
to prevent the co-adaptation of neurons) [73].
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2.2.3 Fine-Tuning the Network’s Parameters
In an adversarial context, such as when trying to detect if an attacker defaced a website, concept
drift can be introduced intentionally by the attacker and impede the accuracy of the detection sys-
tem drastically. Furthermore, concept drift also occurs naturally, such as when the style of deface-
ments evolves over time in such a way that the features cannot distinguish between legitimate and
defacement anymore. Therefore, concept drift can be a severe limitation of any detection system, if
it is not taken into account and addressed properly.
Meerkat can deal with concept drift in two different, fully-automatic ways: ﬁne-tuning the net-
work’s parameters (adjusting feature weights), and retraining the entire network on new data. While
the latter is conceptually straightforward and addresses all kinds of concept drift, it is computation-
ally expensive. The former, on the other hand, allows us to deal with some forms of concept drift
gracefully and is computationally much less expensive. However, it requires some further attention:
when ﬁne-tuning the neural network, Meerkat does not learn new features, but adjusts how impor-
tant the already learned features are. Therefore, ﬁne-tuning cannot address major concept drift for
which the already learned features do not model defacements accurately anymore. Instead, whenwe
ﬁne-tune the network’s parameters, we adjust the already learned weights of the deeper layers of the
neural network so that new observations of defacements and legitimate websites are classiﬁed prop-
erly. As such, ﬁne-tuning the network to maintain an accurate detection performance requires no
additional information about the websites at all, but only defacements and legitimate websites that
were not part of the training set before.
Conceptually speaking, when ﬁne-tuning the network given new defacements and legitimate
websites, we search for a better and, given the new data, more optimal set of weights in the space of
all possible weights. To do so more efficiently, instead of initializing the weights at random, we
initialize them based on the previously-learned weights.
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2.2.4 Implementation
We implemented a prototype of Meerkat using Python and the “Convolutional Architecture for
Fast Feature Embedding” (Caffe) framework by Jia et al. [74]. Caffe was used because of its high-
performance and ease of use, however, it does not offer all functionality that our neural network
requires and some modiﬁcations were made.
Overall, the general architecture ofMeerkat is embarrassingly parallel: the screenshot collection
engine is completely separate from the detection engine except for providing its input. For instance,
to quickly collect the screenshots of all websites, we utilized 125 machines (with 2 cores and 2 GiB
memory each), and collection peaked at about 300 screenshots per second. Similarly, once the neu-
ral network has been trained, the learned parameters can be distributed to multiple machines and
detection can be scaled out horizontally, and, although the system is trained on a GPU, once trained,
the detection engine does not require a GPU and can run on common CPUs instead.
Training the system, on the other hand, is not parallelized to multiple machines yet, but some
clever tricks can be used to reduce training time signiﬁcantly [63], which we leave for future work.
2.2.5 Real-world Deployment
Meerkat’s main deployment is as a monitoring service, acting as an early warning system for website
defacements, to which a website operator subscribes with only the URL at which his website can
be reached. For each monitored website, the system regularly checks, such as every few minutes
(or even seconds), that the website is not defaced. If it detects it as being defaced, it notiﬁes the
website’s operator, who, in turn, depending on the conﬁdence in the warning, manually investigates,
or automatically puts the website in maintenance mode or restores a known good state. Acting as an
early warning system,Meerkat reduces the reaction time to defacements from hours, days, and even
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weeks (see Section 2.1) down to minutes (or even seconds), and, therefore, it reduces the damage
inﬂicted on the website’s operator by the defacement signiﬁcantly.
Furthermore, Meerkat can also reduce human labor: currently, Zone-H manually vets all sub-
missions for defacements [21], of which nearly two-thirds are invalid. Meerkat automates this sig-
niﬁcant amount of work.
2.3 Evaluation
We evaluate our implementation of Meerkat in various settings. However, ﬁrst, we provide details
on what data our dataset is composed of, and how we partition it to simulate various defacement
scenarios.
Our evaluation scenarios are traditional and simulations of real-world events, such as a new de-
facer group emerging, or how the system’s accuracy changes over time, with andwithout ﬁne-tuning
the neural network.
In our experiments, a true positive is a website defacement being detected as a defacement and a
true negative is a legitimate website being detected as legitimate. Correspondingly, a false positive is
a legitimate website that is being detected as being defaced, and a false negative is a defacement being
detected as being legitimate.
2.3.1 Dataset
The dataset on which we evaluate Meerkat contains data from two different sources. First, it in-
cludes a comprehensive dataset of 10,053,772 defacements observed from January 1998 to May 9,
2014. We obtained this data through a subscription from Zone-H, but it is also freely available
from http://zone-h.org under a more restrictive license. From those defacements, 9,258,176
defacements were veriﬁed manually by Zone-H [21]. The remaining 795,596 website defacements
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were pending veriﬁcation, and we do not include them in our dataset. Second, our dataset contains
2,554,905 unique (supposedly) undefaced websites from the top 1 million lists fromAlexa, Majestic-
SEO, and QuantCast.3 Note that we cannot be certain that the legitimate websites in our dataset are
not defaced, and since manual veriﬁcation is impractical at such a large scale, the true negative rate
is actually a lower bound and the false positive rate is an upper bound, correspondingly. In layman’s
terms: the system might be more accurate than our results suggest.4
To accurately evaluate the classiﬁcation performance of Meerkat in a real-world deployment,
we report its accuracy in three different scenarios:
• Traditional, to compare to prior work, that is, by performing 10-fold cross-validation by sam-
pling from all data uniformly at random, so that each bin contains 925,817 defacements and
255,490 legitimate websites.
• Reporter, to simulate a new defacer emerging, that is, by performing 10-fold cross-validation
on the reporters of a defacement and including only their defacements in their respective bin.
Legitimate website are sampled from the legitimate data uniformly at random.
• Time-wise, to evaluate the practicality of our approach in a real-world setting, that is, we
start by training the system on all data from December 2012 to December 2013, and, then,
we detect defacements from January to May 2014. We report the system’s detection accuracy
for each month.
We evaluate our system in these settings to prevent a positive skew of our results that might be the
result of the different evaluation method and how the dataset is composed. For instance, a reporter
3The list of all 2,554,905 legitimate websites included in our dataset is available upon request.
4Over 191,000 website in our legitimate dataset have been defaced at one point in the past, thus, it is likely that some
of them are actually defaced and therefore mislabeled; thus, if classiﬁed correctly as a defacement by Meerkat, they
appear as false positives in our results.
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of a defacement might introduce an inherit bias to the distribution of the defacement by only re-
porting the defacements of one speciﬁc defacer (such as themselves), or there might be a bias in how
defacements and how the web evolved. Those potential pitfalls might skew the results positively or
negatively and must be considered for an accurate comparison to prior work.5
Finally, to account for the different number of samples of legitimate websites (2,554,905) and
defaced websites (10,053,772), we report the Bayesian detection rate [75]. The Bayesian detection
rate is normalized to the number of samples and corresponds to the likelihood if we detect a website
as being defaced, it is actually defaced (the likelihood of a positive prediction being correct, that is a
true positive; that is, P(true positive|positive)).
2.3.2 Features Learned
The features that Meerkat learns depend on the data it is being trained on. Although one can treat
the system as a black-box and not worry about its internal details, understanding how it comes to
its ﬁnal decision helps to reason about its robustness and to understand how difficult the system is to
evade or to estimate when the system must be retrained to retain its accuracy. In our experiments,
Meerkat learned various features automatically and directly from image data, of which we manu-
ally grouped some on a higher, more conceptual level. We manually identiﬁed the learned features
by evaluating which representative windows activate the same neuron of the neural network, that is,
which windows trigger the same feature to be recognized byMeerkat. Note that all the features we
discuss hereinafter have been learned automatically from data and no domain knowledge whatsoever
was required to learn and use these features; yet, the overlap with features that an analyst with do-
5We cannot compare prior work (Section 6.1) on our dataset directly as they do not scale to its size, and we cannot
compare on their datasets because they are too small to train Meerkat accurately.
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main knowledge would use conﬁrms the prospects of feature/representational learning for website
defacement detection. Some of the learned features can be best described as:
Defacement Group Logos.
Meerkat learned to recognize the individual logos of some of the most proliﬁc defacement
groups directly (see Figure 2.2). Clearly, the logos of the defacer groups themselves are ex-
tremely descriptive of website defacements because they are very unlikely to be included in
legitimate websites.
Color Combinations.
Meerkat also learned to recognize unique or speciﬁc color combinations indicative of legiti-
mate and defaced websites, including but not limited to one of the most prominent combina-
tions: bright red or green text on a black background, which is an often used color combina-
tion by defacers, but rarely seen on legitimate websites. On the other hand, small black text
on a white or brightly colored background is being consulted as a non-deﬁnitive indicator for
a legitimate, non-defaced website.
Letter Combinations.
Interestingly, defacers often not only mix colors, but also mix characters from different alpha-
bets right next to each other, such as Arabic or Cyrillic script being mixed with Latin script,
to promote their message in both their native language and also in English as the web’s lingua
franca. Additionally, sometimes the defacement contains characters in a character set encoding
speciﬁc to the defacer’s native language, like ISO-8859-13 for Baltic languages or Windows-
1256 for Arabic. As such, characters appear differently or are replaced by special characters if
the browser does not support it, or if the website does not specify the character set and if the
browser’s fallback is different (like in our case, as we fall back to UTF-8), resulting in a look
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and feel that is descriptive of defacements, and, correspondingly, it was automatically learned
by Meerkat.
Leetspeak.
Similarly to letter combinations, Meerkat learned that defacers often use “leetspeak,” an En-
glish alphabet in which some characters are replaced by numbers or special characters (e.g.,
“leetspeak” as “1337sp34k”) and in which some words are deliberately misspelled (“owned”
as “pwned,” “the” as “teh,” or “hax0red” instead of “hacked”). Defacers often use leetspeak
to discern themselves from “common folks,” and to show that they are “elite” and special,
which, in turn, makes it often a good indicator that a website has indeed been defaced.
Typographical and Grammatical Errors.
While some typographical mistakes are deliberate (as in the case of leetspeak, see above), many
defacers make other unintentional typographical and grammatical mistakes, which rarely oc-
curred on the legitimate websites in our dataset. Many defacers make these mistakes most
likely because they are non-native English speakers (the country of the reporter of the deface-
ment, part of the meta-data in our dataset, suggests that most defacers do not speak English
as their ﬁrst language). Meerkat learned to detect some of these mistakes at training and
values them as a supporting indicator of a website defacement. Some of the examples of (sup-
posedly) unintentional typographical and grammatical errors include “greats to” (instead of
“greets to”), “goals is” (instead of “goals are”), or “visit us in our website” (instead of “visit
our website”).
Note that, since Meerkat works on image data, the system is unaware that it analyzes text and the
textual features, such as unique letter combinations, leetspeak, or typographical and grammatical
errors, are actually being evaluated on rendered text. As such, it seems likely that the textual fea-
tures are speciﬁc to the font, possibly overﬁtting on the speciﬁc font type. However, we manually
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Figure 2.2: Example representativewindows of defacement group logos thatMeerkat learned to rec-
ognized to be a signiﬁcant indicator for defacements. Note that Meerkat also recognizes variations
and that there are many other features used for classiﬁcation.
conﬁrmed that the system actually learned a more robust feature and is not overﬁtting: it combines
slight variances in the font family and size in a single high-level feature. Furthermore, given the slid-
ing window approach Meerkat employs for detection, the features are also completely independent
of the position of the text in the representative window and website.
While some of the learned features can be evaded theoretically, evading them almost always con-
tradicts the defacer’s goal: Making a name for themselves in the most “stylish” and personalized way
possible, thus, it is unlikely that these features will change drastically in the near future. Further-
more, Meerkat also consults features that were not as easy to discern into high-level feature groups
manually, such as artifacts unique to legitimate or defaced websites, or features that are indicative
for one group but are not deﬁnitive because they might appear more often in defaced websites, but
also sometimes legitimately. Meerkat can also be retrained easily and new features are learned au-
tomatically once the old features do not model defacements accurately anymore (i.e., if the concept
of a defacement drifted signiﬁcantly). Finally, since Meerkat uses a non-linear classiﬁer to combine
those features, it can learn more complex models about defacements and legitimate websites, and
simply evading only some features will not be sufficient to evade detection.
Interestingly, some high-level features (letter and color combinations) that Meerkat learned au-
tomatically from data have been leveraged to a smaller degree by prior work [76, 77] (through man-
ual feature engineering), while others (logos, leetspeak, and typographical mistakes) had not been
utilized yet. Further suggesting that representation learning and inspection of the learned features
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can yield important insight into security challenges that were dominated by feature engineering in
the past, such as intrusion, malware, or phishing detection.
2.3.3 Traditional Split
First, for an accurate comparison to prior work, we evaluate Meerkat on our dataset using 10-fold
cross-validation, that is, we split the dataset into 10 bins that contain 925,817 website defacements
and 255,490 legitimate websites each. Note that we discard six website defacements and ﬁve legit-
imate websites from our dataset at random to have the same number of samples in each bin. Next,
for each bin, we train the system on the other nine bins (training bins) and measure its classiﬁcation
performance on the 10th bin (test bin). Considering the 10 different 90% training and 10% test-
set partitions of our dataset separately, Meerkat achieves true positive rates between 97.422% and
98.375%, and false positive rates ranging from 0.547% to 1.419%. The Bayesian detection rate is
between 99.603% and 99.845%.
More interestingly, as a partition-independent measure of the system’s classiﬁcation perfor-
mance, the average true positive rate is 97.878%, the average false positive rate is 1.012%, and the
average Bayesian detection rate is 99.716%. If Meerkat detects a defacement and raises an alert, with
likelihood 99.716% it is a website defacement. Therefore, Meerkat is signiﬁcantly outperforming
current state-of-the-art approaches.
2.3.4 Reporter Split
For the reporter split, we partition our dataset by the reporter of the defacedwebsite. We deliberately
designed the experiment this way to show that Meerkat is not overﬁtting on speciﬁc defacements,
which our results verify.
While a partition by reporter might seem counter-intuitive at ﬁrst, it becomes clear that such a
split ismeaningful and that it can be used to evaluate that a newdefacer group emerges once it is taken
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into account that these groups often have unique defacement designs and that defaced websites are
most often reported by the defacers themselves. Therefore, if we split by reporter, we are practically
splitting by defacer group. Meaning, we create themost difficult scenario for a defacement detection
system: detecting a defacer and her defacement style although we have never seen defacements from
him/her before.
In the same way as for the traditional split, we employ 10-fold cross-validation. However, we
do so slightly differently: ﬁrst, we separate the reporters of the defacements into 10 bins uniformly
at random (each bin containing 7,602 reporters). Second, we construct the corresponding deface-
ment bins, that is, we construct a defacement bin for each reporter bin so that it contains only the
defacements reported by these reporters. For each bin, we then trainMeerkat on the remaining nine
bins and use the 10th bin for testing. Note that the defacement bins contain a different number of
samples, simply because the number of reported defacements varies per reporter (see Table 2.2). We
account for the uneven distribution of defacements by reporting the average true positive and false
positive rate weighted by the number of samples.
Overall, when simulating the emergence of a new defacer, Meerkat achieves a true positive rate
of 97.882% and a false positive rate of 1.528% if bins are weighted, and 97.933% and 1.546% if they
are not (see Figure 2.3; the true positive rate is between 97.061% and 98.465%, the false positive
rate is between 0.661% and 2.564%). The Bayesian detection rates for the reporter split are 99.567%
(unweighted) and 99.571% (weighted) respectively (per split, the Bayesian detection rate is between
99.286% and 99.814%).
2.3.5 Time-wise Split
The time-wise experiment evaluates howwellMeerkat detects website defacements in thewild, that
is, in a real-world deployment. Here, we train the system on defacements seen in the past, and we
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Bin Defacements Legitimate Websites
1 1,116,808 308,202
2 992,232 273,823
3 712,270 196,563
4 907,306 250,387
5 696,069 192,092
6 734,208 202,617
7 1,276,764 352,345
8 789,895 217,985
9 979,309 270,257
10 1,053,147 290,634
Total 9,258,008 2,554,905
Table 2.2: Number of samples per cross-validation bins used for the reporter split. The total number
of defacements in the reporter split contains fewer defacements than available in thewhole dataset be-
cause otherwise reporters would be distributed unevenly per bin. However, due to the considerable
size of the dataset, omitting these defacements has negligible impact.
detect defacements in the present. Similar to the reporter split, the time-wise experiment shows that
Meerkat does not overﬁt on past defacements, and that it successfully detects present defacements.
Our training set selection follows a simple argument: It is extremely unlikely that websites to-
day will be defaced in the same way as they were defaced in 2005 or even 1998. Including those
defacements in our training set would then very likely decrease classiﬁcation performance for de-
facement detection in 2014. Equivalently, one would not include this data to train the system in
practice.
Therefore, we train Meerkat on all defacements that were reported between December 2012
and December 2013 (i.e., 13 months with 1,778,660 defacements observed in total), and 1,762,966
legitimatewebsites that we sample from all legitimatewebsites uniformly at random. We then detect
defacements over a ﬁve months time frame, from January to May 2014, and we report the classiﬁca-
tion performance for eachmonth. The test data from January toMay 2014 spans a total of 1,538,878
unique samples that are distributed as follows: 421,758 samples from January 2014, 364,168 sam-
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ples from February 2014, 474,758 samples fromMarch 2014, 241,926 samples fromApril 2014, and
81,268 samples from the beginning of May 2014.
In detail, Meerkat achieves a true positive rate between 98.310% and 98.816% when the system
is ﬁne-tuned after each month on the data observed in that month, and 97.603% to 98.606% when
it is not. Although there is no signiﬁcant difference in its accuracy from January to March when the
neural network is ﬁne-tuned and when it is not (see Figure 2.4), a non-negligible difference between
their accuracy can be observed for April and the beginning of May (increase in 0.452 percentage
points (pp) and 1.211 pp for the true positive rate; decrease of 1.513 pp and 1.550 pp for the false
positive rate). The Bayesian detection rate, if no ﬁne-tuning is used, decreases from 98.583% in
January 2014 to 97.666% in February (0.917 pp decrease) to 97.177% in May (1.406 pp decrease to
January). If ﬁne-tuning is utilized, the Bayesian detection rate increases from 98.583% in January
2014 to 98.717% in May (0.134 pp).
Unsurprisingly, the regularly ﬁne-tuned system performs better over time, probably because
some defacers became signiﬁcantly more active in 2014, like Team System Dz, who started to de-
face websites just in January 2014 and who were not active before at all, and because some defacers
changed their defacements to spread a different message as opposed to the one they spread the year
before. When the system is not ﬁne-tuned, however, these minor changes to the defacements allow
attackers to evade detection without actively trying to evade it, with a minor accuracy deterioration
already visible after just four to ﬁve months, conﬁrming that detection systems need to be able to
tackle evenminor concept drift adequately and gracefully to maintain accurate detection capabilities
over time, like Meerkat does with ﬁne-tuning.
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Split True Positive Rate False Positive Rate Bayesian Detection Rate
Traditional 97.878% 1.012% 99.716%
Reporter (weighted) 97.882% 1.528% 99.571%
Reporter (unweighted) 97.933% 1.546% 99.567%
Time-wise with Fine-tuning 98.310% – 98.816% 1.233% – 1.413% 98.583% – 98.767%
Time-wise without Fine-tuning 97.603% – 98.606% 1.413% – 2.835% 97.177% – 98.583%
Table 2.3: Average true positive, false positive, and Bayesian detection rates for traditional and re-
porter split. Lower and upper bound of true positive, false positive, and Bayesian detection rate for
time-wise split from January to May 2014.
2.4 Limitations
Similar to other systems leveraging machine learning, our system has some limitations that can be
used to evade detection. We discuss some of these limitations and show how they can be addressed
for a real-world deployment. First, we discuss concept drift, a problem all systems leveraging machine
learning have to deal with; second, we remark on browser ﬁngerprinting and delayed defacement, an issue
all client-based detection approaches have to address; and, lastly, we introduce the concept of tiny
defacements, a limitation speciﬁc to defacement detection systems.
2.4.1 Concept Drift
Concept drift is the problem of predictive analysis approaches, such as detection systems, that the
statistical properties of the input used to train the models change. In turn, a direct result of concept
drift is often a heavy deterioration of the classiﬁcation performance, up to the pointwhere the system
cannot differentiate between good and bad behavior anymore. For instance, prior work [78, 79, 80,
81, 82, 83, 84, 85] has shown that concept drift (in the sense of adversarial learning) can actually be
leveraged to evade detection systems and classiﬁers in practice. Therefore, a detection system must
address it.
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While concept drift is a major issue for all systems using machine learning, it can generally be
addressed, due to its nature, by adopting a new feature space or retraining the machine learning
model on new data, or with an increased weight on new data. However, often, old instances do
not follow the statistical properties of the new feature models, and, therefore, they are classiﬁed less
accurately than before. This has little impact in practice, because old instances are less likely to occur
in the future anyways, but it is important to realize that this approach allows attackers to evade the
system by oscillating their attack strategy.
For Meerkat, those shortcomings can be addressed more easily than for traditional systems. For
minor concept drift, the system’s accuracy can be maintained by ﬁne-tuning the parameters of the
network. Here, the system simply needs to learn minor adjustments to the weights of existing fea-
tures fromnewdata, because some features have becomemore important and others have become less
important (they differ now more from other features than they did previously, relatively speaking;
since we start with already-initialized weights, ﬁne-tuning requires much less time than training
the whole system again). The features still model the differences between defacements and legiti-
mate websites, however, the weights are not optimal anymore and need to be adjusted. Once the
newweights are learned, classiﬁcation performance is restored. Therefore, to address minor concept
drift adequately, we recommend ﬁne-tuning the model regularly, for example, every month (see
Section 2.3.5).
While ﬁne-tuning the system’s parameters can theoretically address major concept drift similar
to retraining the system on new data, in practice, we expect prediction accuracy to decrease, since
different or more features must be modeled with the same amount of resources. Instead, for major
concept drift, increasing the number of hidden nodes of the neural network that learn the com-
pressed representation (the features) and their weights, and then retraining the system can maintain
the system’s accuracy. Simply adding nodes to the hidden layers of the neural network can counter-
act the issue of major concept drift because we increase the number of features that Meerkat learns
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from data directly. Therefore, introducing more hidden units allows the system to learn additional
and different internal representations about the look and feel of defacements, while, at the same time,
maintaining a model of how the old defacements look like. However, it requires computationally-
costly retraining of the network (previously, having those additional hidden units in the network
would result in overﬁtting because the systemwould learnmore complex representations than neces-
sary, and each would only differ little from one another; the system would then be prone to missing
minor variations of defacements).
It is important to note that in both cases, for minor and major concept drift, Meerkat requires
no additional feature engineering because the features are learned automatically from data. In turn,
this allows Meerkat to handle any form of concept drift much more gracefully than approaches
introduced by prior approaches, which require manual feature engineering.
2.4.2 Fingerprinting and Delayed Defacement
A second limitation of detection systems is ﬁngerprinting. Since we are leveraging a web browser to
collect the data that we are analyzing, in our case ﬁngerprinting corresponds to IP-based and browser
ﬁngerprinting. For IP-based ﬁngerprinting, a set of VPNs and proxies can be used to cloak and
regularly change the browser’s IP address. In case of browser ﬁngerprinting, the server or some client-
side JavaScript code detects what browser is rendering the website, and then displays the website
differently for different browsers. In its current form, the screenshot engine from Meerkat might
be detectable (to some degree) by browser ﬁngerprinting. It is theoretically possible to detect it
because it is currently built on the headless browser PhantomJS rather than a “headful” browser
typically used by a normal user, like Google Chrome. However, since PhantomJS is built from the
same components as Google Chrome, ﬁngerprinting the current screenshot engine is not trivial and
requires intimate knowledge of the differences between the different versions of the components and
their interaction. Therefore, we argue that the evasion through browser ﬁngerprinting is unlikely. If,
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however, the screenshot engine is evaded this way in the future, only some minor engineering effort
is required to utilize a browser extension for a headful browser to retrieve the websites’ screenshots
instead.
Additionally, the issue of delaying the defacement emerges, also referred to as the snapshot prob-
lem [1]. With the increased popularity and use of JavaScript, client-side rendering, and asynchronous
requests to backends by websites to provide a seamless and “reload-free” user experience, it is uncer-
tain at what point in time a website is representative of how a user would experience it. This then
bears the issue of when a detection system can take a representative snapshot of the website and stop
executing client-side scripts. For instance, if a detection system takes a snapshot always after ﬁve sec-
onds, to evade detection, defacers could simply inject JavaScript that only defaces the website if a
user interacts with it for at least six seconds.
While delayed defacements are currently scarce, it is likely that they will gain some traction
once more detection systems have been put in place, in a way similar to mimicry attacks and the
evasions of malware detection systems [86, 87]. However, prior work can be leveraged to detect
evasions [88] or trigger the functionality [89] to force the defacement to be shown. Both approaches
are complementary toMeerkat andwe leave their adoption to defacement detection for futurework,
once delayed defacements are actually occurring in the wild.
2.4.3 Tiny Defacements
A third limitation of all current defacement detection systems, including Meerkat, is the lack of de-
tection capabilities for tiny defacements. Tiny defacements describe a class of defacements in which
only a very minor modiﬁcation is made to part of the content of the defaced website. For instance, a
defacer might be dissatisﬁed by an article published by a newspaper. Instead of defacing the website
as a whole, the attacker modiﬁes (or deletes) the news article. It is clear that such defacements are
very hard to differentiate from the original content because they might only have minor semantic
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changes to text or images. Thus, to detect tiny defacements, the detection system must understand
the semantics of the website’s content, its language, and its general behavior to derive a meaningful
model for the website.
However, while those defacements exist, they are extremely scarce in numbers, or they are rarely
noticed. In fact, it is seldom the case that a defacer wants to modify a website without embarrass-
ing the operator more publicly. Most often, the goal of the defacer is to expose the insecurity of the
website, ridicule the operator, show their own “superiority,” and place their opinion and beliefs in
the most public space possible. Therefore, tiny defacements are currently of little interest to the de-
facers themselves, and, hence, also of little impact for detection systems. However, we acknowledge
that tiny defacements must be addressed once they increase in numbers, possibly leveraging recent
work to extract relevant changes from websites [2], and advances in natural language processing.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced Meerkat, a monitoring system to detect website defacements, which
utilizes a novel approach based on the look and feel of a website to identify if the website has been de-
faced. To accurately identify website defacements, Meerkat leverages recent advances in machine
learning, like stacked autoencoders and deep neural networks, and combines them with computer
vision techniques. Different from prior work, Meerkat does not rely on additional information
supplied by the website’s operator, or on manually-engineered features based on domain knowledge
acquired a priori, such as how defacements look. Instead, Meerkat automatically learns high-level
features from data directly. By deciding if a website has been defaced based on a region of the screen-
shot of the website instead of the whole screenshot, the system is robust to the normal evolution of
websites and defacements and can be used at scale. Additionally, to prevent the evasion of the sys-
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tem through changes to the look and feel of defacements and to be robust against defacement variants,
Meerkat employs various techniques, such as dropout and ﬁne-tuning.
We showed the practicality of Meerkat on the largest website defacement dataset to date, span-
ning 10,053,772 defacements observed between January 1998 and May 2014, and 2,554,905 legiti-
mate websites. On this dataset, in different scenarios, the system accurately detects defacements with
a true positive rate between 97.422% and 98.816%, a false positive rate between 0.547% and 1.528%,
and a Bayesian detection rate between 98.583% and 99.845%, thus signiﬁcantly outperforming ex-
isting state-of-the-art approaches.
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Figure 2.3: True positive and false positive rates for the reporter split per bin of the 10-fold cross-
validation set. Note that the scales for true positives and false negatives are the same, but that the
y -axis goes from 0.965 to 0.99 for the true positive rate and 0.005 to 0.03 for the false positive rate.
The weighted mean true positive rate is 97.882% and its false positive rate is 1.528% (weighted by
samples per bin). The unweighted mean true positive rate is 97.933% and its false positive rate is
1.546%.
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Figure 2.4: True positive and false positive rates, and their differences with and without ﬁne-tuning,
for the time-wise split. Note that the scales for true positives and false negatives are the same, but
that the y -axis goes from 0.97 to 1 for the true positive rate and 0.01 to 0.04 for the false positive rate.
No signiﬁcant change is visible for the true positive rate in the beginning regardless if the network
is ﬁne-tuned regularly or not, however, a non-negligible difference is observable for May 2014. A
difference is observable for the false positive rate starting in February 2014, after the network was
ﬁrst ﬁne-tuned.
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Chapter 3
Identifying Web-based Malware Infection
Campaigns
Identifying malicious websites has become a major challenge in today’s Internet. Previous work fo-
cused on detecting if a website is malicious by dynamically executing JavaScript in instrumented
environments or by rendering them in client honeypots. Both techniques bear a signiﬁcant evalua-
tion overhead, since the analysis can take up to tens of seconds or even minutes per sample.
In this chapter, we introduce Delta, a novel, purely static analysis approach, which (i) extracts
change-related features between two versions of the same website, (ii) uses a machine-learning algo-
rithm to derive amodel of website changes, (iii) detects if a changewasmalicious or benign, (iv) iden-
tiﬁes the underlying infection vector campaign based on clustering, and (v) generates an identifying
signature.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of Delta by evaluating it on a dataset of over 26million pairs of
websites, by pairing it with a web crawler for four months. Over this time span, Delta successfully
identiﬁed previously unknown infection campaigns, including a campaign that targeted installations
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of the Discuz!X Internet forum software, in which infection vectors were injected that redirected
the forums’ visitors to an installation of the Cool Exploit Kit.
3.1 Motivation and Contributions
The rapid growth of the Internet and the pervasiveness of web-based services has made it easy to in-
teract with others globally. The software used to implement the functionality of websites, however,
is often vulnerable to different attack vectors, like cross-site scripting or SQL injections. In turn, an
attacker can exploit these server-side vulnerabilities to inject malicious code snippets, so called infec-
tion vectors, that attack visitors of a compromised website through drive-by attacks. In such drive-by
install and download attacks, these malicious code snippets exploit client-side vulnerabilities to in-
stall malware, either directly themselves or indirectly through redirections, or they try to convince
the user to install malware herself. The malware, once installed, can then steal her credentials to
leverage them for phishing attacks on colleagues and acquaintances, siphon off sensitive data, such as
her credit card information, or encrypt her ﬁles and demand a ransom. Moreover, if an attacker au-
tomates the exploitation of a server-side vulnerability, she can launch an infection campaign spanning
thousands of websites, to maximize the number of her victims.
A major challenge for accurately detecting infection vectors is that websites have become more
complex andmore dynamic, and, as a result, the infection vectormight not be perceptible by analysis
techniques, or even difficult to discover for experienced human analysts. For example, legitimate
content changes might be made to the website, like showing personalized advertisements, or users
might have interacted with the website and left a comment or review. Unfortunately, as soon as
a modiﬁcation was made, the website must be reanalyzed, as a single modiﬁcation can change the
website’s behavior and turn it malicious. Evenworse, previouswork in the area of web evolution [29,
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30, 31, 32, 33] suggests that websites evolve constantly through small changes, and if one takes into
account personalization, a change that requires reanalysis might occur every visit for each user.
The most prominent method to protect users from malicious web-based content are, as we dis-
cussed before in Chapter 1, blacklists, such as the Google Safe Browsing list, which are reactive. This
is problematic because their reactive character implies that blacklists are not guaranteed to be com-
prehensive, and that malicious websites can potentially stay undetected for an extended time, as each
website of an infection campaign needs to be identiﬁed and added to the blacklist individually. Con-
sidering that the same infection vector is often reused by an attacker and spread among a multitude
of different websites in an infection campaign to maximize its impact, current defenses might not be
able to protect users from known attacks. Furthermore, once a website is blacklisted, justiﬁed or by
accident, its operator must go to great lengths to remove her website from the blacklist, although it
might now be benign. Such a removal process can take a frustrating amount of time since it is often
subject to some form of veriﬁcation that the website is now benign, a process that might not happen
immediately, during which the website remains inaccessible to a potentially large share of its users.
In turn, users are inconvenienced, possibly alienated, and companies might experience ﬁnancial loss
or a loss in reputation. Clearly, a proactive on-demand approach is preferable to detect infection vec-
tors, especially those that are unknown and not covered by blacklists at all. Unfortunately, the most
promising proactive approach, that is, scanning a website preemptively with an online analyzer sys-
tem [90, 91, 92] is computationally very expensive, and it introduces delays up to multiple seconds
per website. Since such a delay imposes an unacceptable cost to the users’ experience, it is unlikely
that these approaches would be widely deployed, or that they would ﬁnd their way into current
browsers as a protection mechanism.
However, the compromised websites that are part of an infection campaign usually follow a sim-
ple pattern: The infection vector was inserted in the same or very similar way, and its appearance is
similar across the campaign. In terms of compromise, they might be inserted by taking advantage of
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improperly controlled access, or by exploiting software vulnerabilities in a web framework or appli-
cation used by all of the campaign’s websites. Often, the infectedwebsites share some commonalities,
such as employing the same underlying software stack, or sharing a server that was attacked. For ex-
ample, in 2013, Apache web server installations were attacked, and the web server’s executable was
augmented with the backdoor “Linux/Cdorked.A” [93, 94], which injects malicious code to redi-
rect the web server’s visitors to exploit pages. Consequently, by being able to identify an infection
vector as part of a campaign, instead of just detecting that thewebsite is malicious, we can provide im-
portant additional feedback, and we can analyze its root cause more easily because of commonalities
in different observations.
To overcome the limitations of current approachesmainly based on dynamic analysis of websites,
and to facilitate root cause analysis, we introduce Delta, which identiﬁes malicious activity in a
website based on static analysis of the differences between the current and previous versions of the
website. We cluster these differences, determine if the introduced or removed elements are associated
with malicious behavior, identify the infection campaign it belongs to, pinpoint the actual infection
vector, and automatically generate an identifying signature that can be leveraged for content-based
protection.
The main contributions of this chapter are:
• We introduce Delta, which is based on a novel approach to statically analyze and detect web-
based infection vectors, and which identiﬁes infection campaigns based on features associated
with modiﬁcations observed between two versions of a website.
• We develop a tree difference algorithm that is resistant to tiny changes, such as typographical
corrections or the small evolutionary modiﬁcations a website undergoes.
• We develop a set of modiﬁcation-motivated similarity measures to model the concepts of in-
serting and removing malicious behavior into and from a website.
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• We evaluate Delta on a large scale dataset, containing 26 million unique pairs of websites,
to show its applicability in real-world scenarios in terms of infection campaign detection and
identiﬁcation capabilities.
3.2 Approach
Delta, instead of trying to solve the problem of deciding if a website is malicious or benign provides
a solution to the search problem of ﬁnding new infection campaigns and identifying similar, known
infection campaigns. Nonetheless, we are still interested in deciding if a website’s current behavior
is malicious or benign. Instead of analyzing websites in their entirety, Delta investigates only the
difference between two versions of the same website.
The main idea of Delta is to identify if the change made to a website altered the behavior of the
website, that is, if we can be certain that the new version of the website is malicious or benign, by in-
vestigating if the modiﬁcations are similar to already observed ones, such as modiﬁcations associated
with an ongoing infection campaign. In order to identify the changes that were made to a website,
we need a base version, that is, an older version of the same website.
The analysis process of our system is described hereinafter, followed by a discussion on potential
uses of our system, and the impact of deploying Delta.
3.2.1 Analysis Process
Delta’s analysis process follows a simple four-step process, which is shown in Figure 3.1, and whose
steps are:
1. Retrieval and normalization of the website.
2. Similarity measurement with respect to a base version.
49
Identifying Web-based Malware Infection Campaigns Chapter 3
Fetch 
website
Current 
DOM tree
Base 
DOM tree
Cluster feature vector
Benign change
Infection campaign
New campaign?1
<script type="text/javascript"
language="javascript"> ...
Generate 
signature
<input name="csrfmiddlewaretoken"
value=" ...Parse to tree
and normalize
2
Compute di!erences via fuzzy 
tree di!erence algorithm
3
4
5
Figure 3.1: Delta architecture
3. Cluster assignment of the similarity vector.
4. Generation of the identifying signature.
Evidently, a base version of a website has to be available. In the case that a local base version does
not exist, however, we might still be able to retrieve an older version through web archives, such
as the Internet Archive [95] or a web cache provided by a search engine. This makes our approach
applicable for websites that are visited rarely and were no local base version is kept, if we accept the
overhead to retrieve the base version from a remote archive. While this might seem counter-intuitive
because of the potentially large time difference between the archived and current version, we show
in our evaluation that this is indeed a possible alternative.
Following this brief overview, we discuss the important steps of the analysis process in more
detail. First, normalization of a website; second, how the similarity to the base version is measured;
third, how the identifying signature is generated.
Retrieval and Normalization
First, we retrieve the current version of a website, for instance the website a user requested. Then,
after we have retrieved the source code of that website, excluding all external references, such as in-
cluded scripts or frames, we perform multiple normalization steps: we normalize capitalization of
all tags, we reorder attributes of each tag and discard invalid attributes, and we normalize the quota-
tion of an attribute’s value. We perform this normalization step to ensure that functional equivalent
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tags are treated equally during our evaluation, and that changes such as changing the capitalization
of a tag or switching from single to double quotes do not affect our ﬁnal results.
Similarity Measurement and Clustering
Following these normalization steps, we measure the similarity to an already known (and normal-
ized) base version. Measuring the similarity between two versions of the same website in a meaning-
ful way is non-trivial. The Delta performs unordered tree-to-tree comparison via a novel algorithm
that we introduce in Section 3.3. The algorithm extracts the nodes (or tags; subsequently, we use
both terms interchangeably) from the Domain Object Model (DOM) tree of a website that are dif-
ferent between base and current version. Second, based on the extracted nodes, we leverage a variety
of different features to extract meaningful information from the two versions (described in detail in
Section 3.4). The system then tries assigning these feature vectors to a cluster, or detects them as
outliers, if they are not similar to any previously-observed modiﬁcations. Each different tag type,
for example., <input> or <script>, is treated separately, that is, each type is assigned its own feature
space; we do not project two tags of a different type into the same feature space. Additionally, due
to the different nature of our features, where different distance metrics are essential for accurate clus-
ter assignment, we perform consensus clustering for different groups: binary features, absolute and
relative features are all treated as separate clustering instances. The cluster assignment and outlier
detection process then distinguishes between three different cases:
• Assignment to an existing cluster:
– Insertion or removal of an infection vector, if the cluster corresponds to a known infec-
tion campaign.
– Legitimate modiﬁcation, for example, a version update of a library or the insertion of
Facebook’s like button, if the cluster does not correspond to an infection campaign.
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• Detection as an outlier:
– Potentially the start of a new infection campaign, if malicious behavior was inserted.
– Potentially the end of a running infection campaign, if malicious behavior was removed.
– Amodiﬁcation that is not of primary interest to us, such as a new article, template mod-
iﬁcations, or a redesign of the website.
• Formation of a new cluster (the similarity vector we are clustering and other vectors that are
close, which were outliers before, put the number of total vectors in this area of the feature
space above the threshold to form a new cluster, that is, we observed the number of the same
modiﬁcation in the wild that we require to constitute a trend, see Section 3.5.1):
– New infection campaign, if the node was inserted and is associated with malicious be-
havior.
– End of an infection campaign, if the node was removed and is associated with malicious
behavior.
– Legitimate modiﬁcation, for example, an update to a new, bleeding-edge version of a
library or the content-management system used, such as Wordpress.
Upon cluster assignment of the similarity vector, we output the associated cluster, that is, the cor-
responding trend (subsequently, we use these terms interchangeably). For instance, an infection
campaign if the corresponding modiﬁcation inserted or removed a known infection vector. Here,
it is important to note that the detected clusters do not discriminate between removed and inserted
nodes but treat them equally because we do not leverage the notion of removal or insertion in the
feature computation, but attach it to the vector as “external” meta information that is not used dur-
ing clustering. This supports the detection of removal and insertion of the same trendwith the exact
same cluster in both cases and, therefore, increases robustness of our system.
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Delta does not provide detection capabilities for malicious behavior on its own, but rather relies
on an external detection system. This detection system is queried once a new cluster is formed to
identify if this observed trend constitutes amalicious or a benign cluster. In order to guarantee a high
likelihood, we “bootstrap” each cluster by querying for 10 random samples, and acquire a consensus
decision for the returned labels. For instance, a new cluster is observed and nine out of 10 of the
random samples from this cluster have been assigned the label malicious, then Delta will assign the
label malicious to any new observation in this cluster.
Signature Generation
For each of the identiﬁed trends, we generate a signature that matches the textual representation of
all the nodes assigned to a cluster (e.g., a signature might describe the cluster containing “<script
src=’http://$random-url/exploit.js’>”). This signature is generated by simply interpreting the tex-
tual representation of each node as a deterministic ﬁnite automaton (DFA), merging them together,
and calculating the minimal version, which can be done in polynomial time. The resulting DFA
can then be translated into a regular expression that can be used by intrusion detection/prevention
systems.1
Such an identifying signature is, generally, an under/approximation of the actual (unknown)
signature. For instance, in the above example theURL is randomized. Here, the generated signature
only describes the observed samples, that is, where $random-url might be “a.com” or “b.org,” while
the trend could be more general and also include “c.net.” Leveraging only the identifying signature
would miss websites that follow the same trend, that is, websites whomight serve the same infection
vector. While this is of no concern in the case of leveraging Delta for every request (here, we would
assign a similar, but unobserved, tag to the same cluster), it can be an issue if the generated signature
is used as input to other tools. A possible remedy is to generalize the signature and to introduce a
1Although generated signatures match normalized tags by default, it is trivial to normalize incoming data in the same
way and match arbitrary tags that follow the same trend.
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widening operator to describe the different parts of the nodes following this trend. For instance, one
could simply widen ﬁve different characters at the same position in ﬁve different random samples
picked from a cluster to an over-approximating wildcard. An over-approximation, however, is also
likely to introduce incorrectmatches, which is whywe recommend usingDelta if no exact signature
matched.
3.2.2 Use Cases
We see Delta to be deployed in two main scenarios: paired with a web crawler to actively search for
new infection campaigns, and paired with a proxy to identify infection campaigns (passive), or to im-
prove user-protection (active). Additionally, there is a third, minor scenario: providing feedback on
evasions of detection systems. Subsequently, we describe all three use cases in more detail, however,
in the remaining of the chapter, we focus on the ﬁrst use case: paired with a web crawler.
The most interesting use case, in our opinion, is the active identiﬁcation of new infection cam-
paigns. In this case, one deploys the system side-by-side to a web crawler. While the web crawler
retrieves potentially interesting websites multiple times over a given period, our system analyzes the
differences. When our system detects a new cluster, that is, a signiﬁcant number of very similar
modiﬁcations, an external detection system then decides if this change is associated with malicious
behavior or not. If malicious behavior was introduced then we found a new infection campaign,
and we can generate the identifying signature for this cluster. Based on the elements of the cluster,
we can then pinpoint the infection vector (e.g., identify parts of the tag that are common among all
websites in that cluster) and investigate other similarities manually (e.g., only online stores running
a speciﬁc version of the PHP application osCommerce were infected). Starting from those similari-
ties, it is then possible to: generate a more precise ﬁngerprint for the campaign, ﬁnd other infections
via search engines, and estimate the scope of an infection campaign.
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The second envisioned deployment of Delta is the extension of a web browser or a proxy. In
most cases, the browser or proxy already caches visited websites for performance reasons. Moreover,
in security-sensitive environments, it is very likely that a detection system (e.g., an anti-malware en-
gine) is already in place to ensure that only benign websites can be accessed by the user. Such a
detection system can be leveraged by Delta to analyze inserted tags. The system can complement
these tools to prevent repetitive scanning of websites, to improve user experience by increasing anal-
ysis performance, and to provide insight into targeted attacks. For example, small changes a user
might encounter include automatic page impressions counter, updated weather or date information,
or the output of the processing time to render the website on the server’s side. While previous work
requires the reevaluation of the entire website, Delta can identify these changes as benign much
more easily. It is even possible to obtain more accurate results with our system than with the de-
tection system, for example, if it is based upon simple detection methods, such as ﬁngerprinting of
known malicious scripts, or if the detection system is being evaded. Additionally, once a malicious
website is identiﬁed, Delta can verify that a malicious modiﬁcation was removed and that the web-
site is now benign. Particularly, if an infection campaign is dormant or the exploit page is offline,
dynamic analysis systems detect that the website is benign because it does not detect any malicious
behavior. Since Delta is purely static and veriﬁes that the malicious content was removed, it does
not have this disadvantage.
Lastly, Delta can also be leveraged to detect evasions and bugs in detection systems and online
analyzers. For example, if the analyzer is dynamic, but behaves different than a standard browser in
even a single case, then malware can ﬁngerprint the detection system. Such a ﬁngerprinting method
allows the attacker to thwart detection much more easily, for instance, without having to utilize a
blacklist of the IP addresses used by the online analyzer. Leveraging our system, we can detect these
evasions when they are introduced. The system can pinpoint the changed content precisely and, by
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doing this, support the developer in identifying the reason why the analyzer is behaving differently,
correcting the corresponding bug, and preventing further evasions leveraging the same bug.
3.3 Fuzzy Tree Difference
First, to be able to measure the similarity between two websites in a meaningful way, we need to
deﬁne the notion of difference. We are primarily concerned if a website behaves in a benign or
malicious way. To this end, we need to understand what modiﬁcations to the content can result
in behavioral changes, and how we can isolate the modiﬁcations from other parts of the website
that have no effect on the overall behavior. We identify these interesting parts by leveraging the
hierarchical structure of a website and interpreting a website through its DOM tree.
Previous work introduced various algorithms to detect the semantic change in hierarchical struc-
tured data. Themain idea behindHTML, that is, describing how to display data instead of describing
the semantics of the data itself, renders nearly all introduced XML-centered approaches unsuitable
to extract meaningful information about the modiﬁcations. An often made assumption is that the
underlying tree structure has a signiﬁcant semantic relationship with the content, which is not nec-
essarily the case for HTML.Moreover, leveraging standard maximum cardinality matching on cryp-
tographic hashes and simple edge weights of 1 (based in the nature of cryptographic hash functions),
any change would be visible, including very small changes that are uninteresting to us, such as single
character or word changes and legitimate evolutions. We denote such a tree-to-tree comparison as
not tiny change resistant or not fuzzy. To solve this problem, and to identify interesting modiﬁcations
made to a website more precisely and more efficiently, we generalize the previous notion of tree
difference algorithms and introduce a similarity weight. We refer to our algorithm as the fuzzy tree
difference algorithm, which is heavily inﬂuenced by the unordered tree-to-tree comparison algorithms
by Chawathe et al. [96] and Wang et al. [97]. Such a fuzzy algorithm is necessary when comparing
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websites that have evolved over an extended period, for example, have been edited constantly over
a two-week period. Otherwise, the sheer number of remaining nodes to analyze makes it infeasible
to leverage computationally expensive features with reasonable performance overhead.
While we provide a formal description of the algorithm in Algorithm 1, we give a brief informal
description ﬁrst: the algorithm expects three parameters, T1,T2 and tr . T1 and T2 are normalized
DOM trees, that is, all tags are capitalized in the same way, all attributes occur in the same order and
their values are enclosed in the same way (quote-wise). tr is the threshold value for the similarity
measurement, and can range from 0 to 1. Starting from the trees T1 and T2, we create a temporary
graph to match pairs of similar nodes through maximum weighted bipartite graph matching (Hun-
garian algorithm [98]). This graph is constructed by inserting every node of T1, then inserting every
node of T2. For each node from T2, we connect it with an edge to every node from T1 that has a sim-
ilar fuzzy hash value (i.e., the Jaro distance of both hashes must be greater or equal to tr ) and that
takes the exact same path (in the sense of unordered tree-traversal) as the node from T2. The edge’s
weight is equal to the similaritymeasured through the Jaro distance between both hashes (i.e., at least
tr ). Additionally, we color all matched nodes blue. In the last step, we remove the corresponding
matched nodes from the trees T1 and T2 and output a list of removed (remaining in T1) and inserted
(remaining in T2) nodes.
While the reason for coloring nodes might not be obvious, later on, we leverage the color of a
node in the remaining nodes of T1 and T2 in our similarity measures to detect a matching asymmetry,
that is, if a tag with a very similar hash and the same path from the root node was matched, such as
a template that was used more often in T2 than in T1.
The implementation of Delta under evaluation leverages ssdeep [99] as the fuzzy hash function
and a threshold of 0.99 for the Jaro distance [100] (which is normalized to 0 to 1, that is, we require
very similar tags). Similar to cryptographic hash functions like MD5 or SHA, a fuzzy hash function,
such as ssdeep, maps arbitrary long values to a short hash. In contrast to cryptographic hash function,
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however, a fuzzy hash function maps similar values to similar hashes that can be then used to mea-
sure their similarity. This property allows us to efficiently compare nodes of the DOM tree or their
content regardless of their actual length, which otherwise might be computational too expensive
when using standard string similarity measures for longer tags or content. We selected the Jaro dis-
tance function to compare two hash values because it is a simple string similarity measure originally
introduced for duplicate detection by Jaro [100] and best suited for short strings while accounting
for exactly matched characters as well as transpositions, therefore it quantiﬁes the similarity of fuzzy
hashes for similar data accurately.
In general, a threshold value of 1 when used with a cryptographic hash function is equivalent to
standard unordered tree-to-tree algorithms. On the other hand, a threshold value of 0 regardless of
the hash function is equivalent to comparing every element to every other element and impractical
for anymodern website due to the sheer number of possible combinations, which is why a reduction
of potential matches is essential.
3.3.1 Example
An example of the tree difference algorithm is shown in Figure 3.2. The source code of a simple base
version and current version of a website are shown in Listing 3.1 and Listing 3.2 respectively. Two
modiﬁcations to the source code were made: ﬁrst, a head tag including a script tag with an external
source URLwas inserted, and, second, a typographical mistake in the class of the p tag was ﬁxed and
one word in its content was changed: “foo” was replaced by “bar.” Figure 3.2 illustrates that for a
standard tree difference algorithm the modiﬁed p tag would, correctly, constitute a modiﬁed p tag
(the removed p tag is marked with a red background, while the inserted p tag is marked with a green
background). However, since we are interested in severe changes and modiﬁcations associated with
behavioral changes, these tiny changes are uninteresting to us, and, like the example shows, they are
discarded by our algorithm.
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<html>
<body>
<p class="sumamry">
foo
</p>
</body>
</html>
Listing 3.1: Example HTML source, base
version
<html>
<head>
<script src="//url/malicious.js">
</script>
</head>
<body>
<p class="summary">
bar
</p>
</body>
</html>
Listing 3.2: Example HTML source, current
version
Current version
html
script
head
p
body
Base version
html
p
body
Fuzzy tree di!erence
html
script
head
Standard tree di!erence
html
script
head
p
body
p
Tree di!erence
vs.and
Figure 3.2: Comparison between a general tree difference algorithm and our fuzzy tree difference
algorithm (Section 3.3). Nodes with a green background denote nodes that were detected as inserted
in our example, while nodes with a red background were detected as being removed.
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Algorithm 1 Fuzzy Tree Difference
1: function FuzzyTreeDifference(T1,T2, tr )
2: G  Graph
3: for all n 2 T1.nodes do
4: G  G .insert_node(n )
5: for all n 2 T2.nodes do
6: for allm 2 T1.nodes do
7: if path(m ) = path(n ) then
8: d(m ,n ) jaro(hash(m ), hash(n ))
9: if d(m ,n )  tr then
10: G .insert_node(n )
11: m .color blue
12: n .color blue
13: G .insert_edge(m ,n ,d(m ,n ))
14: M  max_weight_matching(G )
15: for all (m ,n ) 2M do
16: T1.remove_node(m )
17: T2.remove_node(n )
18: return T1,T2
3.4 Similarity Measures
Themost interesting part of websites from amalicious code point of view is described by the HTML
markup language: JavaScript, inline frames, or the use of plugins. Most research on document sim-
ilarity, however, assumes that markup language is not of major interest and that it can be removed
without substantial loss of information. For detecting infection vectors, this assumption does not
hold. Essentially, this violationmakes applying existingwork in document similarity for identifying
infection vectors impractical, because core elements are discarded.
Therefore, we introduce our own similarity measures. Once we have extracted the different tags
between two versions of a website, we can map each tag into the feature space in which we cluster
similar changes together. In this section, we describe the features we are using and the intuition
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behind them. Each of our features we apply on multiple levels (where applicable): the whole tag
and for every value of its attributes.
3.4.1 Template Propagation
First, we introduce the template propagation measure, a binary feature that simply models what
content was introduced or removed from the website in terms of their similarity to previous DOM
tree nodes, that is, it captures the concept of reused templates by checking if a node exist already in
the base version, but are unmatched, for example, because there are more matching candidates than
actual matches are possible. Since all matched nodes in the output T1 and T2 of our tree difference
algorithm are colored blue, we can simply set the value of this feature to 1 if the node is blue and 0
if it is not.
The motivation for this measure is that many websites, for example blogs, use templates when
publishing a new article or when showing a new comment, classiﬁed, or advertisement. Detecting
that a template is repeated allows us to model the degree to which a website has drifted away from
expected changes, for example, in terms of character count distributions for a blog with articles
written in English.
3.4.2 Shannon Entropy
Second, we leverage the Shannon entropy as a feature of information in a tag or an attribute’s value.
Two different features are derived from the Shannon entropy: (a) the absolute Shannon entropy,
which is dependent on the length of the string, (b) the normalized Shannon entropy, that is, the
absolute Shannon entropy divided by the ideal Shannon entropy of a string of the same length (i.e.,
it is normalized to the interval from 0 to 1).
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Our intuition behind the Shannon entropy is to measure the distance on how far the tag or
attribute is away from a random source. For instance, to model that the URL in a “src” attribute of
a <script> tag was generated by a random source.
3.4.3 Character Count
In the third set of features we employ a character count. The ﬁrst feature in this set simply measures
how often a single character occurs in the tag or the attribute’s value and discriminates between
upper- and lower-case characters. The second feature also measures how often a single character
occurs, however, it ignores capitalization and counts an “A” as an “a.” The third feature follows in
simplicity and is the count of each digit. A fourth, ﬁfth and sixth feature are taking advantage of the
same method, but are performed on the fuzzy hash value (ssdeep in our implementation) of the tag
or attribute instead.
Beyond these six features, we are also computing relative features for both of those two sets, aswe
did already in case of the Shannon entropy. Alike to the Shannon entropy features, the motivation
behind these features is to model the character and digit distribution in a string.
3.4.4 Kolmogorov Complexity
The third set of measures we introduce is based on an approximation of the upper-bound on the
Kolmogorov complexity [101]. Kolmogorov complexity denotes a complexity measure specifying
the lower-bound of text necessary to describe another piece of text in an algorithmicway. One of the
most important properties of the complexity is its incomputability. An upper-bound on the other
hand is easy to compute by taking the length of the text compressed by any lossless compression
algorithm. Since these features are based on a second information theoretical measure, next to the
Shannon entropy, it is necessary to emphasize that they are complementary in our scenario: on the
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one hand, Kolmogorov complexity is conceptually different from the Shannon entropy, and on the
other hand, we approximate the Kolmogorov complexity up to (at best) an additive constant.
These measures exploit the upper-bound and the fact that compressing already packed data re-
sults in nearly no beneﬁt, in order to measure a change that introduces packed or encrypted data,
such as malicious data trying to evade detection.
We introduce, again, two different features based on computing an upper-bound of the Kol-
mogorov complexity. First, the absolute upper-bound on the tag extracted by our tree difference
algorithm; second, the ratio of the upper-bound over the length of the string. In case of very short
strings, the upper-bound might even take up more space than the actual string.
3.4.5 Script Inclusion
Scripts included in websites are the most prominent way to infect a user with malware, but they are
also used legitimately. Differences exist between how malicious scripts and legitimate ones are used
and included. For instance, malicious scripts are rarely including local ﬁles; instead, they usually
include from an external source or provide the source code directly. The following two binary
features model these differences.
Absolute Source URL
The enduring rise of content-delivery networks, which are often heavily relying on load-balancing
based on the domain name system (DNS), lead to scripts being included much more often with an
absolute and external source address in legitimate cases than it was the case prior to the predomi-
nance of these networks (due to potential compatibility issues if scripts are included differently). It
is important to understand if a website is hosted on a content-delivery network since it bears the
reasoning that these websites are generally much more optimized than personal websites, to save
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on bandwidth on account of the smaller size. This then has an impact on the importance of other
features. This feature is also binary; it is 1 for an absolute non-external source URL and 0 otherwise.
Themany legitimate use cases of including scripts from an absoluteURL suggest that this feature
will not have a discriminatory impact on its own; rather, it supports other features by modeling
the inclusion-style in a website. The notion of a single inclusion-style roots in previous work by
Nikiforakis et al. [102], which suggests that websites follow the same inclusion patterns, that is, the
distribution of how scripts are included is biased toward either relative or absolute inclusions, and
only rarely uniform.
External Source URL
While the last feature is a bias function to judge the use of scripts with an absolute source, the next
feature is a bias function for the concept of external source URLs. It is important to mention that,
if an external script is included, assuming the external domain is maintained by a third party, then
the website operator has to trust that the third party providing the external script will not insert any
malicious code.
3.4.6 Inline Frames
Similar to the features to model the use of script tags, the following three binary features try to
model the inclusion of malicious inline frames, by looking into properties that are uncommon for
benign inclusions.
Absolute and External Source URL
Likewise to the nature of the source URL features for scripts, these features give an intuition on the
use of inline frames. Both features are identical to their script sibling, but they examine <iframe>
tags instead of <script> tags.
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Their motivation follows closely the motivation for the script features: that is, the feature for
absolute source URLs is supporting other inline framemeasures as a bias function. In the past, inline
frameswith an external source addresswere often used to include either advertisements or third party
widgets. Recently, those moved to inline JavaScript or embedding plugins directly. Adversaries, on
the other hand, still use these frames because they allow for easier ﬁngerprinting and support deliver-
ing different infection vectors per user, for example depending on the browser’s patch-level, installed
plugins, or by obfuscating each reply differently. This ﬁne-grained control helps the adversary to
maximize the attack efficacy while reducing the likelihood of detection.
Hidden Frame
Beyond absolute and external frames, another indicator for malicious content being included exists:
hidden frames. Legitimate frames are generally made visible to the user. Adversaries on the other
hand prefer that the included website is invisible, which is why they often resort to setting width
and height of the frame to a low value, so that the frame is visually hard to spot for a human. We
investigated a random sample of 10,000 inline frame tags that we extracted from our dataset and
found that legitimate inline frames are often set to a width and height of larger than 100 and rarely
hidden (the style attribute “display: none” is rarely used). We model this phenomenon, assuming
that a majority of malicious inline frames uses a much smaller area of screen space, by restricting
width and height of our feature to a maximum of 15 pixels. The feature is simply 1 for hidden
frames and 0 otherwise.
3.5 Evaluation
Generally, the problem we are trying to solve is an instance of knowledge discovery in databases [103,
104]. More precisely, when searching actively for infection campaigns pairedwith aweb crawler, we
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are interested in detecting outliers, that is, novel changes, and the appearance of clusters, that is, when
a new trend is observed, for instance an infection campaign. While various clustering algorithms
can be employed, the design of our system encourages the use of an algorithm that detects local
outliers. Additionally, the distribution of a cluster can differ from the distribution of any other
cluster, particularly for clusters with a lowmember count, that is, it is not reasonable to assume that
all changes follow a very similar distribution in the feature space. Sincewe are primarily interested in
the formation of new clusters, when it is even less likely that this assumption will hold, centroid- or
distribution-based clustering algorithms such as k-means (whichwill give spherically shaped clusters)
or expectation-maximization (e.g., Gaussian mixture models) are unlikely to provide any valuable
insight on new infection campaigns early enough. To counter this issue, we adopt a variant of the
density-based clustering algorithmOPTICS (Ordering Points To Identify the Clustering Structure)
by Ankerst et al. [105], namelyOPTICS-OF (OPTICSwithOutlier Factors) by Breunig et al. [106].
3.5.1 OPTICS-OF
The OPTICS-OF algorithm takes two parameters: the maximum distance for a cluster and the min-
imal number of vectors necessary to form a cluster. In the scenario of trend analysis, the maximum
distance corresponds to the similarity of a change, while the minimal number of vectors necessary
describes the number of instances of a change we want to observe before we consider it a trend, that
is, before we want to verify that we found a previously-unknown infection campaign.
The algorithm works, in essence, as follows: if two vectors in the feature space are closer than
the maximum distance, then they are directly density-reachable. If at least the minimal number of
vectors are directly density-reachable from a vector, then this vector is a core object and forms a
cluster. A cluster does not only contain directly density-reachable vectors from this core object, but
is deﬁned transitively, that is, it contains all vectors that are directly and transitively density-reachable
from the core objects. Therefore, an outlier is either not density-reachable to any other vector at all,
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or only density-reachable to a number of vectors, where none of the vectors is a core object, that
is, none of the vectors forms a cluster. In our experiments, we require 10 similarity vectors that are
directly density-reachable to form a cluster.
3.5.2 Dataset
First, in this section, we describe in detail what constraints we imposed on our dataset, why these
constraintswere imposed, and howwe obtained our dataset. In general, it is a challenging problem to
obtain a representative sample of different and distinctmaliciouswebsites. Invernizzi et al. [107] have
shown that this is even the casewhen onlymediocre toxicity2 is required, that is, it is even difficult for
a dataset with a small but non-negligible percentage of malicious websites. This poses a problem for
collecting our dataset because we desire moderate toxicity and diversity among malicious infection
vectors to verify that we can correctly, and without bias, identify similar trends, and by this, similar
infection campaigns. Moreover, to discard trivial cases, the requirements on the websites in our
dataset are even more restrictive:
• Websites must have been set-up for a legitimate reason, that is, we are interested in landing
pages and not interested in exploit pages. Exploit pages denote websites that are set up by
an adversary to exclusively deliver malicious code, while landing pages denote the infected
legitimate page. We enforce this restriction because recent work establishes that legitimate
websites are nowadays the primary target and because other approaches by Provos et al. [23,
92], Ratanaworabhan et al. [108], Curtsinger et al. [109] or Seifert et al. [110] are already able
to detect purely malicious websites with outstanding accuracy.
• Two distinct versions of a website are required, that is, a website must have been modiﬁed
(legitimately or maliciously) to constitute a realistic sample.
2Toxicity measures the maliciousness of dataset and simply corresponds to the fraction of malicious samples in a
dataset over all the samples of the dataset.
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Weobtained our dataset by crawling the web from January 2013 toMay 2013 via a 10-node clus-
ter of custom crawlers running an adaptive fetch schedule with a recrawl delay of at least 15 minutes
and an exponential back-off delay (multiplied by a constant factor of 10 if no change was observed
in a recrawl and with a strict maximum of one week). The hourly seed of URLs for our crawler con-
tained websites that were already present in our dataset and also Yandex’s search engines results for
Twitter’s trending topics. Additionally, to counter the problem of low toxicity and prevent a bias
toward benign websites, we injected a total of 2,979,942 URLs of websites into our crawl seed that
the Wepawet online analyzer [90] had analyzed previously, starting with samples observed in the
beginning of January 2013 and ending with samples observed at the end of April 2013. In total, af-
ter removing exact duplicates and restricting the number of pairs per unique URL to a maximum of
10, our dataset spans a size of 700GiB and 26,459,103 distinct website pairs from 12,464,920 unique
URLs. A distinct pair denotes a pair where both versions are different from each other in respect to
the SHA256 checksum of their normalized DOM tree.
The time difference, before a change between base and current version of a website was observed,
is shown in Figure 3.3a. The average time difference of our pairs is four weeks, with 80% of all pairs
being 2 hours or more apart, 70% being 12 hours or more apart, 60% being 7 days or more apart, and
50% being 20 days or more apart (median). Since not all websites have been recrawled after exactly
15minutes, we can only observe that a change happens in at least 16% of the websites in a 15-minute
interval after a visit.
3.5.3 Case Studies: Identiﬁed Trends/Clusters
In our experiments, we identiﬁed a total of 67,038 different clusters, with the majority of clusters
having 30 or less elements. Figure 3.3b depicts the ﬁnal distribution of cluster sizes we observed
in our experiments. Evidently, the observed distribution follows closely the power law function:
y = 2014  (x   10) 1.8. In addition, we observe that the total sum over all cluster sizes is less than
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the number of distinct tags that we have analyzed. This is the case because any remaining tags are
still considered to be outliers and do not constitute a trend yet. As a matter of fact, both the close
resemblance to a power law function and a non-negligible amount of outliers are expected, because
some changes are onlymade to a limited number ofwebsites, for example, very similar articles might
be posted to less websites than we require as a lower-bound to constitute a trend, and also because
our view of changes is limited by the seed and link expansion of the web crawler, that is, it is possible
that we only observed a subset of the true instances of each unique trend.
We feel that it is important to understand what a single cluster is actually describing, and we pro-
vide different examples about what tags have been clustered together. Therefore, we investigate two
clusters in more detail. Although both clusters are low-count clusters, that is, relatively small, their
small size actually illustrates that Delta does detect when a trend reaches a signiﬁcant distribution
and that it does not rely on an unreasonable large number of observations of a single trend.
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The ﬁrst example we discuss is an actual infection campaign that we have observed in the wild,
an instance of a redirection to a Cool Exploit Kit installation. In contrast, the second example we
discuss corresponds to a cluster describing the change in cross-site request forgery tokens.
We selected these two clusters manually by ﬁltering clusters based on the generated signature
with simple heuristics that suggest malicious behavior, such as external scripts that are included with
a random component or JavaScript with a non-negligible ratio of digits over characters (suggesting
obfuscation). Clearly, these and other heuristics can also be leveraged to order clusters according
to “levels of interest” or to remove clusters that are likely uninteresting and should not be analyzed
manually by an analyst.
Other trends we observed, but will not discuss in detail, include the modiﬁcation of Facebook
Like buttons (the backlink URL changes), a version update for the JQuery library served for blogs
hosted on Wordpress.com, or the insertion of user-tracking tokens.
Cool Exploit Kit Infections of Discuz!X
One of the most interesting clusters, which shows the applicability of Delta in practice, describes
an infection vector used to redirect to a speciﬁc infection campaign that uses the Cool Exploit Kit to
distribute malware. This in-the-wild infection campaign was found at the beginning of April 2013
in a set of 15 different websites from the following 10 unique URLs:
• http://att.kafan.cn
• http://frozen-fs.net
• http://jses40813.ibbt.tw
• http://ppin888.com
• http://www.dv3.com.cn
• http://www.kxxwg.com
• http://www.ruadapalma.com
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<script type="text/javascript" language="javascript">
p=parseInt;
ss=(123) ? String.fromCharCode : 0;
asgq=" [4036 character obfuscated string] "
.replace(/@/g,"9").split("!");
try { document.body&=0.1 } catch(gdsgsdg) {
zz=3; dbshre=79;
if(dbshre) { vfvwe=0;
try { document; }
catch(agdsg) { vfvwe=1; }
if(!vfvwe) { e=eval; }
s="";
if(zz) for(i=0;i 1374!=0;i++) {
if(window.document)
s+=ss(p(asgq[i],16)); }
if(window.document) e(s); }}</script>
Listing 3.3: Cool Exploit Kit infection vector
• http://www.sdchina.cn
• http://www.wlanwiﬁ.net
• http://www.yysyuan.com
Once we veriﬁed that the cluster was indeed malicious, we investigated the underlying commonali-
ties between them. We found that all websites were using the discussion platform “Discuz!X” [111].
Discuz!X is an Internet forum software written in PHP and, according to the Chinese National Ra-
dio [112], the most popular Internet forum software used in China. Clearly, these infections are
part of the same infection campaign. Additionally, such a strong common ground suggests that the
infection is likely to be rooted in a security vulnerability in the Discuz!X software, and it provides
support identifying the cause and a removal method.
Listing 3.3 shows the respective generated signature of the infection. For this infection campaign,
we did not observe any differences in the tags that were clustered together.
71
Identifying Web-based Malware Infection Campaigns Chapter 3
<input
name="csrfmiddlewaretoken"
value="(JhD3IwCXcnnpRtvE42MN6r8dOBOWRoxG
|hH4f6eOMCOTEYF0RYoXFRDaTLzym61O2
[...]
|DNczoWjeN1nK6nq3whXYpSSnZGdxx0Og
|F9yLS0jNUXIURsXDRqxS5NVW7qXfWsgf)"/>
Listing 3.4: Cross-site request forgery token; | denotes an or
Beyond the inclusions of infection vectors pointing to an installation of the Cool Exploit Kit
observed in all pairs, one website (http://frozen-fs.net) also included an infection vector that tried
to infect visitors via an installation of the Blackhole exploit kit.
The domain that included the Cool Exploit Kit and the Blackhole exploit kit, “frozen-fs.net,”
was not cleaned up, and we observed that it was suspended by the provider 27 days after we detected
the infection.
Cross-Site Request Forgery Tokens
A second interesting low-count cluster we found during our evaluation models variations in cross-
site request forgery tokens in deployments of the Django web application framework. In total, we
identiﬁed a similar modiﬁcation among 17 different pairs of websites. Each website used form-based
cross-site request forgery tokens and used the same identiﬁer for a hidden formﬁeld, that is, “csrfmid-
dlewaretoken.” For every pair, the attribute features did not diverge for the name attribute, while
all were different for the value attribute. Nonetheless, Delta clustered them together, since the ran-
dom entropy was nearly constant for the value attribute among all observed removed and inserted
instances. The entropywas nearly constant for the normalized case aswell as for the absolute entropy
features. The exact identifying signature for that cluster is shown in Listing 3.4.
We feel that this observed trend constitutes a perfect example in which the limitations of the
signature generation stick out and where Delta shows its robustness by clustering these changes
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correctly together. While the signature can detect all observed instances correctly, it is clear that
when trying to match new versions of a website with the signature we would fail to identify the
changed token value correctly since the value will change to a new, unobserved random value.
3.5.4 Performance
In order to judge the actual applicability of our system in practice, a performance analysis is necessary.
We show in Figure 3.4 that the performance ofDelta allows for deployments in real-world scenarios.
However, corner cases exist that could impact an actual deployment, if the difference between the
base and current version of a website is particularly large. We performed a manual in-depth analysis
of the system that highlighted the actual performance bottleneck of our system: close to 80% of
the time when analyzing the two versions was spent by the Python library BeautifulSoup to parse
the HTML structure of a page. Although, the number of changes made to a website plays the most
important role in analyzing the changes, pairs that took longer than three seconds to analyze were
exclusively websites that sent data in an encoding different than speciﬁed. BeautifulSoup tries to
take care of this and follows a code path that can get multiple thousand function calls deep, and
easily hits the recursion limit of CPython. While we increased this limit in our evaluation to keep
these pairs and prevent a dataset bias, the particular functions are actually tail-recursive and, therefore,
can be expressed iteratively (thus, removing the necessity of allocating stackframes). However, the
abstruseness of the involved functions prevented us from doing the very same in a reasonable amount
of time. Regardless of these (still outstanding) engineering challenges for a general deployment, we
could analyze a single pair in a median time of 0.340 seconds and in an average time of in 2.232
seconds. It is also evident that we ﬁnished each analysis in at most 20 seconds, regardless of the
aforementioned problems encountered in BeautifulSoup.
These results, when taking into account that 60% of our data is seven days or more apart (see
Figure 3.4), support our claim that Delta does not necessarily need to keep a base version locally, but
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Figure 3.4: Overview of the ratio of website pairs that have been completely analyzed in our exper-
iments in less than x seconds.
could rely on public archives like the InternetArchive or aweb cache by a search engine. Nonetheless,
we strongly recommend keeping a local version to prevent an additional delay in fetching thewebsite
and to prevent running into the problem of a potentially outdated or even non-existing version on
the side of the public archive.
3.6 Limitations
Similar to other static analysis approaches leveraging machine learning, our approach has some limi-
tations, which can be used to evade detection. This section discusses these limitations and how they
could be managed in a real-world deployment of Delta. First, we introduce a limitation called Step-
by-step Injection. Second, wewill brieﬂy discuss the Evolution of Infection Vectors as a major fundamental
problem in detecting malicious code. Lastly, we discuss the trade-off between dynamic and static
analysis and the limitations of either approach.
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3.6.1 Step-by-step Injection
It is possible to circumvent Delta by adding malicious code in small steps, that is, in a series of modi-
ﬁcations where each step on its own gets detected as being benign, while the aggregation is malicious.
For example, an attacker could build an infection vector that delivers these small steps depending
on a cookie or the visitor’s IP address to keep track of the client’s previous version. However, we
argue that the scope of such an attack is heavily limited because: (a) it requires an attacker to be able
to inject code that is executed on the server-side, otherwise detection is possible because it has to
be done client-side, and the attack can also be impeded or even avoided by keeping the ﬁrst version
instead of updating the stored base versionwith every visit; or (b) the DOM treewill bemodiﬁed on-
line, for example through JavaScript. In the ﬁrst case, an important and drastically scope-reducing
factor is that the vulnerability needs to support such an iterative process, where, for example, mem-
ory regions are shared among browser tabs or between multiple visits to the same website, which is
highly unlikely given the strict separation current browser sandboxes enforce. In the latter case, on
the other hand, we suggest analyzing the website on every mutation event,3 that is, by considering
the website that was modiﬁed online as a new current version and comparing it to the stored base
version.
3.6.2 Evolution of Infection Vectors
Detecting malicious code is an arms race and malicious websites are no exception. Malware develop-
ers are trying to evade detection systems to gain the upper hand, while detection system developers
are trying to catch and prevent these evasions. Previous work on evasions motivated the search for
better and different detection systems [113]. More advanced obfuscation [114], encryption, poly-
and metamorphic code [115] and virtualized environments have become more common in response
3JavaScript events are called mutation events if they modify the DOM tree, for example, by changing attributes of a
node, such as the src attribute of a script tag, or inserting or removing elements from the DOM tree.
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to these improvements and impeded detection systems. With more approaches being able to handle
these cases, it is to be expected that malware and infection vectors will evolve and successfully cir-
cumvent available detection systems. While retraining the machine learning algorithm on a more
recent dataset is often a possible approach to counter the evasion problem, it is only a near-sighted so-
lution to counter the dataset shift, as malware will deviate more severely, up to the point where the
features will not model the underlying problem anymore. Even in cases where the features are not
publicly known to an adversary, it is possible to partially derive these by probing the system carefully,
which then will either allow for successful evasion of the system or (on re-training) increase the false
positive and false negative rate because of misclassiﬁcation due to minuscule differences between le-
gitimate and malicious code in the feature space. Both cases are obviously not desired for a detection
system, however, it is a general problem of all approaches employing machine learning [92, 23, 116,
117, 118, 110, 91, 33], and it is generally only countered reliably by adapting to a new feature space,
which we leave for future work.
3.6.3 Dynamic vs. Static Analysis
Delta in its current form is a purely static analysis system, while, at the same time, the Internet
is becoming more and more dynamic. While one might think that static analysis is inferior to dy-
namic analysis here, this is not the case. Instead, our system complements dynamic analysis systems:
it detects trends/infections statically and can forward the interesting trends/infections to dynamic
analysis systems that extract further information.
Our motivation to rely on a purely static analysis is based on multiple reasons. First, dynamic
analysis is not necessarily useful at the early stage in which our system operates, that is, trends that
change the behavior and are interesting to us show themselves ﬁrst with static content changes, ren-
dering dynamic analysis (currently) unnecessary. A second argument against dynamic analysis for
Delta is that it, for instance by instrumenting embedded or included JavaScript to modify the DOM
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tree to retrieve a “ﬁnal” version of the website, under-approximates the behavior of the website to
this speciﬁc execution environment and might yield a potentially incomplete or untrue representa-
tion of the DOM tree. It also poses the questions of when to consider the DOM tree “ﬁnal,” that is,
when to take a snapshot. Consequently, it might then be possible to evade the trend detection step in
the ﬁrst place. Additionally, we might also miss infection campaigns that are statically present, but
which are removed dynamically or are inactive (for us). For example, servers could be unavailable
(for us) or code might not be loaded (for us), we could be ﬁngerprinted, the IP address of our analysis
system might be in a region of the world that is not affected or simply because the user-agent of our
browser does not match a (unknown) regular expression. The third argument in favor of static anal-
ysis is that it can be considerably faster than dynamic analysis, which, in turn, allows us to leverage
more computationally-expensive features to increase trend detection accuracy.
Lastly, while the trend detection step is purely static, to detect malicious behavior, Delta relies
on an external analysis system that might very well use dynamic analysis. Generally, we do not
impose any limitations on this detection engine but that it can detect malicious behavior.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced Delta, a novel, light-weight system to identify changes associated
with malicious and benign behavior in websites. The system leverages clustering of modiﬁcation-
motivated features, which are extracted based on two versions of a website, rather than analyzing
the website in its entirety. To extract the important modiﬁcations accurately, we introduced a fuzzy
tree difference algorithm that extracts DOM tree nodes that were more heavily modiﬁed, discarding
changes in single characters or words, or legitimate evolutions. Beyond detecting if a change made
to a website is associated with malicious behavior or not, we showed that Delta supports the detec-
tion of previously-unknown infection campaigns by analyzing, unknown trends and measuring the
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similarity to previous, known infection campaigns. Furthermore, we showed that the system can
generate an identifying signature of observed infection campaigns, which can then be leveraged to
protect users via content-based detection systems or as test-cases for online analyzer systems. Ulti-
mately, the system’s ability to identify speciﬁc infections is helpful in identifying the reason why the
website was infected by a speciﬁc campaign in the ﬁrst place, such as a distinct version of the web
application among all infections; additionally, it facilitates the removal of malicious code and the
mitigation of additional infections in the future.
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Chapter 4
Mitigating the Risks of Takeover Attacks
and Domain-Validated Certiﬁcates
Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), andmore generally the “cloud,” like AmazonWeb Services (AWS)
orMicrosoft Azure, have changed the landscape of systemoperations on the Internet. Their elasticity
allows operators to rapidly allocate and use resources as needed, from virtual machines, to storage,
to bandwidth, and even to IP addresses, which is what made them popular and spurred innovation.
In this chapter, we show that the dynamic component paired with recent developments in trust-
based ecosystems (e.g., TLS certiﬁcates) creates so far unknown attack vectors. Speciﬁcally, we dis-
cover a substantial number of stale DNS records that point to available IP addresses in clouds, yet,
are still actively attempted to be accessed. Often, these records belong to discontinued services that
were previously hosted in the cloud. We demonstrate that it is practical, and time and cost-efficient
for attackers to allocate IP addresses to which stale DNS records point. Considering the ubiquity of
domain validation in trust ecosystems, like TLS certiﬁcates, an attacker can impersonate the service
using a valid certiﬁcate trusted by all major operating systems and browsers. The attacker can then
also exploit residual trust in the domain name for phishing, receiving and sending emails, or possi-
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bly distribute code to clients that load remote code from the domain (e.g., loading of native code by
mobile apps, or JavaScript libraries by websites).
Even worse, an aggressive attacker could execute the attack in less than 70 seconds, well below
common time-to-live (TTL) for DNS records. In turn, it means an attacker could exploit normal
service migrations in the cloud to obtain a valid TLS certiﬁcate for domains owned and managed by
others, and, worse, that she might not actually be bound by DNS records being (temporarily) stale,
but that she can exploit caching instead. We introduce a new authentication method for trust-based
domain validation that mitigates staleness issues without incurring additional certiﬁcate requester
effort by incorporating existing trust of a name into the validation process. Furthermore, we provide
recommendations for domain name owners and cloud operators to reduce their and their clients’
exposure to DNS staleness issues and the resulting domain takeover attacks.
4.1 Motivation and Contributions
Over the past ten years, cloud services have grown tremendously. Generally, clouds are comprised
of hundreds to thousands of commodity servers, which make up pools of computing resources that
are shared by different users. One of the main drivers behind the clouds’ rise in popularity is their
elasticity: Users can acquire and use resources as needed, on demand, and at scale, all while requiring
almost no upfront investment. In fact, AmazonWeb Services (AWS), Amazon’s public cloud, serves
over one million active users worldwide [119], Microsoft Azure is gaining 120,000 new customers
each month [120], and the global cloud IP traffic has reached 3.9 zettabytes (3.9 billion terabytes)
in 2015 already [121]. Unfortunately, as the recent years have shown, the resource pooling and
increased popularity of cloud-based deployments also pose severe security issues to the clouds’ ten-
ants [122, 34].
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With the clouds’ increase in popularity and their commoditization, website operators have been
empowered to deploy their website themselves instead of relying on more traditional web hosting.
At the same time, HTTPS has become basically a requirement for any website operator, not only
for dynamic websites trying to protect login credentials, but also for static websites. Unprotected
websites are being ranked lower by search engines [123], they are limited in browser features that
they can use [124], and they risk having content and advertisements injected, for example, by wire-
less access point operators or Internet Service Providers [125, 126]. For HTTP/2, it has become
practically mandatory because all major browsers support HTTP/2 over TLS only [127]. Website
operators now typically deployTLS certiﬁcates for their domains and useHTTPS to ensure integrity
and conﬁdentiality for any communication with their website. For certiﬁcates to be trusted by the
websites’ visitors’ browsers, however, they need to be issued by trusted certiﬁcate authorities (CAs).
Traditional veriﬁcation approaches involve identity documents, like verifying passports, which in-
curred high processing overhead. To cope with the high-volume demand for digital certiﬁcates,
CAs adopted automated approaches to verify and issue certiﬁcates, and now heavily rely on domain-
validation. Having launched only inApril 2016, Let’s Encrypt has since been dominating the domain-
validation part of the certiﬁcate authority ecosystem through openly available and well-designed
tooling that uses the Automatic Certiﬁcate Management Environment protocol (ACME) [128] to
validate domain ownership and issue certiﬁcates almost transparently for users. Today, Let’s En-
crypt has issued over 100 million certiﬁcates in less than 15 months and their certiﬁcates account for
80% of all publicly trusted certiﬁcates [129, 130].
Unfortunately, combining the elasticity of cloud infrastructure and the automation of certiﬁcate
issuance introduces new security vulnerabilities. We discover that stale and abandoned DNS entries
pointing to cloud IP addresses can be exploited by attackers to deceive domain-based certiﬁcate vali-
dation and obtain certiﬁcates for the victim domains. The problem stems from the ephemeral nature
of the cloud resources. More speciﬁcally, if a user releases a cloud IP address, but does not remove
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the corresponding DNS entry before releasing the IP address, an attacker can allocate the same IP
address, impersonate ownership of the domain, and request trusted certiﬁcates from a CA, like Let’s
Encrypt. We call them IP address use-after-free vulnerabilities, which can enable a variety of at-
tacks and cause harm. Adversaries can leverage the acquired valid certiﬁcates for man-in-the-middle
attacks, for example, to intercept the HTTPS traffic to the victim domain on a wireless network.
Worse, if an attacker obtains a wild-card certiﬁcate, her attack capabilities are signiﬁcantly enhanced,
possibly allowing her to impersonate any sub-domain, including non-existing ones. The obtained
certiﬁcates can be abused for phishing attacks, by impersonating the legitimate website, including
TLS veriﬁcation and its “trustworthy green lock.” Attackers can deface the website, and they might
even be able to launch remote code execution attacks, for example, if JavaScript or native code is
being loaded from the domain that was taken over [6, 102, 131].
To better understand the prevalence of IP address use-after-free vulnerabilities in the wild, we
conduct a large-scale analysis. From passive DNS traffic, we extract over 130 million domains that
point to IP addresses of cloud networks. On these domains, we perform regular liveness probes
to determine whether their cloud IP addresses are allocated and in use. Our results indicate that
over 700,000 domains point to cloud IP addresses that are free, and which are susceptible to domain
takeover attacks due to use-after-free vulnerabilities. We further investigate the feasibility of obtain-
ing particularly interesting target IP addresses from cloud services, and we estimate that it would
cost attackers less than $1 (USD) to cycle through the necessary unique IP addresses, which renders
the attack economically viable for adversaries. Based on our in-depth analysis, we propose to extend
the ACME protocol version 2 by including our new trust-based identiﬁer validation challenge, and
we provide practical recommendations for domain owners and cloud operators to protect themselves
from domain takeover attacks.
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We make the following contributions:
• We conduct a comprehensive study of IP address use-after-free vulnerabilities, and the domain
takeover attacks that these vulnerabilities enable. We show that the scale of the vulnerabilities
is considerable: Over 700,000 unique domains point to IP addresses that are free and can be
abused to take over the respective domains.
• We discover that even well maintained DNS zones can be vulnerable to domain takeover at-
tacks: After releasing cloud IP address resources, an adversary might be able to exploit now
outdated zone information in DNS caches to launch attacks.
• We examine the feasibility of launching domain takeover attacks in the real world through
cloud IP address re-use, by analyzing their allocation cycles, and we show that it is practical,
time-efficient, and cost-efficient for an attacker to launch such attacks.
• We propose a new domain-validation method for automated certiﬁcate management environ-
ments (ACME) CAs that leverages the existing trust of a name to mitigate domain takeover
attacks.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: First, we provide background detail on
DNS, operation of Infrastructure-as-a-Service clouds, and domain validation (Section 4.2). Next,
we analyze and evaluate to what degree IP address use-after-free vulnerabilities pose a security threat
(Section 4.3). Then, we present our mitigation technique, which retains almost all usability beneﬁts
of automated domain-validation, yet protects against IP address use-after-free attacks (Section 4.4).
Finally, we conclude (Section 4.5).
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4.2 Background
Weprovide a basic introduction to theDomainName System (DNS), to different operational models
in cloud setups, and to the use of domain-validation for TLS certiﬁcate issuance.
4.2.1 Domain Name System and DNSSEC
TheDomainName System (DNS) is a core protocol of the current Internet architecture. It facilitates
to use easily identiﬁable hierarchically organized names instead of IP addresses to access services
online. Although the fundamental idea of DNS is straightforward [132], we describe IPv4 and IPv6
resource records (RRs) and DNSSEC as they are essential.
Resolving names to IP addresses via DNS is done by requesting an ARR to resolve a name to an
IPv4 address, or an AAAARR to resolve to an IPv6 address. The information for a RR is stored in
the so-called parent zone. Each record is served by (at least one) DNS server, which is authoritative
for that zone. There is, however, no automatic aspect within the DNS ecosystem that guarantees
that DNS entries remain fresh, that is, a method that ensures that a given RR never becomes stale,
but that it always points to the correct IP address or that it is removed if it should point nowhere.
DNS by itself does not provide authentication, which brings security issues due to response
spooﬁng, and spooﬁng can allow domain takeover attacks. DNSSEC is one method to provide in-
tegrity for the unencrypted DNS ecosystem. Authenticating existing records is a straightforward
extension of DNS through a signature record type (RRSIG) for each original resource record set
(RRset), which is signedwith a zone-signing key (ZSK). The public key portion of the ZSK is hosted
in the zone, while the parent zone provides a hash of the ZSK in a DSRR. The problem of distribut-
ing public keys in a trustworthy manner is solved through DNS’ hierarchical nature and its existing
chain of trust from the root zone to the queried zone. Crucial is that DNSSEC discourages the use
of online signing to prevent denial of service attacks against the nameserver and chosen-plaintext at-
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tacks against the zone-signing key, as well as deploying the ZSK to (hidden) master nameservers to
automate signing of updated zone information online [133, Section 5]. Instead, it strongly encour-
ages to publish only zone information that was signed offline in a secure manner, and then deployed
to (hidden) masters [134, Section 3.1, Section 9, and Section 12][135, Section 3.4.3]. Furthermore,
the current state of the DNSSEC ecosystem shows signiﬁcant deployment issues, for example, not
publishing all required records for validation, incorrectly rolling-over keys, or not rolling keys over
in the ﬁrst place, which indicates a lack of care or toolingwhen deployingDNSSEC in practice [136].
4.2.2 Cloud Models
Cloud Computing has become a widely used concept in Computer Science. Following, we employ
the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) deﬁnition of Cloud Computing [137].
Clouds are hardware and software bundles to provide users with ﬁve basic characteristics: on-
demand self-service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity, and, measured services. Speciﬁcally,
it means that a cloud must provide services at its users’ demand, without requiring any further man-
ual interaction by the cloud operator, it must allow customers to (ideally) automatically scale their
resource usage based on their needs, and all operations must be metered precisely and billed accord-
ingly.
Cloud infrastructures generally have different deployment models, depending on their use case
and users: public for the general public, private for large operators or higher security requirements
(e.g., businesses or the government), or community for private clouds shared among multiple organi-
zations for cost-savings or security. We focus on IP address re-use vulnerabilities in public clouds.
The most distinguishing technical difference for clouds is their respective service model:
Software as a Service (SaaS).
The SaaSmodel is themost abstract setup. Customers interface with software provided by the
operator, either via their web-browser or a standardized program interface (API). Customers
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do not have access “the underlying cloud infrastructure including network, servers, operating systems,
storage, or even individual application capabilities [...]” [137]. Examples include Microsoft Office
365 and the SalesForce Platform.
Platform as a Service (PaaS).
For PaaS clouds, users deploy their own code and applications to run on the cloud. Although
the executed code is under the users’ control, access to the underlying cloud infrastructure,
like network and disk, is similarly restricted as in the case of SaaS clouds. Examples include
Heroku and Google App Engine.
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS).
IaaS clouds, on the other hand, give more control to cloud users. Here, a user can freely
request storage, network, memory, processing, and other resources as needed. Commonly,
these resources are provided to the user in form of a virtual machine (VM), on which the user
can install any operating system and software. Popular examples of IaaS clouds are Amazon
Web Services (AWS) EC2 and Microsoft Azure.
We investigate IaaS clouds because they allow us to freely and rapidly allocate IP addresses as part of
their resource pooling characteristic. Depending on the external interfaces of PaaS clouds, they may
also be vulnerable to re-use attacks, which are related to the IP address use-after-free vulnerabilities
that we describe.
4.2.3 Domain-Validated Certiﬁcates
The HTTPS ecosystem is based on certiﬁcate authorities (CAs), which are trusted by operating sys-
tem and browser vendors. These vendors include the CAs’ certiﬁcates in their products, and certiﬁ-
cates that are presented to clients have to demonstrate a chain of signatures to a certiﬁcate of a trusted
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CA. The job of a CA is to verify that the entity that requests a certiﬁcate to be issued is authorized
to obtain a signed certiﬁcate for the speciﬁc domain(s) that the certiﬁcate is supposed to be valid for.
Various methods to assert authority over a domain exist. Classical and more expensive methods
of identiﬁcation require a CA to verify that a requesting party conforms to the domain-owning
party by checking identity documents, for example, passports, or company incorporation forms.
However, such processes incur signiﬁcant overhead.
Nowadays, more cost-effective methods of validating domain ownership, or rather establishing
that the requesting party is currently controlling the domain, exist, and they have been adopted by
all major CAs, mainly to combat operating costs. These methods are generally referred to as issuance
of a domain-validated certiﬁcate, because only authority over the domain is established. The three
most common validation methods are:
DNS Validation.
To validate ownership of a domain via DNS, the certiﬁcate requester must set a nonce that she
received from the CA in a DNS record, usually a TXT record, which the CA will attempt to
query and validate. Requiring the requester to change a DNS entry implies that she controls
the domain’s DNS zone, which is considered a strong indicator for authority over a domain.
Email Validation.
Similarly, to validate a domain via email, the CA sends an email to (a) one of the mail ad-
dresses listed in the domain’sWHOIS data, or, (b) to one of the common administrative email
accounts, like “postmaster,” “webmaster,” or “sslmaster.” The email includes a unique token
that must be send to the CA, or a unique link that needs to be visited to verify ownership of
the email address, and, in turn, the domain.
Web-based Validation.
For web-based validation the certiﬁcate requester receives a token from the CA that she must
87
Mitigating the Risks of Takeover Attacks and Domain-Validated Certificates Chapter 4
make available via HTTP at a CA-speciﬁed path on the domain for which the certiﬁcate was
requested. Once made available, the CA veriﬁes that the token is accessible and contains the
correct value, and only then attests ownership of the domain and issues certiﬁcate.
Traditionally, CAs were dominated by an enclosed and business-oriented community. CAcert
was among the earliest and most prominent approaches to introduce a community driven CA ef-
fort [138]. Unfortunately, due to insufficient support by browser and operating system vendors, it
never reachedwidespread adoption. Furthermore, the recent rise of TLS related incidents, for exam-
ple, DigiNotar [139] and CAs issuing illegitimate certiﬁcates [140], lead to two new developments
trying to disrupt the established CA ecosystem: the wide-spread introduction and requirement of
certiﬁcate transparency and the Let’s Encrypt CA.
Certiﬁcate transparency is a framework that speciﬁes that a CA must publish to a tamper-proof,
append-only log, which can be audited by authorized parties [141, 142]. Its purpose is to allow po-
tentially affected parties, for example, domain owners, to verify that a CA has not issued a certiﬁcate
for a given domain to an unauthorized party. In an ideal world, all CAs would participate in this
scheme and publish certiﬁcate transparency logs, but, unfortunately, not all CAs do currently par-
ticipate. However, some individual CAs have been forced to publish transparency logs by browser
vendors, most notably Google, who threatened to void their trust in the CAs and to remove the CAs’
certiﬁcate from their products if the CA does not comply with Google’s request. Without a doubt,
the removal of a CA from a major browser, such as Google Chrome, would have severe business and
ﬁnancial consequences for a CA, as it might have to refund cost for already issued certiﬁcates and it
would likely have difficulty acquiring new customers, which is what forces a CA into compliance
and why it is willing to participate in the certiﬁcate transparency scheme. One example of such an
occurrence is Symantec, who has been required to publish certiﬁcate transparency logs after they
issued certiﬁcates for google.com without Google’s authorization [140].
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Let’s Encrypt, on the other hand, is an effort to make TLS encryption more prevalent on the In-
ternet. They practice a leaner and completely automatic identity veriﬁcation process, and they only
issue certiﬁcates with short lifetimes of 90 days, to limit the potential damage of key compromise
and mis-issuance, as well as to encourage automation [143]. Contrary to the most other CAs, Let’s
Encrypt issues certiﬁcates free of charge, and identity is veriﬁed exclusively via web-based validation
and through DNS validation. Thanks to a combination of a browser-trusted certiﬁcate, being free
of charge, and software tooling openly available to reduce system administrator effort, it has led to
a signiﬁcant increase in the number of systems on the Internet which use validly signed certiﬁcates,
as well as it increased Let’s Encrypt’s popularity and market share [144].
4.3 Problem Analysis
Mitigations to protect from security problems can be implemented with varying degree of com-
plexity, and for problems of varying degree of complexity. However, in practice, these security
measures bear performance overhead and have usability drawbacks, which might not be acceptable.
In turn, their actual real-world deployment depends on security risk evaluations, operational costs,
and human costs. Therefore, before trying to mitigate a non-issue, it is necessary to justify them
with supporting data instead of recommending absolutes.
Following, we ﬁrst discuss the different security issues in respect to use-after-free vulnerabilities
for IP addresses in respect to DNS-based domain validation. We then evaluate to what degree those
security issues are practical to exploit. Finally, we estimate howmany domains might be susceptible
to takeovers and whether protecting them is worthwhile.
For our problem analysis, we investigate and interact with systems that are online and in-use by
third parties. Naturally, those systems are outside of our control. In turn, our analysis poses ethical
challenges to not affect or impact the legitimate users of such systems in any way. We discuss the
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considerations we undertook for an ethical and appropriate, yet realistic, analysis separately for each
experiment in their respective sections.
4.3.1 Impact
Domain takeovers bear serious consequences, even temporary takeovers can provide ample opportu-
nity for an attacker (Section 4.1). Naturally, the way an attacker might cause harm to the legitimate
domain operator and domain users varies from case to case and the space of attacks is vast, which is
why we only discuss a subset of possible attacks:
Malicious and Remote Code Loading.
Likely the most straight-forward way for an attacker to turn a proﬁt through a domain she
took over is by serving malicious code, serving advertisements, or including affiliate mar-
keting [1, 102, 131]. Although considered easier to launch for websites, the attack is not
restricted to websites. Instead, an attack could also be launched on mobile or desktop appli-
cations, for example, through remote code loading [145, 146]. Unfortunately, HTTPS and
HSTS themselves do not mitigate such an attack.
TLS Certiﬁcates.
Another way for an attacker to leverage a domain takeover attack or to increase its success
chance is by requesting a TLS certiﬁcate that is trusted by operating systems and browsers. Re-
questing a trusted TLS certiﬁcate has become practically feasible because of domain-validated
certiﬁcates, such as Let’s Encrypt. Once she has obtained the certiﬁcate, she has increased
capabilities for remote code loading attacks over HTTPS, even including HSTS.
Nameservers.
A domain might also point to a nameserver, where the domain server can be for the same do-
main or different ones. In practice, these cases occur because DNS demands multiple name-
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servers for redundancy, and if a nameserver does not respond, a client automatically and, trans-
parent to the user, retries queries with fail-over nameservers. Therefore, a domain pointing to
a free IP address for a nameserver only incurs a latency penalty and is barely noticeable by the
user. However, an attacker could take over the entire domain and even create additional do-
mains. For a domain owner, taking over a domain that is being used as nameserver equates to
the worst case scenario. Unfortunately, even entire top-level domains have been vulnerable
to nameserver domain takeover attacks [147].
Email Servers.
Similarly, after gaining control over a domain, an attacker might be able to send and receive
emails. Importantly, a DNS MX record is not required: if a domain has no MX record set,
then its respective A record is being used. Acquiring the capability to send or receive email
allows an attacker to abuse a domain for spear-phishing and phishing campaigns, such as CEO
email scams, or to recruit victims for fraudulent schemes [148, 7].
Sub-domain Attacks.
Finally, top-level domains are not the only worthwhile takeover targets for an attacker. Sub-
domains are at least similarly interesting for attacks, even sub-domains that might have never
been used in production, as they could still be abused for authentication bypass vulnerabilities,
for example, like it recently happened to the ride-sharing company Uber [149].
Regarding TLS certiﬁcate related attacks, it is sufficient for an attacker to request an ordinary certiﬁ-
cate. She does not require a wild-card certiﬁcate to launch successful attacks. However, if an attacker
can obtain a wild-card certiﬁcate, her capabilities are signiﬁcantly extended. For example, if she can
receive a wild-card certiﬁcate for “support.example.com,” she would then be able to impersonate,
intercept traffic to any sub-domain of “support.example.com,” and even launch sub-domain related
attacks at themain domain “example.com” [149]. Although, currently, wild-card certiﬁcates are not
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supported by free domain-validated certiﬁcate authorities, like Let’s Encrypt or StartCom, at least
Let’s Encrypt is planning to support them as early as January 2018 [150]. Furthermore, wild-card
certiﬁcates are already supported by other mainstream CAs, such as Comodo. While they charge
a fee, they allow signiﬁcantly longer validity periods of up to three years, which can make attacks
even more disastrous.
4.3.2 Taxonomy
For a precise classiﬁcation of how IP address use-after-free vulnerabilities are being rendered possible,
we distinguish four different cases in which a domain points to a free IP address (i.e., the domain is
stale) through the following taxonomy:1
Early Migration.
A domain-IP mapping is migrating early if the domain is in use by the operator, and the records
at the authoritative nameserver have been updated to point to the new IP address before the
old IP address is being released and available for others to request and use.
Delayed Migration.
Similarly, a domain-IP mapping is migrating with delay if the domain is in use by the operator,
and the records at the authoritative nameserver have not been updated yet, that is, they point
to a released IP address.
Auxiliary.
Differently, a domain-IP mapping is auxiliary if the domain is used by the operator, and the
domain has multiple records, which point to both current and old IP address, possibly in a
way so that the old and free IP address would only be used as in a fail-over scenario and has
otherwise no practical impact.
1Our study focuses on TLS certiﬁcates, web servers, domain-validation through HTTP, and type A DNS records.
However, our ﬁndings also apply to other record types, for example, MX or NS.
92
Mitigating the Risks of Takeover Attacks and Domain-Validated Certificates Chapter 4
Abandoned.
We deﬁne a domain-IP mapping as abandoned if the domain is not used legitimately anymore.
For example, a company might become defunct and is not operating the service anymore
that was previously offered at the domain, but it retains ownership of the domain until its
expiration.
Depending on how the domain becomes stale, the length of the window of opportunity differs. In
case of an early migration, an attacker has the shortest window of exploitation: the cache lifetime of
the domain IP mapping. Note, however, that the time a domain IP mapping might be cached is not
strictly its time to live (TTL) as set by the authoritative nameserver. Themapping can be purged from
the cache before its expiration, and a caching nameserver might ignore the TTL entirely and cache
entries longer, for example, for performance reasons, though in violation of the DNS RFC [151].
Theoretically, early migration could prevent IP address use-after-free attacks under the assumption
that no intermediate nameservers cache entries longer and that the IP address is released only after the
TTL has expired. Practically, unfortunately, human error results in domains not always migrating
early and intermediate nameserversmight ignore the TTL. Therefore, even those domainsmigrating
early can be at risk of temporary domain takeovers.
From a security standpoint, the remaining three classes are more worrisome. The easiest case to
launch a successful attack against is an abandoned domain: the attacker is not rushed by the legitimate
operator, and she can wait until an opportunity arises. Fortunately, it is also the least interesting
case for an attacker because users are not expected to contact the service at the domain regularly
anymore but only sporadically (e.g., through an outdated bookmark for a website), thus, the number
of potential victims is generally low.
For domains that migrate with delay, the window of opportunity to validate ownership of a
domain is ﬁxed in time and often short. While an attacker could miss the window, she can lurk and
wait for a target domain migrating with delay by repeatedly trying to allocate the target IP address,
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which we later show is practical (Section 4.3.3). More important, once the window of opportunity
has passed, the successfully validated domain is not useless to the attacker even though she has no
control over the host with the IP address behind the domain-IP mapping anymore (it is now a new
IP address, which is not under the attacker’s control). For instance, in case of domain-validated
TLS certiﬁcates, once an attacker validated that she owns the domain, she can later leverage the
obtained certiﬁcate for man-in-the-middle attacks, for example, for a wireless network at a coffee
shop, because the certiﬁcate is trusted by major operating systems and browsers. Here, the number
of victims is larger than in the case of abandoned domains, but seldom substantial. The core problem
with domain-IP mappings that are migrated with delay lies in the long-term capabilities granted to
the attacker.
Auxiliary domain-IP mappings are the most troublesome case: they provide a constant window
of opportunity and can cause the most havoc. First, an attacker can remain stealthy as a “fail-over”
until a viable opportunity arises. During normal operation, the attacker’s machine does not respond
or it redirects all traffic to a legitimate host. Second, an attacker can force a fail-over to the IP address
under his control by launching a denial of service (DoS) attack against the legitimate hosts. However,
even without forcing a fail-over, an attacker will see a subset of traffic due to implicit round-robin
in DNS, which occurs because DNS records have no implied order. Upon forcing fail-over, the
attacker forces a domain-validation service to connect to the host under the control of the attacker,
as no other hosts are responsive. Correspondingly, without forcing a fail-over, the attacker might
need to try multiple times until the domain-validation service connects to the address under her
control and, in turn, validates her ownership of the domain. The attacker can verify ownership of
the domain successfully in both cases, for example, to request a certiﬁcate, and a signiﬁcant number
of users will connect to the attacker’s machine (all or a subset due to DNS’ round-robin). Overall,
auxiliary domain-IP mappings can affect the most victims and it can provide ample opportunity to
cause harm, for example, to visitors of a website by injecting malicious code.
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After we classiﬁed the reasons for why IP address use-after-free vulnerabilities exist and what
their impact can be, the immediate next question becomes: can an attacker actually exploit these
vulnerabilities in practice, by allocating the same IP address the victim has freed?
4.3.3 IP Address Churn
An attacker can successfully exploit an IP address use-after-free vulnerability in practice if she can get
a cloud provider to assign the recently freed IP address to herself within the window of opportunity.
Following, we determine whether it is practical for Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Microsoft
Azure, the two largest cloud providers today [152].
Speciﬁcally, we repeatedly allocate and free IP addresses in succession. To prevent starvation,
we are using a slow allocation cycle to not interfere with the clouds’ operations: We request ﬁve IP
addresses per region, freeing them immediately, and then sleeping for 10 seconds, that is, effectively
allocating 1 IP address every two seconds. We performed our IP address churn experiment from
April 29, 2017 01:03UTC to June 6, 2017 23:27UTC spanning all regions of the cloud providers at
the time for a total cost of $31.06 (USD). Over the course of ourmeasurements, we cycled through a
total of 14,159,705 allocations of 1,613,082 unique IP addresses. Aswe always ﬁrst released addresses
before allocating the next batch, we cannot cause address starvation. This is highlighted by us always
receiving an IP address upon issuing an API request.
The success of our technique depends on how fast we can iterate through the pool of free IPv4
addresses for a given availability zone. This depends on the overall size of the pool, and its variance,
that is, how fast addresses are allocated by other users. To illustrate these characteristics for each
availability zone, we investigate the churn (see Figure 4.2) and time between allocation of the same
address (see Figure 4.1). We show only AWS speciﬁc plots in the pursuit of brevity and comprehen-
sibility, as Azure is not behaving signiﬁcantly different.
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Using the churn plots in Figure 4.2, we get an overview of change in the IaaS cloud’s IP pools.
Figure 4.2 shows the churn in allocated addresses for AWS, that is, for each daywe allocated addresses
we plot the fraction of addresses we previously allocated and the fraction of addresses we did not
previously receive as an allocation. Dates without data relate to dates where either the IaaS provider
conducted maintenance operations, or our measurement scripts were not yet running for that zone.
The natural patternwe expect for the churn plots is an initially high share of new addresses while
the pool is being initially explored. This pattern should then slowly approach a stable socket, which
corresponds to those addresses that are handed back to the pool by other tenants. Indeed, we ﬁnd
this pattern in our data. For example, Figure 4.2a and Figure 4.2g show this expected pattern. How-
ever, these zones have a relatively large pool of addresses that are free at any given time. Zones like
eu-west-2 (see Figure 4.2i) are signiﬁcantly smaller, hence converge more quickly. This further-
more underlines that the allocation algorithm must, in some form, iterate through the whole pool
of addresses, instead of just allocating the (same) ﬁrst free addresses.
In addition, we also ﬁnd a couple of interesting events: Zone ap-southeast-2 (see Figure 4.2e)
started off similar to eu-west-2. However, at the beginning of week 20 in 2017, a large batch of
free addresses was added to the pool, leading to a “restart” of the churn pattern. In eu-west-1 (see
Figure 4.2i) and us-east-1 (see Figure 4.2k)we see the effect if several days of not iterating through the
pool: As soon as we restart our allocation script, we observe a slight rise in new addresses, which have
accumulated during the time we did not perform measurements. We ﬁnd the last notable pattern in
us-west-2 (see Figure 4.2n). Here, a substantial amount of so far unseen addresses is released to the
pool in the middle of each week.
Next, we take a look on how long it takes to iterate through the whole pool, that is, how fast an
attacker could obtain a speciﬁc address. For this, we look at how much time passes on average, until
an address is allocated for the second time. Given our earlier observation that we do indeed circle
through the IP pool, we expect the mean to correspond to the point where we iterated through the
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IP address pool. This is summarized with boxplots (without outliers) in Figure 4.1. We ﬁnd that
with our ethically restricted approachmost pools are exhaustedwithin under a day. Only the largest,
like eu-west-1 and us-east-1 reach means signiﬁcantly over a day.
Although we used a slow allocation cycle to not interfere with the clouds’ operations, an at-
tacker is not bound by the same ethical standard. Practically, the attacker will be bound only by the
response time of the IP address allocation API endpoint and her network latency to it. Therefore, an
attacker can cycle through available IP addresses much more rapidly. In fact, considering the AWS
API limit (10,000 requests per second [153]) and the number of requests needed to exhaust pools in
our experiments, an attacker would only need between two and 61 seconds to acquire a target IP
once the victim has freed it, using a rapid allocation cycle of 5,000 IP allocations per second. In prac-
tice, this theoretical limit is not necessary for an attacker to launch a successful attack. For example,
DNS cache times are almost always ﬁve minutes, and often much longer with 60 minutes to multi-
ple hours, thus, allowing an attacker to be successful by exploiting caching effects with rates of less
than 50 IP address allocations per second.
4.3.4 Affected Domain Names
Considering the worrying high-rate of IP address churn for major cloud providers and low oppor-
tunity cost for an attacker to launch an attack, the only question that remains unanswered before
we can determine whether temporary stale domains pointing to readily available IP addresses are a
problem in practice is whether a signiﬁcant number of domains are affected?
For a better understanding of how many domains are affected by IP address churn, we observe
DNS traffic through Farsight’s passive DNS measurements [154]. The Farsight passive DNS dataset
is provided through a continuous data feed. For our collection and DNS data analysis, we follow es-
tablished best practices for collecting and handling Internet measurement data [155], we anonymize
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Figure 4.1: Time between allocations of the same IP address per AWS EC2 availability zone
all incoming data immediately by removing any resolver information, and we only retain successful
DNS responses.
Speciﬁcally, we collect all DNS responses containing A records pointing to the Amazon Web
Services (AWS) EC2 cloud, theMicrosoft Azure cloud, and theDigitalOcean cloud spanning exactly
120 days from April 11, 2017 0:00 UTC to August 9, 2017 0:00 UTC. Overall, we extract and
analyze 130,274,722 unique domains with 767,108,850 unique domain-IP mappings, counting also
sub-domains. Including sub-domains is important for completeness, however, it makes an accurate
comparison to top domain lists (e.g., Alexa), to estimate the domains’ popularity, difficult, because
they do not include sub-domains. Matching at the second-level of a domain is similarly problematic
due to potentially over-estimating the impact of ephemeral sub-domains and the loss of information
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Figure 4.2: Share of newly-observed IP addresses (churn) per AWS EC2 availability zone
on sub-domains of special second-level domains, such as .ac.nz or .co.uk. It remains for future work
to evaluate the distribution of DNS zone staleness in regard to domain popularity.
We perform our evaluation on a Kubernetes cluster comprised of 656 processor cores and 3,020
GiBmemory, and which is connected at a dedicated 10 Gbps Internet uplink.2 For each domain, we
2The cluster is on a network separated from the main network of the institution at which the experiments are per-
formed. The network traffic generated for our evaluation is not subject to packet introspection, which would have had
a negative impact on our measurements.
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test every six hours3 from June 10, 2017 0:00 UTC to August 9, 2017 0:00 UTC (60 days) whether
the IP address is still in use or if it might be freed and available:
1. We resolve the domain and check if the IP address the domain points belongs to a network of
a cloud provider.4 If the domain points to a cloud IP, we test if the IP address is responsive
and whether it might be free and available to others. If it does not point to a cloud provider
or does not exist anymore, we do not perform any further tests.
2. We test if the IP address responds to ICMP ping requests, or responds to any packet sent on 36
of the most frequently used TCP and UDP ports (see Table 4.1) [156] within a two seconds
timeout.5 If we receive a response to any of our requests, wemark the IP address as online and
allocated. Correspondingly, if we receive no response until the timeout is reached, we mark
the IP address as offline and freed.
Naturally, ingress ﬁrewall rules could prevent our test from succeeding and, thus, our estimation
is an upper-bound. One might expect it to be a gross over-approximation because cloud virtual
machines instances have traditionally received public IP addresses. Nowadays, however, this is not
necessarily the case: cloud instances that do not need a public IP address can and generally do live
in cloud-only internal networks. Furthermore, by default, many machines respond to ICMP ping
requests or allow for secure shell (SSH) access via TCP on port 22. Additionally, a public IP address
associated with an instance is freed and can be reused by others if the instance is shutdown, even
if it is later powered on again (it receives a new IP address at this point). In turn, it means that we
only misclassify machines as offline with heavy ingress ﬁltering that do not provide a service on the
3Some tests were up to twelve hours apart because of scheduling delay.
4We exclude networks of cloud providers that are used for services other than cloud virtual machine instances, for
example, Load-Balancing-as-a-Service.
5We chose a two seconds timeout after we experimented with higher timeouts of ﬁve to ten seconds and did not
notice any difference in results. A shorter timeouf of one second resulted in a high misclassiﬁcation rate due to network
and system load. The cut-off for no misclassiﬁcations was close to 1.4 seconds in our tests. Out of carefulness, we chose
a two-second timeout.
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Protocol (Common) TCP UDP Port(s) Î
FTP 3 3 21
SSH 3 3 22, 2222, 22022
Telnet 3 3 23
SMTP 3 3 25, 587
WHOIS 3 43
DNS 3 3 53
HTTP 3 80, 8000, 8080
Kerberos 3 3 88
POP3 3 3 110
IMAP 3 3 143
LDAP 3 3 389
HTTP (Secure) 3 443, 8443
SMTP (Secure) 3 3 465
LDAP (Secure) 3 3 636
Telnet (Secure) 3 3 992
IMAP (Secure) 3 3 993
POP3 (Secure) 3 3 995
MS SQL 3 3 1433
CPanel 3 2082
CPanel (Secure) 3 2083
CPanel WHM 3 2086
CPanel WHM (Secure) 3 2087
MySQL 3 3 3306
2Wire RPC 3 3 3479
Virtuosso 3 4643
Postgres 3 3 5432
CWMP 3 3 7547
Plesk 3 8087
Webmin 3 10000
ENSIM 3 19638
Table 4.1: Ports and protocols used for IP address liveness checking
top 36 ports (see Table 4.1), and which have not been migrated to an internal network yet, which is
becoming scarcer. Therefore, although our estimate remains an upper-bound, we are conﬁdent that
it is a close estimate.
Over the course of our measurements, we classify 702,180 unique domains (0.539%) as pointing
to available and freed IP addresses. Therefore, these domains, most likely, have been vulnerable to a
(temporary) domain takeover attack at some point in time. In fact, while themajority of domains mi-
grated delayed (80.31%), a non-negligible amount of domain-IP mappings are abandoned (17.24%)
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and, fortunately, only a small number of domain-IP mappings are auxiliary (2.45%). Note that we
only determine that the domain could be taken over, but its prior purpose remains unknown. Fur-
ther investigation by future work is required to determine howmany of the vulnerable domains have
been actively used in the past and what the impact of an attack on them would be, for example, on a
website that is protected through HTTPS and requires a TLS certiﬁcate, or a domain that is used to
load remote code for amobile application (see Section 4.3.1). Although the amount of vulnerable do-
mains appears small relatively speaking, in absolute terms, the number of stale domains is quite large.
Additionally, due to the nature of our dataset, we only observe domains that are actively being at-
tempted to be accessed: the estimated number of cases that might be vulnerable to domain takeover
attacks and could be abused for phishing or scams, but which were not being accessed during our
observation period, might be signiﬁcantly larger.
4.3.5 Proof of Concept Domain Takeover
Finally, we show the practicality of domain takeover attacks through a proof of concept certiﬁcate
request to Let’s Encrypt. Certainly, we face the largest ethical challenges with this experiment, as
disrupting or having any impact on legitimate users raises ethical concerns. For example, it is im-
possible to guarantee that we do not interfere with any third party operation that might rely on the
domain, or that we do not accidentally receive Personally Identiﬁable Information (PII) or other
conﬁdential data. Therefore, we perform a domain takeover attack for a domain under our control.
After obtaining the certiﬁcate from Let’s Encrypt and verifying that it has been published to certiﬁ-
cate transparency logs, we revoke it, and publish the revocation to Let’s Encrypt. The time until
these actions appear in CT logs serves as an indication of the time that passes before the legitimate
owner would be able to notice the attack by monitoring CT logs.
For our proof of concept experiment, we gained temporary control over the domain “cloud-
strife.seclab.cs.ucsb.edu” by attempting to re-allocate the IP address to which the domain points to
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(34.215.255.68). Note, that the IP address is located in the availability zone us-west-2, which has
a high churn that makes takeover attackers more difficult. While this may seem contradictory, as
a high churn means that an attacker can allocate more addresses per time-unit, a high churn also
indicates a larger IP address pool. Ultimately, we were able to successfully re-allocate the IP ad-
dress within 27 minutes and 55 seconds with a slow allocation cycle of two IP addresses per second.
While anecdotal, it serves as an estimate of the time needed to launch an attack successfully under
unfavorable conditions for an attacker (high churn, low allocation rate). We requested a TLS cer-
tiﬁcate from Let’s Encrypt, it appeared in different certiﬁcate transparency logs between 34 minutes
and 61 minutes later, and we revoked the certiﬁcate immediately after certiﬁcate transparency log
entries had been propagated. Our certiﬁcate request was published at the Certiﬁcate Search (crt.sh)
web-interface under id 250959196; it can be viewed at https://crt.sh/?id=250959196. The
certiﬁcate that we obtained from Let’s Encrypt and a message signed by the respective private key is
contained in Appendix A.1.
Although the incorrect migration of domain-IP mappings is comparatively small on a relative
scale, we believe that the absolute numbers speak volumes paired with the practicality of takeovers.
Together, they justify looking closer at mitigating IP address use-after-free at its core, however, with
a strong requirement to incur as little additional overhead on usability or performance as possible.
4.4 Mitigation
Weaddress the issue of IP re-use attacks abusing staleDNS records, particular for IP addresses belong-
ing to cloud networks, a topic that has received little attention so far. To be more speciﬁc, we inves-
tigate IP address use-after-free vulnerabilities, which can pose severe security threats, and which can
be made even more dangerous through domain-validated TLS certiﬁcates (see Section 4.3). Current
automated domain-validation-based certiﬁcate issuance systems are also threatened to be exploited
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through man-in-the-middle attacks discussed by Gavrichenkov et al. [157]. Existing defenses rely
on certiﬁcate revocation, which is severely fragmented and cannot be relied on in practice [158, 159].
It became only recentlymore tractable, for example, throughCRLite [160], but these solutions have
not been adopted yet. One core problem is that revocation checks in browsers are not comprehen-
sive: Chrome generally does not verify revocations, its CRLSet is limited to emergency revocations
by design [161], and Mozilla’s Firefox similarly limits revocation checks through OneCRL to CA
intermediate certiﬁcates [162]. Certiﬁcate revocations in other software and libraries, which rely on
the same certiﬁcate issuance processes andwould also be required to adopt the new revocation checks,
are rarely checked in practice [163]. Furthermore, revocations are reactive by nature, and they pro-
vide a window of opportunity to an attacker by design: the time until the revocation has propagated
plus the time until the attacker’s certiﬁcate has been revoked by the issuing CA on request of the le-
gitimate party, the latter of which is generally a manual process as additional veriﬁcation is required.
We believe that the ﬁrst line of defense should be with domain-validation-based CAs and it should
be preventive. Therefore, we propose an additional layer of protection for domain-validation-based
CAs, such as Let’s Encrypt, that can efficiently and with negligible overhead prevent these attacks.
Our mitigation technique builds on the ACME protocol version 2 [128] and it is complimentary to
the certiﬁcate transparency framework [141].
4.4.1 General Concept and Threat Model
The underlying problem of IP address re-use attacks is that a domain-validated certiﬁcate can be re-
quested as soon as an attacker controls the IP address towhich a domain points to, and that requesting
and receiving a trusted certiﬁcate is fully automatic and only a matter of seconds nowadays. An at-
tacker might be able to obtain the IP address legitimately, because the domain record was left stale.
To obtain a certiﬁcate, she might also be able to performman-in-the-middle attacks between the au-
thenticating CA and the target system. A similar issue occurs, if she can (temporarily) compromise
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the DNS (delegation or authoritative servers) for a domain. Then, she can simply change the IP ad-
dress a record points to, as well as potential CAA or DANE TLSA records [164, 165]. Technically,
attacks involving DNS-based attacks should be prevented by DNSSEC [134]. However, if key sign-
ing is performed online on the authoritative servers itself (against DNSSEC best practices) [166], and
she compromises one of these servers, then she regains full control over the domain. Although, do-
main takeovers rarely tend to last for extended periods of time, TLS certiﬁcate for the domain can
later be used by the attacker until the certiﬁcate’s expiration date, possibly involving other man-in-
the-middle attacks.
For all certiﬁcate requests that a CA receives, one of the following four cases applies:
1. No certiﬁcate has been requested for this domain in the past.
2. A certiﬁcate for the domain has been requested in the past, and the domain still points to the
same IP address.
3. A certiﬁcate for the domain has been requested in the past, but the domain now points to a
different IP address.
4. A certiﬁcate for the domain has been requested in the past, but it was veriﬁed in a more strict
manner, possibly using extended validation (EV).
The ﬁrst case is relatively frequent, and it is indistinguishable from the legitimate ﬁrst use of domain-
validated certiﬁcate issuance, which it is impossible to protect against without extended validation,
which is itself often deemed too costly or impractical. We also acknowledge that an attacker who
has compromised the system to which this domain points to will, in any case, be able to issue a new
certiﬁcate for the domain, or steal the existing one.6 Hence, a full system compromise is outside of
6Certiﬁcate theft can be protected through hardware security modules and may further become a commodity
through methods like Intel SGX or ARM’s TrustZone, which can be used to entrench certiﬁcate handling in a secured
enclave.
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the scope of our work. What our mitigation technique has to ensure is that a domain-validated cer-
tiﬁcate is only issued if the CA can verify that there has been no non-cooperative change of authority
over either the system the domain points to or DNS zone for the domain.
Concerning our threat model, the attacker does not control a trusted CA, and she has average
resources and skills, that is, she is not a state-level actor and cannot expend signiﬁcant resources for
a successful attack. Her overall objective is to obtain a domain-validated TLS certiﬁcate for a target
domain that already uses a valid TLS certiﬁcate issued by a third party CA. However, she has no
administrative access to the machine that the target domain currently points to, she cannot steal the
current certiﬁcate or factors its keys in a reasonable amount of time, but, instead, she must request
a new certiﬁcate. Taken into account the current operational model for domain-validating CAs,
to achieve her goal, the attacker can: (a) obtain access to an IP address to which a stale A record
for the domain points to, (b) perform a man-in-the-middle attack somewhere on the path between
the issuing CA and the system to which the target domain points to, or, (c) illegitimately take over
authority over the DNS zone for some amount of time.
4.4.2 Pre-Signature Certiﬁcate Consistency Checks
To ensure that an attacker within our threat model cannot request a new certiﬁcate, we must ensure
that she cannot show that there has been a cooperative change for: (a) the IP address to which the
domain points to, or (b) theDNSzone of the domain. Oneway to accomplish this task is by requiring
each subsequent certiﬁcate request for a domain for which a certiﬁcate has been issued in the past by
trusted CA, or which was covered by a similarly issued wild-card certiﬁcate, to be signed with a
preexisting certiﬁcate.
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Pre-Signed Domains
A challenge for a CA receiving a domain-validation certiﬁcate request is to determine whether a TLS
certiﬁcate has been issued to this domain in the past, either by itself, or possibly by another trusted
CA. Fortunately, two approaches to implement these requirements exist that are viable:
Federated Approach.
In case of the federated approach, each trusted CA is required to publish its issued certiﬁcates
in multiple certiﬁcate transparency logs, which do not need to be run by the CA itself [141].
This approach has the strong advantage that it utilizes established technology, meaning that
the required functionality is readily available and no additional service needs to be deployed
and managed. Although certiﬁcate transparency logs are not yet required for every CA or
every certiﬁcate, and not all CAs are publishing certiﬁcate logs, Google Chrome is already
requiring CT logs to some certiﬁcates: for all certiﬁcates issued by Symantec, WoSign, and
StartCom, aswell as for all extended validation certiﬁcates (since January 2015). Furthermore,
enforcing the requirement for all trusted CAs is expected within the next years [167]. Thus,
expected development and policy changes would further empower this approach.
From an algorithmic point of view, a naïve existence check requires lookups for each trusted
CA in an aggregated database. Fortunately, by leveraging CAA records via DNS combined
withDNSSEC, one can limit lookups to a small set of CAs, for example, only one or twoCAs.
Speciﬁcally, it is more likely that one of the authorized CAs has issued a certiﬁcate for the
domain in the past. Once a previously issued certiﬁcate has been found that is still valid, then
the search can be terminated early, which reduces lookup time. Additionally, CAA records
have become mandatory to be honored by CAs in September 2017 [168]. Therefore, due to
the increasing adoption and availability of CT and CAA, we consider this approach the most
practical and promising one.
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Centralized Approach.
Alternatively, a centralized approach is possible. Here, a single authority, possibly IANA,
would provide an oracle service. The service would return a boolean answer when queried,
conﬁrming whether any CA ever issued a certiﬁcate for a speciﬁed domain. Before issuing
a new certiﬁcate, CAs would have to check if a certiﬁcate has been issued in the past. Fur-
thermore, they must notify the authority of newly issued certiﬁcates. Unfortunately, the
centralized approach bears potential trust issues and poses a single point of failure.
4.4.3 Domain Takeover Resistant Identiﬁer Validation Challenge
Next, we develop a practical identiﬁer validation challenge that is resistant to domain takeover at-
tacks. Speciﬁcally, we target the ACME protocol, which is used by Let’s Encrypt and others to
automate the process of issuing certiﬁcates. To do so, we introduce an additional challenge to the
ACMEv2 RFC [128]. No other changes to the RFC are necessary. In turn, it allows our validation
challenge to be minimally invasive to the protocol and its subsequent implementations, yet, at the
same time, it signiﬁcantly improves security by mitigating the attacks that we present in this chap-
ter. The core idea of our proposed challenge is to leverage existing certiﬁcates to form a chain of
trust. Implementing a solution that uses existing certiﬁcates to sign responses to identiﬁcation val-
idation challenges triggers various issues with the handling of key material. For example, private
keys should not be used outside of the context for which their respective certiﬁcate has been issued,
which would happen if we naïvely sign a challenge response with a key, for which the respective cer-
tiﬁcate was issued for handling TLS server connections. Fortunately for us, retrieving the challenge
response through over HTTPS eliminates the problem, and verifying the used certiﬁcate satisﬁes all
requirements we put forth in the previous sections.
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Figure 4.3: Certiﬁcate request process that mitigates domain takeover attacks
Our challenge works as follows (see Figure 4.3):
Ê The client sends a new certiﬁcate request for her domain, for example, “example.com,” to a
domain-validating ACME CA.
Ë The CA checks whether a certiﬁcate for the domain “example.com” exists, that is, that one
has been issued by a trusted CA in the past. The CA is free to include expired certiﬁcates in
the check or ignore them according to an agreed-on policy (see Section 4.4.4).
Ì The CA issues a challenge to the client, which she needs to fulﬁll to validate ownership of
the domain. If a prior certiﬁcate exists, the CA sends two challenges: ﬁrst, our challenge,
which is similar to the original HTTP challenge, and which includes a token to be hosted
at a speciﬁed path at the domain of the requested certiﬁcate, and, second, a challenge that is
considered more trustworthy than the HTTP challenge, such as a whois-based challenge or a
DNS-based challenge. Following the ACMEv2 RFC, a client needs to satisfy only one of the
two challenges. If she fails our challenge, whichmight happen in some cases (see Section 4.4.4),
the more trustworthy challenge must be completed. For more details on how challenges are
implemented, we refer to Section 8 “Identiﬁer Validation Challenges”’of the ACME v2 RFC.
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Alternatively, if no prior certiﬁcate exists, the CA is free to send any challenges as deﬁned by
the RFC.
Í Once the client receives our challenge, she will host the nonce from it at the URL speciﬁed
by the challenge to serve as the veriﬁcation resource.
Î The CAwill attempt to access the veriﬁcation resource, and, in turn, verify that the challenge
has been completed by the client. Veriﬁcation requires that the nonce has been placed at the
resource, as well as that the HTTPS response is signed with the private key for a certiﬁcate of
the domain that was previously issued by a trusted CA (see certiﬁcate existence check;Ë).
4.4.4 Failure Cases
There exist some possible failure scenarios of our challenge, which must be handled gracefully to
preserve security of domain-validation. However, the simple failure of the process does not (yet)
indicate an attack. Furthermore, as soon as a failure has been resolved, the above process can be used
to regularly renew certiﬁcates automatically because the HTTPS challenge will not fail again for the
same reason.
Lost Access to Old Certiﬁcate or Private Key
Among the most likely non-malicious scenarios for failure is the case of an operator who has lost
access to her prior certiﬁcate or private key. Here, the HTTPS response cannot be signed and the
challenge will fail. From a security standpoint, this case must be treated like a potential attack by
the CA because it is impossible to automatically distinguish between a legitimate lost key, and an
attacker not having access to the key in the ﬁrst place. Instead, the operator should use a DNS-based
challenge or whois-based challenge. Note that no additional certiﬁcate request is required, but the
same certiﬁcate request will be used. In fact, instead of issuing the certiﬁcate, ﬁrst, a prompt that
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additional veriﬁcation is needed will be shown to the operator, and once she passes the additional
challenge (sent along with the ﬁrst challenge;Ì), only then the certiﬁcate will be issued.
Expired Certiﬁcate
Another common case in which the HTTPS challenge might fail are expired certiﬁcates. Operators
may simply forget to renew their certiﬁcates in time, or a service may be shut down for a longer
period, preventing certiﬁcate from being renewed. Whether expired certiﬁcates should be accepted,
and if so, whether their expiration should be limited by a grace period, is a policy decision rather
than a technical decision. Basically, two options exist:
1. Accept an expired certiﬁcate.
2. Treat it like an attack.
Relaxing the requirement and allowing expired certiﬁcates could increase the usability of our ap-
proach. However, relaxing requirements for corner cases introduces additional sources for potential
errors, and thereby, security issues. Ultimately, we err on the side of caution and default to strong
security and treating it as an attack, as also recommended by Fiebig et al. [169].
Legitimate Change of Authority
A third legitimate case that might fail is a legitimate change of domain ownership, possibly without
the consent of the previous owner. Such cases include but are not limited to seizures because of
copyright violations, or court orders, or a simple lapse in renewing the domain itself. Again, such a
change in ownership cannot be recognized as legitimate by an automated system, simply because an
attack has exactly the same properties. Therefore, similar to the lost private key access, the CA fails
the HTTPS challenge and it requests a second challenge to be completed by the client, which any
legitimate client can complete easily.
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Possible Attacks
Following our earlier reasoning, attacks are cases in which the requesting client cannot prove a con-
tinuity in authority using previously issued valid certiﬁcates, which are considered rare, particular as
you renew certiﬁcates in the validity period of your current period, and often automatically. Consid-
ering prior work (Chapter 6) and the attacks that we present in this chapter, a large portion of attacks
are time critical. Therefore, the ﬁrst aspect in the process of resolving a potential attack should be
time. By increasing the time requirement, we increase the likelihood of the enabling attack to be
detected. Nonetheless, potential for stale DNS attacks remains. Yet, we can approach this issue by
designing an extended process for validating ownership of a domain and the correct delegation to an
IP address. Unsurprisingly, CAs already commonly offer such extended validation processes. In ad-
dition, this service could also be offered by official institutions or NGOs with a sufficient trust level
and the resources to do this. The certiﬁcates issued in this process would not even have to be valid
for an extended time period. In fact, they can be used as simple seeds to re-initiate the continuous
process of retrieving domain validated certiﬁcates.
4.4.5 Transitioning Techniques
One of the biggest problems when introducing new technique is the transitioning phase. However,
for the adoption of our challenge, this is not an issue. The certiﬁcate ecosystem already makes ex-
tensive use of validity periods, generally certiﬁcates are set to expire within 1-3 years, and even as
early as three months in case of Let’s Encrypt. If our challenge would be adopted, we can also make
use of extensive CT logs, which contain over hundreds of millions of domains already. For domains
for which no entry exist in CT logs, we realize that our challenge is based upon trust on ﬁrst use [170].
However, this does not leave domains for which certiﬁcates are already issued with less security than
today, but it strictly increases security. Furthermore, CAs may add domains for which they previ-
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ously signed certiﬁcates to certiﬁcate transparency logs voluntarily. Therefore, we believe that our
system provides a robust and painless transition toward an increase of security for domain-validated
certiﬁcates within the diverse certiﬁcate ecosystem.
4.4.6 Best Practices
Beyond directly addressing the root cause of the presented problems in the certiﬁcate issuing process,
we suggest that cloud providers deploy mitigations as well. These mitigation techniques aim to pre-
vent attackers from allocating speciﬁc addresses, for example, by rate-limiting IP address allocation
and release operations, using disjoint sets of IP addresses for different tenants to reduce attack surface,
and perhaps even by monitoring their networks for (non-scanning) inbound traffic to unallocated
addresses to warn previous users of those addresses.7 Finally, for cloud tenants, we strongly suggest
keeping old addresses allocated when migrating IP addresses, at least until the TTL of the record has
expired out, preferably until one can be reasonable sure that it is not cached anymore (preferably
from a day to a week). Furthermore, we can only stress the importance of maintaining DNS zones
properly and to remove obsolete records as quickly as possible to not fall victim to domain takeover
attacks.
4.5 Conclusion
We have shown that it is practical, time-efficient, and cost-efficient for an attacker to (temporarily)
takeover domains by exploiting so-called IP address use-after-free vulnerabilities on, currently, the
two largest Infrastructure-as-a-Service clouds (Amazon AWS and Microsoft Azure).
In our study, we discovered that attacks are practical on public clouds because of their instances’
ephemeral nature and the “throw-away culture” of development operations concerning immutable
7The noise-to-signal ratio might impractical for monitoring because of Internet-wide scanning efforts, and ﬁltering
scanning traffic from other traffic might be too costly for a supplemental warning service.
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instances and service migration. In turn, it is not necessary to takeover the IP address to which a
domain points to, but IP address migration occurs regularly and sometimes is outside of the control
of the cloud user (e.g., reboot or shutdown of the hypervisor because of an update), thus freeing
the previously assigned IP address and making it available for re-use by others. Here, a slightly
incorrect DNS domain record migration strategy can immediately render domains vulnerable to
IP address use-after-free attacks. In fact, the problem is even further ampliﬁed for so-called spot
instances, which are signiﬁcantly cheaper instances, but which can be terminated at any point and
without notice to the cloud user, and for which he cannot protect himself from temporary domain
takeovers.
We have examined the reasons of why and how IP address re-use domain takeover attacks can
occur in practice, and we classify them according to what their potential impact in practice is. Partic-
ularly, we investigated their impact on domain-validated TLS certiﬁcate issuance, such as through
automatic certiﬁcate management environments (ACME), for example, Let’s Encrypt. Based on our
ﬁndings, we then developed best practice recommendations for cloud operators as well as domain
owners and cloud users, which can reduce vulnerability to the aforementioned attacks.
Finally, we introduced a new mitigation techniques that addresses the issue of domain takeover
attacks for trust-based domain-validation services, focusing on the real-world case of automatic cer-
tiﬁcate issuance. Our mitigation technique protects against IP address use-after-free attacks with
negligible operational overhead and only requiresmanual intervention in disaster-recovery scenarios,
thus, rendering it practical for real-world deployment even under strict performance and usability
requirements of services like Let’s Encrypt.
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Enumerating IPv6 Hosts
Security research has made extensive use of exhaustive Internet-wide scans over the recent years, as
they can provide signiﬁcant insights into the overall state of security of the Internet, and ZMapmade
scanning the entire IPv4 address space practical. However, the IPv4 address space is exhausted, and a
switch to IPv6, the only accepted long-term solution, is inevitable. In turn, to better understand the
security of devices connected to the Internet, including in particular Internet of Things devices, it is
imperative to include IPv6 addresses in security evaluations and scans. Unfortunately, it is practically
infeasible to iterate through the entire IPv6 address space, as it is 296 times larger than the IPv4 address
space. Therefore, enumeration of active hosts prior to scanning is necessary. Without it, we will be
unable to investigate the overall security of Internet-connected devices in the future.
In this chapter, we introduce a novel technique to enumerate an active part of the IPv6 address
space by walking DNSSEC-signed IPv6 reverse zones. Subsequently, by scanning the enumerated
addresses, we uncover signiﬁcant security problems: the exposure of sensitive data, and incorrectly
controlled access to hosts, such as access to routing infrastructure via administrative interfaces, all of
which were accessible via IPv6. Furthermore, from our analysis of the differences between accessing
dual-stack hosts via IPv6 and IPv4, we hypothesize that the root cause is thatmachines automatically
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and by default take on globally routable IPv6 addresses. This is a practice that the affected system
administrators appear unaware of, as the respective services are almost always properly protected
from unauthorized access via IPv4.
Our ﬁndings indicate (i) that enumerating active IPv6 hosts is practical without a preferential
network position contrary to common belief, (ii) that the security of active IPv6 hosts is currently
still lagging behind the security state of IPv4 hosts, and (iii) that unintended IPv6 connectivity is a
major security issue for unaware system administrators.
5.1 Motivation and Contributions
There has been a multitude of Internet-wide security challenges of varying severity over the recent
years. Heartbleed [171] and SSL related vulnerabilities [172, 173], common misconﬁgurations of
database systems [174], and other issues like protocol ampliﬁers [175, 176] have been investigated
closely. Studying these issues methodologically has only been possible because exhaustive security
scans of the Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) address space became practical through ZMap in late
2013 [177]. Since then, Internet-wide IPv4 security scans have become an integral part of modern
security research.
The total number of IPv4 addresses is, however, limited. For many of those addresses, their use
is further restricted through special use arrangements, and because of large allocations to institutions
thatwere early adopters of the Internet. In fact, all addressesmanaged by the InternetAssignedNum-
bers Authority (IANA) have been allocated as of September 24, 2015 when the American Registry
for Internet Numbers (ARIN) allocated its last IPv4 address [178].
The accepted long-term solution to the IPv4 address exhaustion problem is considered to be the
Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) [179, 180]. Contrary to the 32-bit wide addresses of IPv4, IPv6
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uses 128-bit wide addresses (7.9 1028 as many as IPv4) and its adoption would eliminate the need
for further address resources for the foreseeable future.
Indeed, IPv6 has gained signiﬁcant traction in recent years: In August 2016, Google reported
that almost 13% of their users accessed their services via IPv6. This number increased by an order
of magnitude in just three years from 1.3% as of July 2013 [181]. Similarly, the Internet Society
reports that “global IPv6 traffic has grownmore than 500% since June 6, 2012.” Many other network
operators have deployed IPv6 to signiﬁcant parts of their network since then [182]. In fact, for some
networks, up to 97% of all devices use IPv6 (see Table 5.1).
Unfortunately, the vast address space of IPv6 threatens to take the important tool of Internet-
wide scans away from the security community. Theoretically, for IPv6, up to 2128 addresses (ap-
proximately 3.4 1038) can be allocated. While scanning all reachable devices is considered to be a
solved problem for the IPv4 address space [177], it is practically infeasible to scan the entire IPv6 ad-
dress space, because it is larger than the IPv4 address space by 296 (28 orders of magnitude). In fact,
a sweep over the entire IPv6 address space would take 7.532  1023 years with state-of-art tools for
Internet-wide scanning.
Due to the Internet’s continuing growth and its increasing dependence on IPv6 globally, it is
critical to include IPv6-connected devices in future Internet-wide security evaluations, in addition
to IPv4. This need is further ampliﬁed by the fact that IPv6 traffic is commonly enabled (by default).
Often no standard security mechanisms, such as ﬁrewalls, have been put in place for IPv6, even
though they are already in place for IPv4. In turn, it exposes the respective hosts to attacks from
miscreants via IPv6 [183, 37].
At the same time, it remains difficult to perform Internet-wide IPv6 security scans, which leaves
a dangerous blind spot. To address this issue, authors have started to suggest various techniques to
perform Internet-wide IPv6 security scans, which leverage IPv6 seed sets to scan IPv6 hosts. The
most recent of these, 6gen, has been presented by Murdock et al. [184]. However, most existing ap-
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proaches to collect active IPv6 addresses as seed sets require network vantage points or leverage older,
possibly stale, public datasets. For example, some techniques require access to content delivery net-
works or traffic brokers to observe IPv6 traffic and collect addresses [185, 186]. Others extract IPv6
addresses from historical forward DNS records, in the hope that they are still active [37]. Unfortu-
nately, some techniques to collect these records, such as ANY queries, have since been deprecated
by the operators of major nameservers to protect from denial of service attacks [187], which ren-
ders them impractical for IPv6 address collection. Fiebig et al. [9] recently introduced a different
methodology to enumerate IPv6 hosts, namely by exploiting the NXDOMAIN semantics in the
DNS ecosystem. However, their technique can be mitigated comparatively easily, as they demon-
strated on an industry conference in 2016 [188]. Therefore, it is necessary to identify new seed-set
collection techniques that allow researchers, who might not have access to network vantage points,
to include IPv6-connected devices at scale in Internet-wide security evaluations.
To retain the capabilities of security researchers to conduct Internet-wide scans, we introduce a
novel IPv6 address enumeration technique that leverages DNSSEC-signed IPv6 reverse zones. We
show that our approach enumerates classes of active IPv6 addresses that existing techniquesmiss, and
that prior work has not evaluated. Furthermore, our technique does not depend on implementation-
speciﬁc behavior and it is resilient against the mitigation techniques that have been put in place to
protect against the enumeration techniques of prior work. Instead, to prevent our enumeration
technique, signiﬁcant changes to the DNSSEC standard are required.
In our evaluation, we discovered that IPv6-connected hosts expose a variety of critical security is-
sues: exposed ﬁle sharing, access to interior and exterior routing protocols, remote access to switches
and routers, remote monitoring, hosts that can be exploited to launch reﬂected and ampliﬁed denial
of service attacks, and, alarmingly, remote system management ports vulnerable to attacks that al-
low full machine takeover (e.g., IPMI, which provides practically physical access through remote
keyboard and video).
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Category Network Operator Percentage
Wireless Carrier
Digicel Trinidad & Tobago 97.04%
Verizon Wireless 77.65%
T-Mobile USA 71.09%
University University of Twente 79.17%Virginia Tech 70.06%
Organization United States Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) 74.52%
Broadband Provider Google Fiber 64.96%xs4all (Netherlands) 61.75%
Table 5.1: IPv6 penetration of real-world networks [189]
We make the following contributions:
• We introduce a practical enumeration technique that effectively exploits DNSSEC zone walk-
ing to identify active IPv6 hosts by utilizing unique features and thewell-structured format of
the IPv6 reverse DNS tree. We focus on reverse zones that have deployed NSEC3 to thwart
existing zone-walking attacks. Speciﬁcally, we exploit intricacies of how the IPv6 reverse
zone is organized to make enumerating active IPv6 addresses in the face of NSEC3 practical.
• Our methodology is resilient against mitigations, including techniques effective against ear-
lier enumeration approaches, and, to mitigate it, modiﬁcations to the DNSSEC standard are
required. In fact, we enumerate hosts that have been hidden from established methodology
using existing mitigations already.
• Using our methodology, we identify several vulnerabilities and misconﬁgurations of hosts
reachable via IPv6 thatwere hidden from scans usingmethodology of priorwork. Our results
indicate that the exposed IPv6 addresses can cause additional and signiﬁcant security risks,
and network operators are required to take precautions when adding IPv6 addresses into the
DNSSEC-signed reverse zones, as it inevitably leaks information about the presence of those
hosts to potential attackers.
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In the remainder of this chapter, we provide the necessary background information (Section 5.2), de-
tail our enumeration technique (Section 5.3), discuss ethical considerations for active measurements
(Section 5.4), evaluate our technique (Section 5.5), consider potential mitigations (Section 5.6), and,
ultimately, conclude (Section 5.7).
5.2 Background
Some background information on the Domain Name System (DNS), DNSSEC, denial of existence
records, and the way the IPv6 reverse zone is organized is required for our enumeration technique.
5.2.1 Domain Name System and DNSSEC
DNS is a core protocol of the current Internet architecture. It allows using easily identiﬁable hierar-
chically organized names instead of IP addresses to access services online. While the basic idea of the
DNS is straightforward [132], denials of existence (NXDOMAIN) require some attention, as our
approach builds upon their equivalent in the scope of DNSSEC.
In a simpliﬁed schema (see Figure 5.1), a client talks to a nameserver to inquire about whether a
speciﬁc name for a speciﬁc resource record (RR) type exists within a zone. If the record does exist,
then the nameserver responds with the respective answer (e.g., in case of an A record, with the IPv4
address mapping for a name). If the record does not exist, the nameserver generates a NXDOMAIN
response (NX signifying “non-existing”).
Unfortunately, however, the DNS protocol does not provide authenticity and it is suscepti-
ble to a variety of attacks, including man-in-the-middle attacks, like ﬁltering, redirection, and re-
sponse spooﬁng [190, 191]. An intermediate nameserver could (maliciously) hijack NXDOMAIN
responses and replace them with a record that points to an advertisement website [192, 193]. While
120
Enumerating IPv6 Hosts Chapter 5
1 Queries for b.edu 2
Looks up name in 
zone information  - a.edu …
 - g.edu …
 - y.edu …
3a Returns NXDOMAIN response for b.edu
3b Returns NSEC record (a.edu, g.edu)
NameserverClient
Zone Information
Figure 5.1: Example DNS interaction between a client querying a nameserver without and with
DNSSEC. The client queries the nameserver for a record of the domain “b.edu” (1). The name-
server looks up the resource record (RR) in the zone information (2). Here, the queried resource
does not exist in the zone ﬁle. If DNSSEC is not present, then the nameserver responds with a single
NXDOMAIN response that is generated online (3a). If DNSSEC is present, then the nameserver
responds with an authenticated response. Since DNSSEC discourages online signing, a pre-signed
entry must exist. However, pre-signed denials of existence for any possible query are impractical
from a space and computational perspective. Therefore, DNSSEC returns pre-signed denials of ex-
istence for an entire name range: the previous existing entry with an associated record is “a.edu,”
the next existing entry with a record is “g.edu” (3b), effectively leaking the existence of those names
within the zone.
the intermediate nameserver is intentionally violating the standard, it is technically able to return
bogus responses because they are not authenticated.
DNSSEC aims to solve these authentication problems via cryptographic signatures for records
contained as part of a zone. Authenticating existing records is an extension of DNS through a signa-
ture record type (RRSIG) for each original record, which is signed with a zone-signing key (ZSK).
The public key portion of the ZSK is hosted in the zone, while the parent zone provides a hash of
the ZSK in a DS RR. In turn, it solves the problem of distributing public keys in a trustworthy
manner through DNS’ hierarchical nature and its existing chain of trust from the root zone to the
queried zone. Intuitively, signing NXDOMAIN RRs would be possible if the zone-signing key is
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available at the nameserver, so that the generated records can be signed online. However, DNSSEC
discourages the use of online signing to prevent denial of service attacks against the nameserver and
chosen-plaintext attacks against the zone-signing key [133]. Instead, it strongly encourages to serve
zone information that was signed offline. Consequently, authenticating denials of existence naïvely
is impractical: all non-existing names would have to be signed and it would require operators to
create zones of practically unbounded size. As a solution, a single NSEC RR is used to deny the ex-
istence of a range of records: it describes the previous existing name and the next existing name. For
example, an NSEC record might point to “a.edu” as the previous existing name and “g.edu” as the
next existing record. Then, any query for a name that is lexically between “a.edu” and “g.edu,” for
example, “c.edu” or “foo.edu,” would result in the same authenticated NSEC response. This is an
efficient authenticated denial of existence, satisfying the requirements of DNSSEC.
5.2.2 IPv6 and Reverse IPv6 Zones
Contrary to IPv4’s quad-dotted decimal representation, IPv6 addresses are instead represented as
32 hexadecimal digits, which are divided into eight groups of four digits to ease readability, for
example, 2001:0db8:0000:0bad:f00d:feed:cafe:0001. For convenience, addresses can be ab-
breviated by removing leading zeroes and replacing the largest consecutive group of zeroes with a
double colon, for example, the above address can be abbreviated to the shorter 2001:db8::bad:
f00d:feed:cafe:1.
Conceptually, reverse zones are like any other standardDNS zone, but they have a speciﬁcmean-
ing: They are used tomap an address or resource, such as an IPv4 or IPv6 address, to a name instead of
the other way around. For IPv6, the designated reverse zone is ip6.arpa and it is hierarchically orga-
nized at nibble (a nibble is a single hexadecimal digit) boundaries in reverse order. Listing 5.1 depicts
an example reverse zone for 2001:db8::/32 with two entries, one for 2001:db8::bad:f00d:
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feed:cafe:2 pointing to “h.a.edu” and one for 2001:db8::bad:f00d:feed:cafe:9 pointing
to “s.a.edu.”
In practice, reverse address zones are used for a variety of reasons. Initially devised for trou-
bleshooting, reverse lookups for forward-conﬁrmed reverse DNS names are nowadays its main use
case and considered best operational practice [194]. A forward-conﬁrmed reverse DNS lookup cor-
responds to looking up the domain name with an address and then looking up the address for that
domain name, if they are the same, then the lookup is considered conﬁrmed. Today, most mail
transfer agents (MTA) rely on conﬁrming reverse DNS lookups to reduce spam and might reject or
bounce incoming mail if the lookup is not forward-conﬁrmed [195]. Consequently, network oper-
ators are essentially forced to deploy reverse zones to not degrade the quality of service for the hosts
in their network. In practice, reverse zones are regularly populated automatically via DHCP and
IPv6 node information queries and the reverse zone information accurately represents an active part
of the network [196, 197, 12].
Due to DNS’ inherent hierarchical design and the IPv6 address space being split into a signiﬁ-
cant number of sub-networks, it is not possible to simply download the entire reverse zone for IPv6
to enumerate hosts. In fact, the sub-networks are delegated to thousands of different nameservers
worldwide, which do not allow to download the respective reverse zones directly. Hence, it moti-
vates the need for an effective IPv6 address enumeration technique.
Fortunately, the IPv6 reverse zone (ip6.arpa) supports DNSSEC since April 2010, which en-
ables our enumeration approach if the respective delegate reverse zones are also DNSSEC-signed.
Currently, as of January 2018, already 51 out of 59 delegate IPv6 reverse zones (i.e., zones below
ip6.arpa) are signed via DNSSEC [198], and, thus, this allows our approach to enumerate IPv6 hosts
within those zones, that is, within those networks. Interestingly, the (still) unsigned reverse zones
include the 6-to-4 zone (2002::/16), which is an IPv6 transition mechanism and which can be enu-
merated through traditional IPv4 enumeration techniques.
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$TTL 1h
@ IN SOA ns1.a.edu. admin.a.edu. (
2018010101 ; serial
1h 15m 1w 1h) ; refresh retry copy cache
@ IN NS ns1.a.edu.
; IPv6 PTR Entries
2.0.0.0.e.f.a.c.d.e.e.f.d.0.0.f.d.a.b.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa. IN \
PTR h.a.edu.
9.0.0.0.e.f.a.c.d.e.e.f.d.0.0.f.d.a.b.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa. IN \
PTR s.a.edu.
Listing 5.1: Example IPv6 reverse zone for 2001:db8::/32
5.3 Approach
Following, we describe our approach, which enumerates active IPv6 addresses by walking an IPv6
network’s reverse zone. The network can be the entire IPv6 address space or any sub-network that
might be of particular interest, for example as part of a security evaluation. Consequently, our
approach can be targeted and can be faster than state-of-the-art techniques.
Our enumeration technique requires that the reverse zone for the network is signed viaDNSSEC
because it relies on NSEC or NSEC3 responses for non-existing addresses. Nevertheless, it is al-
ready practical because over 86% of the top-level delegations in the IPv6 reverse zone are already
DNSSEC signed and it is expected that all zones will support DNSSEC soon [199]. In fact, NIST
recommends deployingDNSSEC since September 2013 [200] and adoption has been ever increasing
since then [199]. If the records are not signed yet, for example because a large network is partitioned
into smaller networks and only some of the zones employ DNSSEC then we can still enumerate the
hosts within networks for which the reverse zones are signed (regardless of whether intermediate
zones are signed).
A fundamental difference of our approach to existing techniques that determine an active part
of the IPv6 address space through network vantage points or datasets is that our approach can enu-
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merate hosts that do not actively initiate connections, nor does it require that IPv6 addresses appear
in a forward zone. At the same time, conventional “brute-force” enumeration attacks known from
IPv4 [177] do not scale to the vast IPv6 address space, while our approach can enumerate sparsely
populated IPv6 networks without problems.
5.3.1 Reverse Zones with NSEC
It is an understood problem that NSEC denials of existence allow zone-walking attacks on signed
zones because they leak the previous and next existing name of that zone. In case of the IPv6 re-
verse zone, those leaks correspond to the previous and next IPv6 name pointer (PTR) for an address
in that reverse zone, or a nameserver (NS), if a subdomain (sub-network) is delegated to another
nameserver [201]. We modify the existing NSEC-based approach and exploit the organization of
the IPv6 reverse zone to enumerate addresses more efficiently.
Starting from a target IPv6 reverse zone, for example, the root zone for the entire IPv6 address
space, the steps to enumerate the reverse zone for NSEC-based denials of existence records are:
1. Bootstrapping: We query for a random string below the target zone, like foobar.ip6.arpa, to
determine a starting point for address enumeration (seed). Based on the organization of the
IPv6 reverse zone (as speciﬁed by RFC 5855 [202]), it is guaranteed that a random string
that is not a single hexadecimal digit will result in a NSEC response. In turn, it removes the
requirement to identify a non-existing address in the address space prior enumeration.
2. Zone Walking: Starting from the seed, we follow the chain by iteratively querying the next
addresses incremented by one, that is, the next address that might not exist and could yield a
denial of existence.
If we do not receive a NSEC response, then we discovered an active address, and we keep in-
crementing the address until we receive a NSEC response. Once we receive a NSEC response,
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based on the organization of the IPv6 reverse zone, we can immediately identify if the next en-
try of a NSEC record is an address or a sub-network: if it is not a full-length IPv6 address (32
nibbles), then this sub-part of the reverse zone is delegated, possibly to another DNS server.
If we encounter a zone delegation, we optionally identify via a random seed whether it is
signed at all, and if so, if we can immediately descend into it (NSEC) or if it requires further
processing (NSEC3). If we can descend into it, we optionally add it to a sub-zone queue (i.e.,
we perform breadth-ﬁrst search).
We terminate the zone-walking step if the next address in the returned NSEC record points
to the seed (we have closed the chain and formed a circle).
3. Sub-zone Enumeration (optional): For each sub-zone that we added to our queue, we may de-
scend into it and recursively apply the same enumeration strategy.
Intuitively, the runtime of our approach to enumerate IPv6 addresses for NSEC-based reverse zones
is linear and requires O (n +m ) DNS queries to nameservers for the reverse zone where n is the
number of addresses within the networks andm is the number of zone delegations.
5.3.2 Reverse Zones with NSEC3
In an attempt tomitigate the side effect of zone-walking attacks onDNSSEC-signed zones, Laurie et
al. proposed NSEC3 [201]. Instead of listing the previous and next existing name in clear, NSEC3
uses a cryptographic hash for the names in the zone, sorts the hash values in alphabetical order, and
then uses each pair of consecutive hash values in the zone to indicate the denials of existence through
a NSEC3 record.
If the zone is using NSEC3, then the nameserver responds to a query for a non-existing name n
as follows: it computes its hash value h (n ) where h is the cryptographic hash function as speciﬁed
for the zone, and it then returns the NSEC3 record with the pre-computed hashes of the existing
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names n1 and n2, such that h (n1) < h (n ) < h (n2). Note that n1 < n < n2 does generally not hold
because h is not order-preserving. In fact, since the names are ordered by their hash value, and since
h is not order-preserving, only the cryptographic hashes of two existing names are exposed, which
are considered computationally difficult to reverse.
Given a NSEC3 response, the client can verify herself that the name does indeed not exist in
the zone. She veriﬁes that the NSEC3 response is authentic and then veriﬁes that the queried name,
when hashed, falls into the range speciﬁed by the NSEC3 record. To hash the queried name, she uses
the parameters speciﬁed in the authenticated NSEC3 record, that is, hash algorithm (only SHA1 is
currently supported), salt, and the number of iterations, which are valid for the entire zone.
Nevertheless, NSEC3 records still leak two existing records from the zone, even though their
names are cryptographically hashed. Therefore, they are technically still vulnerable to zone enumer-
ation through brute-force and dictionary attacks [203, 204]. In fact, the attacks identiﬁed by prior
work inspired our research. However, existing approaches for forward zones are ineffective for the
IPv6 reverse zone because of the reverse zone’s organization: (i) existing dictionary attacks, such
as nsec3walker, are inefficient due to the small alphabet (0-f, one character maximum) and the large
height of the zone’s hierarchical tree; and (ii) uninformed brute-force attacks are computationally
expensive and considerable computational resources are required to successfully launch them, partic-
ularly considering the size of the IPv6 address space. Following, for our case, we show the contrary:
enumerating IPv6 addresses for NSEC3-protected reverse zones is practical and effectively compu-
tationally less complex than uninformed brute-force attacks.
Different from NSEC-based address enumeration, in case of NSEC3, a two-phased approach
is required. First, we need to collect the NSEC3 chain for a zone online by actively querying for
names. Subsequently, we can unblind the IPv6 addresses offline. Note that the ﬁrst phase does
not necessarily have to be completed before we can launch the second phase. We can launch the
second phase as early as the ﬁrstNSEC3 record is being observed, which can reduce the time required
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to enumerate the target network’s addresses signiﬁcantly. Furthermore, even though a network
operator could change hash parameters during the collection phase, such as the salt or the iteration
count, previously collectedNSEC3 records can still be unblinded and used to enumerate hostswithin
the zone. Following, we discuss how our approach can efficiently unblind NSEC3-protected IPv6
addresses in the reverse zone by exploiting intricate details of the speciﬁcation and implementation
of the IPv6 reverse zone.
5.3.3 Online Collection
The design of NSEC3 makes it computationally impractical to follow its chain to ﬁnd the next hash.
Instead, the core idea is to randomly query for names that do not exist until the full NSEC3 chain
has been recovered. Similar to the NSEC case, a complete chain of NSEC3 records forms a closed
circle and, thus, can be veriﬁed easily. During the sampling process, any not-yet-discovered NSEC3
records leave missing “gaps” on the circle. Eventually, the sampling process will ﬁll all gaps (see
Figure 5.2). The problem of discovering names whose hashes are inside one of the remaining gaps
is similarly embarrassingly parallel as the offline unblinding step and can easily be sped up massively
through graphical processing units.
For NSEC3-based reverse zones, online collection works as follows:
1. Bootstrapping: We query for a random string below the target zone, like foobar.ip6.arpa, to
determine a starting point for online collection. As in the case for NSEC, it is guaranteed
that a random string that is not a single hexadecimal digit will result in a NSEC3 response
and it removes the requirement to identify a non-existing address in the address space prior
enumeration.
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Figure 5.2: Online collection andNSEC3 hash gaps. During the online collection phase forNSEC3-
protected zones, we ﬁrst bootstrap by choosing a random seed that is guaranteed to result in aNSEC3
response for the zone, which exposes two hashed addresses. Following, we walk the zone randomly
and iteratively ﬁll hash gaps to discover more addresses until we have successfully identiﬁed all hash
gaps.
In addition, we are also interested in the current hash algorithm, salt, and iteration count to
ﬁll hash gaps locally as to not query the nameserver unnecessarily or cause suspicion or incur
unnecessary load.
2. Zone-Walking: We calculate the hash value for a randomname under the zone based on salt and
iteration count. If the hash value is covered already by a range uncovered from the previously
collected NSEC3 records, then we repeatedly select random names until a hash falls into a gap
and is guaranteed to reveal more information about the NSEC3 chain (see Figure 5.2).
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Intuitively, with the number of hash gaps decreasing, the probability to hit one of the remain-
ing ones decreases too, and the time requirement increases. The average number of required
hash calculations isO (r log r )with r being the number of records in the zone (addresses plus
delegated sub-zones).
Already during the collection phase we can determine whether a hash is a full IPv6 address or
a zone delegation: a NSEC3 record leaks whether the next hashed value is a PTR record (full
IPv6 address) or a NS record (sub-zone delegation) (see Listing 5.2). In fact, this detail allows
us to separate addresses and networks into different buckets and unblind them separately later,
which reduces computational cost signiﬁcantly.
We retain all NSEC3 records for offline unblinding.
We repeat the zone-walking step until no more hash gaps exist or in case an exit condition
is true, in which case parts of the address space remain unexplored. If we have ﬁlled all hash
gaps within the NSEC3 circle, we have successfully collected all hashed IPv6 addresses and
sub-zone preﬁxes.
The runtime of the online collection phase isO (n +m )DNS queries to the nameservers where n is
the number of addresses within the target network andm is the number of sub-zone delegations.
To probabilistically enumerate addresses within a zone, one may specify an exit condition that
terminates the zone walking step. A trivial condition might be a timeout during which a new gap
must be ﬁlled. However, a more intelligent solution is to ﬁll in all gaps until at most x gaps of at most
size y exist. At that point, at most x  y hashes of the entire zone will not be collected through
our approach (effectively, missing at most x  y addresses or sub-zones). Here, x and y can be
chosen to speciﬁc probabilistic requirements, such as “at least 95% of the zone must be enumerated.”
Additionally, if hashes within those ranges are later discovered during unblinding, the gaps can be
ﬁlled.
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; Reverse IPv6 NSEC Entries
2.0.0.0.e.f.a.c.d.e.e.f.d.0.0.f.d.a.b.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa. IN \
NSEC 9.0.0.0.e.f.a.c.d.e.e.f.d.0.0.f.d.a.b.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa. \
PTR RRSIG
; Reverse IPv6 NSEC3 Entries
1PDJ9FP13S70NCFCJCV35B8LLVT68U5Q.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa. IN NSEC3 1 0 10 86\
B3E6B74F0A2C23 G5AL6GMJ6ARLJ9M5F56LL48JPHJ1SGQK PTR RRSIG
Listing 5.2: Example NSEC and NSEC3 RRs for the reverse IPv6 zone for 2001:db8::
/32. A client querying for a name that is lexically between 2001:db8::bad:f00d:feed:
cafe:2 and 2001:db8::bad:f00d:feed:cafe:9 will receive the NSEC (top) record from
the nameserver. For NSEC3, if no record exists in the zone whose hash is lexically between
1PDJ9FP13S70NCFCJCV35B8LLVT68U5Q and G5AL6GMJ6ARLJ9M5F56LL48JPHJ1SGQK (base32-
encoded SHA1), then the NSEC3 record will be returned.
5.3.4 Offline Unblinding
Following online collection, the next step to enumerate IPv6 addresses is to unblind the collected
hashes offline. Since DNSSEC leverages cryptographically secure hashes, the naïve choice falls to
brute-force attacks. Brute-force attacks, however, are impractical because of the large search space
for SHA1, which is the only supported hash of DNSSEC, at 2160 possible values.
Generally, domain names can be composed of letters, digits, and hyphens [205]. The IPv6 re-
verse zone, however, follows a well-deﬁned structure: each subdomain is strictly a hexadecimal
digit (see Section 5.2.2). Practically, by leveraging the organization of the IPv6 reverse zone, we can
unblind hashed IPv6 addresses (which we identiﬁed as full addresses during online collection) signif-
icantly faster through directed search. We exploit the fact that addresses are almost never randomly
assigned from a network’s range, but instead follow observable patterns. First, addresses are often
assigned incrementally through static assignment or via DHCPv6, possibly with gaps at earlier nib-
bles, such as 2001:db8::1/64, 2001:db8::2/64, or, with a gap, 2001:db8::1:1/64. Second,
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addresses are also more likely to be assigned through stateless address autoconﬁguration (SLAAC)
than being randomly picked. With SLAAC, a host commonly assigns itself an IPv6 address based
on its MAC address, in which case 12 nibbles (out of 32 nibbles) of the IPv6 address are based on
the host’s MAC address, which is vendor-based, and additional four nibbles are constant across all
IPs assigned through SLAAC. For example, a host with MAC address 00:11:22:33:44:55 on the
network 2001:db8::/32would assign itself the IPv6 address 2001:db8::211:22ff:fe33:4455.
As of January 2018, only 24,434 vendor preﬁxes are officially in use [206], and combined with the
constant nibbles, it reduces the search space by a factor of 225. Inherently, a MAC-based address
assignment strategy allows Internet-wide equipment and user tracking, because the MAC is consid-
ered universally unique and remains constant across networks. To prevent such tracking, privacy
extensions were added to SLAAC, for which temporary addresses may be used instead. These pri-
vacy extensions make the enumeration attack more difficult initially due to the addresses’ ephemeral
nature, however, their effectiveness degrades over time since addresses are generally not reused. Fur-
thermore, their use is commonly limited to end users and they are not used by servers or network
equipment.
Overall, we can reduce the search space from 2128 to as little as 239 for full IPv6 addresses (al-
though the SHA1 search space is 2160, it is reduced to 2128 because IPv6 addresses are only 128-bit
wide) depending on network preﬁx and address assignment strategies used. By guiding the address
search intelligently, we can further speed up the unblinding process. Speciﬁcally, we can exploit that
a hash gap (pair of NSEC3 records) leaks the type of the preceding and following resource record.
The type of the resource record indicates the length of the unhashed value (PTR for full addresses,
NS and SOA for network preﬁxes), which, in turn, signiﬁcantly reduces the complexity of unblind-
ing the hashed value. Practically, we can reduce the search space down to as little as 239 for full
addresses and 233 for networks, which renders enumeration practical. Notably, we successfully un-
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blinded various networks of different sizes (/32, /48, and /64) in mere hours, including for reverse
zones with high hash iteration count (see Section 5.5).
Unblinding zone delegations is practical for similar reasons: First, we accurately identify them
as delegated zones during online collection (since the NSEC3 record leaks whether the next hash
is a PTR or NS record). Second, we exploit that sub-networks, a common cause for sub-zones
being delegated, are commonly assigned and used incrementally rather than randomly from the vast
address space. Third, we exploit that networks are allocated at speciﬁc nibble boundaries, effectively
limiting the search space to
P
0i824i ( 233).
For example, for the hashes g5al6gmj6arlj9m5f56ll48jphj1sgqk and 1pdj9fp13s70ncf
cjcv35b8llvt68u5q (see Listing 5.2), we only need to attempt to unblind full addresses as they are
PTR records. Combined with the salt 86b3e6b74f0a2c23, we can then unblind the hashes to 2.0
.0.0.e.f.a.c.d.e.e.f.d.0.0.f.d.a.b.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa and 9.0
.0.0.e.f.a.c.d.e.e.f.d.0.0.f.d.a.b.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa, that is,
they represent the IPv6 addresses 2001:db8:bad:f00d:feed:cafe:2 and 2001:db8:bad:f00d:
feed:cafe:9 respectively.
In summary, our approach can quickly enumerate IPv6 hosts and networks, even for sparsely
populated IPv6 networks, by exploiting the well-deﬁned organization of IPv6 addresses and net-
works, and by leveraging the structure of the IPv6 reverse zone and the information (record type)
leakage of DNSSEC-based denial of existence records (NSEC3).
5.4 Ethical Considerations
In our evaluation, we perform active measurements on the enumerated addresses to establish if they
are actually active. We also establish a limited set of additional data points on the running software
versions and possibly security-sensitive conﬁguration settings. For our data acquisition, we adopt
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the high andwell-accepted ethical standards of prior work conducting Internet-wide activemeasure-
ments [177, 207, 9]. We further ensured that our measurements do not disrupt or harm evaluation
targets, for example, through unintended resource or bandwidth consumption, andwe put a process
for a permanent opt-out of our measurements in place.
5.4.1 Preventing Disruption
In addition to standard ICMPv6 (Internet Control Message Protocol version 6) echo request to es-
tablish host reachability, we performed only basic service and version detection on open service
ports. Misconﬁgurations, such as weak cryptographic keys, were only evaluated based on protocol
handshake information. Similar to prior work, our independent evaluation of this measurement pro-
cedure yields that it is of negligible risk compared to the beneﬁts provided to the community. This
approach prevents misleading ﬁndings and reduces false positives, which would cast an incorrectly
insecure picture of the evaluated hosts. Examples of such false positives are services listening on non-
standard ports or services secured via tcpwrapper, which would also not be detected correctly by a
standard port scan.
5.4.2 Subject Information and Opt-Out
A network administrator might misjudge our measurements for attacks, due to receiving alerts from
an intrusion detection system deployed at the evaluated network. To inform the operators of the
measured networks, we follow best practices [177] and provide a “usage notice” website reachable
at both the IPv4 and IPv6 addresses of the measurement machine. The notice explains that the
measurements are benign in nature, who is conducting them, how to contact the authors, and how
to opt out of future measurements. We have not received any opt-out requests or related complaints.
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5.4.3 Responsible Disclosure
We encountered several vulnerable systems and deployments during our evaluation. With the publi-
cation of ourmethodology, an attacker could use it to enumerate active IPv6 addresses and rediscover
vulnerable devices and infrastructure. Therefore, we conducted a responsible disclosure process for
our ﬁndings, having informed the affected parties. To prevent any possible harm, we contacted the
individual parties and the responsible Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRT). The
responsible disclosure process has been completed for all our ﬁndings.
5.5 Evaluation
We ﬁrst evaluate how our technique fares on an Internet-scale. We then look in-depth at various
issues IPv6 networks exhibit in the wild, which prior studies have missed, possibly due to being
unable to target and enumerate speciﬁc IPv6 networks or IPv6-only hosts. Our results underline
the need for an active enumeration technique for future IPv6 security studies, instead of being able
to rely on data collected at network vantage points.
5.5.1 Internet-wide Enumeration
First, we enumerate the entire IPv6 address space using our technique. To enumerate the address
spacemore quickly,we seed our enumeration techniquewith IPv6network preﬁxes thatweobtained
from aggregating a view on the global routing table (GRT). We aggregate this GRT from Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP) dumps available from RIPE RIS [208] and Routeviews [209] following
current best practices [210]. In addition, we leverage the enumeration technique of Fiebig et al. to
establish a baseline [9].
We ﬁnd that our technique performs favorably compared to the enumeration technique of Fiebig
et al. (see Figure 5.3). Speciﬁcally, we perform better than the baseline for large preﬁxes. For in-
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stance, for network preﬁxes of size /32, the maximum allocation size for IPv6, we identify 3,770
more networks, while for networks of size /48, the general allocation size for IPv6, we ﬁnd 2,649
more networks [211, 212]. Unfortunately, however, due to the delayed deployment of DNSSEC,
our technique currently enumerates fewer different preﬁxes than Fiebig et al. for more speciﬁc nib-
bles in IPv6 addresses. We expect this behavior to change in the near future as the adoption of
DNSSEC is increasing, which, in turn, allows our technique to enumerate even more addresses.
Interestingly, during our study we encounter 316 networks using DNSSEC that have an un-
trusted path from the root zone. In detail, of these 316 networks, 191 utilize NSEC and 125 have
NSEC3 conﬁgured. This observation underlines that DNSSEC and DNS zones are not necessarily
conﬁgured correctly in practice. Following the hierarchical concept of DNSSEC, there should not
be a zone that is DNSSEC-signed that was not found by enumerating from the reverse zone root
(ip6.arpa). DNS is strongly hierarchical by design, and following the tree-based key distribution and
veriﬁcation schema of DNSSEC, there should be no signed zone that is only reachable through in-
termediate unsigned zones. It further indicates that the seed-based approach we utilized not only
reduces the overall runtime, but also discovers networks and enumerates hosts that would other-
wise not be found by naïvely enumerating the reverse zone in a top-down fashion. In practice, the
time to unblind IPv6 addresses is reduced further by exploiting the knowledge of total addresses in a
reverse zone (the number of hashes that we collected online prior to unblinding) and address assign-
ment strategies. Addresses are rarely assigned randomly, but instead follow incremental strategies or
use stateless address auto-conﬁguration, and allow us to direct our unblinding process in the search
space and reduce its time further.
We ﬁnd fewer records than Fiebig et al. While they enumerated 5.8M unique addresses using
their technique in late September 2016 [9], and—with an improved version running on multiple
hosts at the same time—over 10M in early 2017 [12], we merely found 2.2M addresses running the
published toolchain on a single host (compared to 5.8M).Wemostly attribute this to the signiﬁcantly
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Figure 5.3: Records enumerated by our DNSSEC-based technique and the technique by Fiebig et
al. [9]. Applied on a global scale, we identify more unique preﬁxes than the technique by Fiebig et al.
for preﬁx lengths between /20 and /56, for example, 3,395 more networks with a preﬁx length of at
least /44. For networks smaller than a preﬁx of /60, the number of discovered preﬁxes increasesmore
slowly, because DNSSEC is not yet being frequently deployed at smaller leaf networks (compared
to its wide-spread adoption for zones at the higher level). The deployment of DNSSEC for these
smaller networks is expected to increase in the near future.
higher number of necessary requests of their approach compared to ourmore informed enumeration
technique (Figure 5.2), leading to an increased impact of packet loss. Indeed, especially due to the
higher number of requests, their technique can be detected and selectively mitigated with relative
ease. Hence, our technique does not only provide more reliability by being harder to mitigate, but
also puts less stress on networks. Both features are desirable when conducting large-scale active
measurements.
In summary, we ﬁnd that our technique shows great promise. We easily out-perform existing
techniques for zones that are already DNSSEC signed. Our technique is only hampered by the
current deployment state ofDNSSEC for leaf zones. However, the adoption ofDNSSEC is expected
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to increase even further in the future, as is the adoption of IPv6. Therefore, we expect our approach
will be able to enumerate signiﬁcantly more networks in the near future.
5.5.2 Observed Security Issues
Following the demonstration of the large-scale potential of our technique, we utilize it to survey
network security issues in current IPv6 deployments around the globe. Speciﬁcally, we have scanned
338 different IPv6 networks, and we report detailed ﬁndings of the security posture of ﬁve different
networks with different and diverse security requirements: (i) a French Internet service provider
(ISP), (ii) a Ukrainian Local Internet Registry (LIR) and transfer broker (responsible to facilitate IP
address space transfers), (iii) a European domain registry, (iv) a supercomputing facility in theUnited
States, and (v) a large German university. The security issues we have uncovered in these networks
illustrate that even experienced network operators from a variety of backgrounds might be unaware
of the problems that a hasty IPv6 deployment can bring.
For each identiﬁed network of hosts, we perform the following two steps:
1. We look up the hostnames for the enumerated IPv6 addresses within the reverse zone, and
then forward look up the hostnames to obtain the corresponding IPv4 addresses. If a host-
name maps to a single IPv4 address, then we assume that IPv4 and IPv6 address point to the
same physical host and compare open ports and available services through access via IPv4 and
IPv6, respectively. If a hostname maps to multiple IPv4 addresses, we do not further evaluate
its security as it would skew the comparative analysis because it is uncertain which IPv6 and
IPv4 addresses correspond to each other.
2. We evaluate the enumerated hosts with nmap and we specify the command-line arguments
-Pn -O -sV –nsock-engine=epool -p1-10000 -sS -sU –max-retries 1 to identify potential security
issues.
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Network
Hosts
Sub-NetworksIPv6-only Dual-stack Total
French Internet Service Provider 2,069 66,545 70,818* 43
Ukrainian LIR 4,619 245† 4,864 611
European Domain Registry 130 119‡ 249 0
United States Supercomputing Facility 28 1,343 1,371 1
German University 138 97§ 235 0
Table 5.2: Number of IPv6 hosts enumerated and sub-networks identiﬁed
*We successfully unblinded 68,614 addresses within our timeout of 12 hours, and only 2,204 hosts
remain blinded for a 96.90% success rate. † Two (2) hosts leak private IPv4 addresses via forward
DNS lookups from two networks, and two (2) hosts point to IPv4 localhost addresses.
‡ Five (5) hosts leak private IPv4 addresses via forward DNS lookups.
§ Sixteen (16) hosts leak private IPv4 addresses via forward DNS lookups.
We responsibly disclosed our ﬁndings to the network operators for all networks that we have evalu-
ated in the course of this chapter. We hope that our ﬁndings motivate network operators to evaluate
the security of IPv6-connected devices on their network.
The different networks that we investigated in-depth vary in the way they deploy DNSSEC:
one network deploys NSEC3 and the remaining four deploy NSEC. They also differ in size as the
number of active hosts ranges from 235 to 70,818, with between 28 and 4,619 hosts classiﬁed as
IPv6-only. We classify a host as IPv6-only if we were unable to conﬁrm that its hostname, which
we obtained from the reverse IPv6 zone, points to exactly a single IPv4 address in the forward zone.
An IPv6 network might be split into various sub-networks for speciﬁc purposes or regions. Un-
surprisingly, the number of sub-networks differs quite a lot per network type: the French Internet
service provider’s network has 43 sub-networks, which likely correspond to different regions where
they provide their services; the Ukrainian LIR delegates the most networks (611), most likely to its
customers, some of which are government and law enforcement entities; the European domain reg-
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istry and theGerman university do not have any sub-networks, possibly because of a central network
operations center; and the United States supercomputing facility uses one sub-network, possibly for
users of the computing cluster or the cluster itself. While we did not include the sub-networks in
our evaluation, our technique can enumerate them readily as they are also DNSSEC-signed.
We are focusing our efforts on the following problems and discuss them separately: (i) for IPv4
and IPv6 dual-stack hosts, we look at all ports accessible via IPv6 but not via IPv4 and vice-versa;
(ii) for IPv6-only hosts, we look at all services that can be accessed externally and which could be
a security risk; and (iii) potential privacy concerns for names in the reverse zone. Particularly, we
investigate more closely:
• Remote access protocols: Secure Shell (SSH), Telnet, and remote desktop sharing.
• File sharing: Apple Filing Protocol (AFP), FTP, HTTP, Server Message Block (SMB), and
WebDAV.
• Monitoring and system management: Nagios Remote Plugin Executor (NRPE), Simple
NetworkManagement Protocol (SNMP), Intelligent PlatformManagement Interface (IPMI),
and management interfaces for machine virtualization (Hyper-V, VMware).
• Network management via routing protocols: Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) as an inte-
rior gateway protocol, and the Border Gateway Protocol (both iBGP and BGP).
5.5.3 Dual-stack Analysis: IPv4 vs. IPv6
We contrast the security deployment of IPv4 and IPv6 by taking an in-depth look into some existing
networks. In total, we investigate more closely the differences in security measures of accessing
68,349 hosts through IPv6 compared to through IPv4. The hosts are part of the networks of ﬁve
different institutions with varying security requirements.
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The infrastructure network of the French Internet service provider is the most populous net-
work, of the ones we have investigated more closely, with 66,545 dual-stack hosts. Fortunately,
most hosts are secured appropriately. In fact, much to our surprise, hosts following incremental
IPv6 address assignment pattern exhibit the same or better security, that is, the same or less exposed
ports through IPv6 than via IPv4. This might be the case because the services are conﬁgured to lis-
ten on their respective IPv4 address only, instead of the default to listen on all available addresses
(IPv4 and IPv6) or interfaces, and, thus, no access via IPv6 is possible. On the other hand, hosts who
have taken on globally routable addresses via stateless address autoconﬁguration (SLAAC) do exhibit
worse security. Alongside world-readable Apple ﬁle sharing we discovered open ports for access to
management interfaces of Cisco switches via Telnet, access to Hewlett Packard StoreFabric network
storage devices (both client and management interface ports), as well as read-only SNMP access for
various networking devices (access might not be restricted to read-only, but without potentially dis-
rupting infrastructure, we are unable to conﬁrm whether access is read-write; therefore, we report
all SNMP access as read-only).
Different is the network of the supercomputing facility in the United States, for which we enu-
merated 1,371 IPv6-capable hosts, with 1,343 of them being dual-stack. Although a signiﬁcant
amount of services, like HTTP(s), FTP(s), IMAP(s), SMTP(s), POP3(s), are available on the net-
work, almost all of them are accessible via IPv4 and IPv6 and we consider them as intentionally
open and without additional security risk. Of all 1,371 hosts, 828 hosts assigned themselves IPv6
addresses through SLAAC,while the remaining 543 hosts have IPv6 addresses assigned incrementally
with gaps due to jumps at earlier nibble boundaries, conﬁrming that guided search for enumeration
has substantial beneﬁts. There was no difference in security for incrementally assigned addresses
and automatically assigned address through SLAAC, but hosts remained more open to attackers via
IPv6 than IPv4. Speciﬁcally, we still encountered services accessible via IPv6 that are likely unin-
tentionally accessible as they are security-sensitive, including, but not limited, to BGP (secured via
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tcpwrapper for some hosts only), Telnet access to Cisco routers, and access to Microsoft’s Active
Directory.
Similar to the supercomputing facility, a variety of IPv6 hosts on the German University’s net-
work expose SSH, HTTP, and FTP. Again, we observed the same ports being publicly accessible via
IPv4. Since universities often provide HTTP and FTP mirrors of open-source software, and SSH
is generally considered secure, we do not consider them potential security problems. Alarmingly,
however, we still determined a plethora of potentially critical security problems. In particular, pub-
licly accessible via IPv6 but not IPv4 are: interior BGP and exterior BGP for 57 hosts, old SSH
versions on two Cisco switches, SNMP on 35 hosts, Nagios Remote Plugin Executor for 38 hosts, a
portmap version on 38 hosts that can be exploited to launch reﬂected and ampliﬁed denial of service
attacks [213], and ﬁngerd on one host. Especially concerning are the exposure of BGP, portmap,
and SSH access on the two Cisco switches, which used weak host keys (512-bit RSA).
We observed no signiﬁcant differences in security for dual-stack hosts for the European domain
registry or the Ukrainian LIR. Yet, over all networks, the security of hosts whose addresses appear
assigned through SLAAC, that is, automatically based on the hosts’ MAC addresses, is worse than
those for which the address is assigned incrementally.
5.5.4 Security Posture of IPv6-only Hosts
We also enumerated hosts that are single-stack and thus are only reachable via IPv6. Interestingly,
some early proponents of IPv6 without prior experience operating IPv4 networks exhibited the
worst security measures and exposed administrative, infrastructure, and network management in-
terfaces through IPv6 to the world. Most likely, they assume more secure defaults and might not
know better given a lack of experience.
Unfortunately, although experience helps to mitigate some issues, it is not a silver bullet. An
example is the infrastructure network of a major LIR in theUkraine of which almost all hosts (4,619
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of 4,864 hosts) are reachable only through IPv6. However, since the network operator has extensive
experience operating an IPv4 network, we were expecting a relatively secure network. Regardless
of prior operating experience, we discovered critical security issues on two IPv6-only hosts, both of
which do not have an entry in the forward zone. Both hosts expose the Quagga routing software’s
management port as well as BGP via IPv6 and could be used to control routing for all the LIR’s sub-
networks, which include law enforcement and government entities. Although already concerning,
we detected an old version of Quagga (0.99.22.1) at a core network router, which is potentially
vulnerable to a remote code execution and a denial-of-service attack [214, 215]. Unfortunately,
the critical security issues did not stop there, and, even more alarming, we discovered a vulnerable
version of SuperMicro IPMI at an IPv6 address that was assigned automatically (via stateless address
autoconﬁguration), which not only allows full remote execution, but it allows an attacker to gain
practically physical access to the machine remotely.
Wemanually conﬁrmed that all vulnerable hostswere not part of any public dataset used byCzyz
et al. [37], which further emphasizes the need for practical IPv6 address enumeration techniques,
and it illustrates that existing datasets might in fact cast a skewed result on the security state of IPv6-
connected devices. Considering that Czyz et al. collected their dataset from ANY records on the
forward zone, it is clear why prior work did not include it: the hosts’ IPv6 addresses do not appear
in the forward zone at all, but only appear in the reverse zone.
As in the case for dual-stack hosts, we reach the conclusion that the security posture of IPv6-only
hosts varies in the way addresses are assigned. For devices who leverage SLAAC security is worse
than for those who have addresses assigned manually or via DHCPv6.
5.5.5 Privacy Issues
A possible security and fundamental privacy issue we discovered is the leakage of meaningful host-
names through the automatic population of the reverse zone.
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In case of the European NIC, regardless of the deployed security measures at those hosts, the re-
spective hostnames leaked information about their use case: conﬁguration management and deploy-
ment, system and network monitoring, logging, version control, bug tracking, as well as registry
internal infrastructure (authentication, transfers, validation). Although not a security issue necessar-
ily, it opens an avenue for reconnaissance for attackers and it might provide the extra information
that is necessary to circumvent security measures that have been put in place.
Similarly, for the French ISP, stateless autoconﬁgured IPv6 addresses leaked that Apple, Cisco,
and Hewlett Packard devices are on the network. From reverse DNS entries, we further determined
that the Apple devices are laptops and based on a combination of reverse DNS, MAC address, and
service and version detection on open ports, we can determine that the Hewlett Packard devices
are HP StoreFabric storage devices, while the Cisco devices are top-of-rack switches. Additionally,
based on hostnames themselves and routes taken to hosts, we believe that we have enumerated hosts
in four data centers or office buildings: two in Paris, one in Lyon, and one in Toulouse.
Signiﬁcantly more concerning is the case of the United States supercomputing facility though.
The way the reverse zone is used and populated allows us to track employees’ devices and even their
location. Speciﬁcally, we were able to track 13 phones and 10 laptops of employees over time and
we correlated their working hours, and their presence across two buildings. Of the ten laptops, three
laptops are connected via Ethernet and Wi-Fi, allowing higher ﬁdelity tracking, and one person is
using two laptops. From reverse zone information, we can also determine that four people work
in the main complex, while another nine work in an adjacent and affiliated research center. We
manually veriﬁed this to be true through its website.
Tracking is made possible due to the automatic populating of the reverse zone. To track work-
ing hours, regular liveness probes are sufficient (e.g., via ICMPv6). On the other hand, tracking
users across buildings is possible in two different ways. First, through liveness probes over multiple
network preﬁxes, since the remaining nibbles of the address stay constant (due to SLAAC), and, sec-
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ond, through forward DNS lookups on the hostname under a different subdomain (the subdomain
used for Wi-Fi access in the buildings is different). More ﬁne-grained location tracking, up to ﬂoors
and even rooms, is sometimes possible through tracing the route to the host and investigating inter-
mediate router hostnames more closely. The privacy implications of automatically populating the
reverse zone are further ampliﬁed by host and node information, such as names in “jane-iphone” or
“doe-notebook” (with only one person with the ﬁrst name Jane or last name Doe working at the
facility).
5.5.6 Discussion
From our evaluation it is apparent that IPv6 hosts can be, and sometimes are, secured in the same
manner and to the same level as IPv4 hosts. However, as of today, IPv6-connected hosts still lag
behind in regard of security when compared to IPv4 hosts, and their improvement progress must
be monitored and evaluated closely as to not relive the “Wild West” days of the Internet from the
1990s.
Furthermore, we discovered that stateless address conﬁguration can be a signiﬁcant security prob-
lem if network-based ﬁrewalls are not deployed. Our ﬁndings show that devices take on global IPv6
addresses automatically if they are advertised an IPv6 route, regardless of whether they are secured
appropriately. Since some networks are secured appropriately and since the self-assigned IPv6 ad-
dresses do not ﬁt into the networks’ address assignment pattern, we suspect that the devices with
self-assigned addresses have worse security because the network operators are unaware of their be-
havior and might assume that they do not support IPv6 yet, possibly because support might have
been added with a software update after deployment. We believe that we encountered these cases be-
cause IPv6 is sometimes enabled by default in newer ﬁrmware versions of switches and routers, which
might be installed for part of a data center only, for example, through a staggered deployment, and
because laptops might normally connect to IPv4-only networks exclusively, but sometimes connect
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to a network where an IPv6 route is advertised. For them, host-based ﬁrewall rules might not be
conﬁgured for IPv6 yet, thus exposing the machine completely to the rest of the Internet.
5.6 Mitigation
In response to zone-walking attacks against DNSSEC, a variety of defenses have been proposed.
Some of these approaches would also prevent enumerating IPv6 addresses from the reverse zone.
However, the proposed defenses have signiﬁcant shortcomings and some require to fully trust the
nameserver with the authoritative zone-signing keys, a practice that DNSSEC strongly discourages.
We discuss how those techniques would impact our approach and, if adopted, what other issues they
bear.
5.6.1 Reverse Zone Modiﬁcations
A straightforward solution to prevent IPv6 addresses from being enumerated via DNSSEC on the
reverse zone is to drop the reverse zone completely or to not deployDNSSECon it. Not keeping any
reverse zone information for IPv6 addresses has signiﬁcant problems though, which would render
the affected IPv6 addresses almost entirely useless in practice. Nowadays, reverse zones are used
to protect against spam and other inconveniences and the lack of a reverse entry for an address is
considered a lack of trust and “sign of trouble.” For instance, almost all incoming email servers
(SMTP) are conﬁgured to look up the reverse name and reject incoming mail from IP addresses that
do not hold a valid reverse DNS record. Therefore, not keeping a speciﬁc IP address in a reverse zone
immediately limits the use of that address. For instance, in the case of a hosting or access Internet
service provider, it would effectively prevent its customers from sending email.
Alternatively to dropping the reverse zone entirely, one could choose not to deploy DNSSEC
for it. However, similarly as to verifying that an IP address has a reverse entry, some SMTP servers
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are trusting signed and valid reverse entries more and service them quicker (e.g., no greylisting). In
turn, the decision to not sign the reverse zone can degrade the overall quality of service but it would
not prevent the service to be used at all. In addition, this technique exposes the reverse zone to the
known problems of DNS that have been solved by DNSSEC. For example, by effectively removing
any authenticity on a zone one enables malicious nameservers to return bogus responses (again).
In both cases, the respective authority for the reverse zone needs to decide on the trade-off:
whether she prefers to degrade quality of service, or whether she wants to prevent zone-walking and
protect the privacy of addresses on her network. It is understandable that network operators prefer
to guarantee a high quality of service over preventing zone-walking attacks, particularly considering
that IP addresses will become public during communication with other hosts anyways. Thus, hiding
them is merely a misguided attempt at security through obscurity. Furthermore, security manage-
ment of the hosts that could be enumerated is often outside of the responsibilities of the network
operator herself (instead, a system administrator is often responsible) while the quality of service is
her métier.
5.6.2 Minimally Covering NSEC Records
An alternative approach to preventing zone-walking attacks via already existing DNSSEC record
types, such as NSEC3, was proposed by Weiler et al. [133]. Instead of signing the zone offline
and thus, by requirement, introducing large spans for NSEC3 records, Weiler et al. suggest to sign
records online and to return minimally covering NSEC3 records on demand. For instance, a minimal
covering NSEC3 record for a non-existing domain n with hashed name hn would fake the previous
existing hash as hn   1 and next existing hash as hn + 1. For proving the denial of existence for n ,
it is irrelevant whether hn  1 actually exist, if they do not exist the denial record is considered a
“white lie.”
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Minimally covering NSEC3 records prevent zone-walking attacks effectively. However, this
approach requires online signing and thus requires the full zone-signing secret key to be available at
the nameserver. If the zone-signing key is deployed to the authoritative nameservers, then any single
compromised authoritative nameserver results in a complete zone compromise, and any bogus and
possibly malicious responses can be signed and returned. This would be a direct contradiction to the
goals of DNSSEC and its operational practices [216]. Given the computational overhead of online
signing DNS responses and its potential security risks, minimally coveringNSEC records have so far
been adopted only hesitantly.
5.6.3 NSEC4
Another attempt to revolutionize DNSSEC’s denial of existence records was the proposal of NSEC4
by Gieben et al. [217]. However, the respective Internet-Draft does not propose any techniques
that would prevent zone-walking, and thus cannot be considered a mitigation technique. Instead, it
introduces performance optimizations for denials of existence of wildcard records and the opt-out
ﬂag. The draft has expired in January 2013 and has not been renewed. The optimizations have been
integrated into NSEC5.
5.6.4 NSEC5
Goldberg et al. [218] introduce NSEC5 as a solution to provably preventing zone enumeration at-
tacks. The adoption of NSEC5 would prevent enumeration of active IPv6 addresses through the
reverse zone, but, it comes at the signiﬁcant cost of requiring additional online asymmetric cryptog-
raphy operations. In fact, the additionally incurred cost for online signingwhen deployingDNSSEC
renders nameservers subject to denial of service attacks and chosen-plaintext attacks [133], which
is why it might have been rejected by industry leaders in favor of signing zones offline. Speciﬁ-
cally, denial of service attacks due to asymmetric cryptography can be abused in many more ways
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for DNSSEC over similarly authenticated protocols, like TLS, because it uses UDP for the trans-
port protocol instead of TCP. The latter are less impacted because they normally do not perform
any cryptographic operations prior completion of the TCP handshake, which acts as a way to ensure
that the connection between server and client is intended. On the contrary, in the case of DNSSEC,
no such protection exists and cryptographic operations must be performed when receiving the ﬁrst
and only packet. Furthermore, it is more prone to abuse because of reﬂection and spoofed addresses.
Nonetheless, we support the authors’ effort to have NSEC5 become an Internet standard. The ad-
ditional computational cost incurred on the nameserver and the increased risk of denial of service
attacks might be a reason why the Internet-Draft remains a work in progress, and had to be renewed
by the authors prior to expiration ﬁve times already [219]. Without sufficient industry interest and
without an implementation except for the reference implementation for Knot DNS being available
(although NSEC5 solves a known problem and was proposed in mid 2014 [220], no implementa-
tion for the BIND nameserver exists), wide adoption of NSEC5 in the (near) future appears highly
unlikely, allowing our approach to be used in practice.
If NSEC5would be deployed for a zone, an attacker who is trying to enumerate that zonewould
need to obtain the NSEC5-signing-key. Once the attacker has obtained the key, she can degrade
NSEC5’s security guarantees to those of NSEC3, walk the zone, and, in turn, enumerate IPv6 ad-
dresses.
5.7 Conclusion
We introduced a technique to enumerate part of the active IPv6 address space as a starting point
to evaluate the security state of IPv6-connected hosts. Our approach leverages DNSSEC-signed
reverse DNS zones to enumerate active IPv6 addresses that can later be scanned through readily
available tools, such as nmap. Although NSEC3 should protect from zone-walking attacks, the
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combination of the well-deﬁned structure of IPv6 addresses in the reverse zone, and the implications
of the disclosure of the record types for the previous and next hashes in the NSEC3 chain counteract
its protective impact. In turn, it reduces the search space needed to break the hashed addresses to
as little as 264, with additional reductions in practice through intelligent search due to incremental
(e.g., manual or via DHCPv6) and MAC address-based (stateless address autoconﬁguration) address
assignment schemes. Exploiting these intricacies, we successfully demonstrate that it is practical to
enumerate active IPv6 addresses at scale in the face of NSEC3. Furthermore, to the best of our
knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to introduce systematic and practical methodology to enumerate IPv6
addresses throughNSEC andNSEC3 based DNSSEC-signed reverse zones by exploiting previously
ignored subtleties in the interplay of reverse zones and DNSSEC.
Based on the enumerated address set, we evaluated the state of security of IPv6 hosts and we
have shown that many are insufficiently secured. Speciﬁcally, IPv6-enabled systems often expose
critical infrastructure or sensitive and privacy-concerning information to the outside. For instance,
we discovered various routers exposing unsecured Telnet access, or internal ﬁle shares being exposed
via IPv6, and that the analysis of hostnames in the reverse zone can leak employees’ working hours
and locations. Furthermore, from our comparative analysis of scanning dual-stack hosts via IPv6
and IPv4, we conclude that one main cause is that globally routable IPv6 addresses are assigned
automatically to the machines. It appears that hosts assigning themselves a globally routable IPv6
address is a practice some system administrators are unaware of, as the respective hosts are almost
always properly protected from unauthorized access via IPv4.
Finally, we discussedmitigationmechanisms that could protect against zone-walking in the pres-
ence of DNSSEC and, in turn, could prevent IPv6 address enumeration attacks through DNSSEC-
signed reverse zones. Ultimately, we reach the conclusion that the proposed defenses suffer from
shortcomings that will prevent them from being adopted in practice in the (near) future. There-
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fore, we expect our approach to continue being a viable IPv6 address enumeration technique and to
further improve with the continued deployment of DNSSEC.
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Related Work
A large amount of prior work has been carried out to address Internet abuse of varying scale. Here-
inafter, we ﬁrst discuss related work on tackling web-based threats, from detecting website deface-
ment, to defeating phishing through image-based analyses, to detecting malicious code, and, ﬁnally,
to leveraging and understanding the dynamic nature of the web to recognize intrusions. Following,
we discuss related work in the areas of DNS security and measurements, IP address squatting and
takeover attacks, the security of domain-based certiﬁcate and trust validation, and cloud security,
speciﬁcally issues grounded in resource sharing. Finally, we discuss prior work in the areas of IPv4-
wide security scanning tomeasure abuse and abuse potential, enumerating active IPv6 addresses, and
privacy issues with respect to DNSSEC and zone enumeration.
6.1 Website Defacement Detection
Similar toMeerkat, Davanzo et al. [76] introduce a system that acts a monitoring service for website
defacements. Their system utilizes the website’s HTML source code for detection, and its features
were selected manually based on domain knowledge acquired a priori, making the system prone to
concept drift. On their, comparatively, very small dataset containing only 300 legitimate websites
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and 320 defacements, they achieve false positive rates ranging from 3.56% to 100% (depending on
the machine learning algorithm used; suggesting extreme underﬁtting and overﬁtting with some
algorithms), and true positive rates between 70.07% to 100% (in the case of simply classifying every-
thing as a defacement; i.e., extreme underﬁtting). Overall, these results are signiﬁcantly worse than
Meerkat, both in terms of false positives (1.012%) and true positives (97.878%).
Bartoli et al. [77] propose Goldrake, a website defacement monitoring tool that is very similar
to the tool proposed by Davanzo et al. and leverages a superset of their features. To learn an ac-
curate model, Goldrake requires knowledge about the monitored website to learn website-speciﬁc
parameters. However, it is unclear how well Goldrake detects defacements in practice because it is
evaluated on a small and (likely) non-diverse dataset comprised of only 11 legitimate websites and
20 defacements, on which it performs poorly with a high false negative rate (27%).
Medvet et al. [221] introduce a defacement detection system based on work by Bartoli et al. and
Davanzo et al., but the detection engine is replaced by a set of functions that are learned through
genetic programming. The learned functions take the features by Bartoli et al. and Davanzo et al. as
input, but classiﬁcation is more accurate on a dataset comprised of 15 websites (between 0.71% and
23.38% false positives, and about 97.52% true positives). It is, again, unclear how the system would
fare in a real-world deployment because of the small and (likely) non-diverse dataset.
Note that all text-based approaches have major weaknesses, similar as those encountered in spam
and phishing detection, such as using images to show text to evade detection. Meerkat does not
suffer from these shortcomings.
Lastly, most commercial products that detect website defacements are built upon host-based
intrusion detection systems to monitor modiﬁcations of the ﬁles on the web server, for example, via
ﬁle integrity checks (checksums) [222, 223]. Therefore, those approaches bear the major drawback
that they can only detect the subset of defacements that modify ﬁles on disk, and that they cannot
detect other defacement attacks, such as through SQL injections, even when the defacements look
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exactly the same to the website’s visitors. Meerkat does not have this blind spot and detects these
stealthier attacks.
6.2 Image-based Detection in Security
No prior work, to the best of our knowledge, applies image-based methods to detect defacements,
which is why we compare Meerkat to prior work that visually detects phishing pages, or leverages
image-based techniques as part of a larger system.
Medvet et al. [224] propose a system to detect if a potential phishing page is similar to a legiti-
mate website. The system leverages features such as parts of the visible text, the images embedded on
the website, and the overall appearance of the website as rendered by the browser for detection. Sim-
ilarity is measured by comparing the 2-dimensional Haar wavelet transformations of the screenshots.
Their system achieves a 92.6% true positive rate and a 0% false positive rate on a dataset comprised
of 41 real-world phishing pages.
Similarly, Liu et al. [225] present an anti-phishing solution that is deployed at an email server
and detects linked phishing pages by assessing the visual similarity to the legitimate page, but only
when analysis is triggered on keyword detection. The system identiﬁes phishing pages by comparing
the suspicious website to the legitimate website, which it does by measuring similarity between text
and image properties, like the font size and font face used, or the source of an image.
Although detecting phishing pages by comparing the similarity of two websites is sensible, for
defacements the difference between them is more interesting. Instead of creating a visually-similar
page to trick users into disclosing their credentials, a defacer wants to promote his message. Adopt-
ing existing phishing detection systems to detect defacements instead, that is, by comparing if the
website looks different from its usual representation, however, bears two problems: (i) the usual rep-
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resentation must be known and stored for comparison, and (ii) false positives are much more likely
if the website is dynamic or if it shows regularly-changing ads.
Anderson et al. [60] introduce image shingling, a technique similar to w-shingling, to cluster
screenshots of scams into campaigns. However, in its current form, image shingling cannot be used
to detect defacements as it is trivial to evade the clustering step with only minor modiﬁcations that
are invisible to the human eye, and, thus, the technique is unsuitable for a detection system in an
adversarial context.1
Nappa et al. [226] leverage perceptual hashing to group visually similar icons of malicious exe-
cutables, assuming that a similar icon suggests that the two executables are part of the same malware
distribution campaign. While it is theoretically possible to detect defacements through perceptual
hashing-based techniques and comparing the distance of the hashes, it is impractical to do so on a
large scale and in an adversarial context. For once, one must have a ground-truth screenshot that is
close enough to the screenshot that one wants to classify; if ground-truth is not available or slightly
too different, a system based on perceptual hashing will be unable to detect the defacement. Fur-
thermore, classiﬁcation is not constant in the number of defacements the system has seen in the past:
For each new screenshot we would want to classify, we would need to compute the distance to the
hashes of at least some (or all) of the previously-seen defacements.2
Grier et al. [227] introduce their own image similarity measure to cluster malicious executables
that have similar looking user-interface components after being executed in a dynamic analysis envi-
ronment. Two images are considered similar if the root mean squared deviation between the images’
histograms is below some manually-determined threshold. Clearly, a defacement system based on
this technique is not suitable in an adversarial context: An attacker can (and eventually will) simply
1The authors acknowledge the shortcomings in an adversarial context in Section 4.2, but they do not discuss any
remediation techniques.
2Therefore, detection time increases with each observed defacement; it is at best in O(logn ) and at worst in O(n ),
with n being all observed defacements.
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change the colors slightly or add dynamic content, so that the root mean squared deviation is above
the threshold, but remains visually similar to the human eye. Furthermore, as for Nappa et al. [226],
one needs to pair-wise compare the histogram of the screenshot one wants to classify to some or all
of the already-seen defacements.
Meerkat does not suffer from any of these shortcomings: First, it learns high-level features on
the defacements’ general look and feel to detect also previously unseen defacements, and, second, its
classiﬁcation time is constant in the number of already-seen defacements.
6.3 Detection of Malicious Code
Numerous papers have been published on detecting malicious activity in websites. To the extent of
our knowledge, no prior work exists that actively searches and ﬁnds previously unknown malware
infection campaigns. The majority of prior work focus on dynamic analysis of JavaScript in instru-
mented environments or on rendering websites in high-interaction client honeypots. It is important
to recall that Delta is complementary and provides additional information: the infection campaign
and the responsible node of the DOM tree.
Eshete et al. [228] discuss the effectiveness and efficacy issues of malicious website detection
techniques. Approaches from blacklists, to static heuristics, to dynamic analysis are compared in
their detection accuracy and time spent analyzing the website. Amajor argument on the weaknesses
of previouswork is theirmissing discussion on the necessity of episodic re-training or online learning
capabilities, to keep upwith the ongoing evolution ofweb-basedmalware, and to prevent the evasion
of deployed detection systems.
Cova et al. [90] introduce the system JSAND, to detect and analyze drive-by download attacks
and malicious JavaScript in an instrumented environment. The system leverages a comprehensive
dynamic analysis approach by instrumenting JavaScript to extract a variety of different features from
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redirection and cloaking, to deobfuscation, to observing heap exploitation. They compare JSAND
to client honeypots, such as Capture-HPC and PhoneyC, as well as the anti-virus engine ClamAV. It
shows a much lower false positive (0%) and false negative rate (0.2%) than all other approaches (5.2%
to 80.6%), while taking an average of 16.05 seconds to analyze a website. CaptureHPC, the closest
system in terms of accuracy takes 20 seconds per sample.
Canali et al. [91] extend the dynamic analysis system JSAND by implementing a pre-ﬁltering
step. Themain goal is to prevent the submission of certainly benignwebsites to the dynamic analysis
system and, in turn, reduce the time spent on analyzing benign samples, that is, the system assigns to
a false negative a much higher cost than it does to a false positive. The ﬁlter method leverages a C4.5
( J48) decision tree and a diverse set of features spanning from the HTML content, to the JavaScript
code, to information about the host, to uniform resource location (URL) patterns. They evaluate
their ﬁlter on a dataset of 15,000 websites and compare it to similar methods by Seifert et al. [110]
and Ma et al. [118]. Both other methods yield more false positives and false negatives, but process
up to 10 times more samples in the same time.
Provos et al. [23, 92] introduce a system to detect URLs to malicious websites. However, they
are not considering legitimate infectedwebsites in general, as their approach is restricted to detecting
the inclusion of exploit pages, and hence their approach is complementary to our system’s capabili-
ties. Their system uses a proprietary machine learning algorithm to classify URLs based on features
like their use in “out of place” inline frames, obfuscated JavaScript, or links to known malware dis-
tribution sites. Besides detecting 90% of all malicious landing pages with 0.1% false positives, they
validate previous work by Moshchuk et al. [229] that infection vectors are inserted into legitimate
websites through exploiting vulnerabilities, advertisement networks, and third party widgets.
Delta complements prior work by being able to search and ﬁnd known and unknown infection
vectors throughout the Internet, which prior work can then leverage to train their system for better
detection accuracy and increased user protection.
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6.4 Web Dynamics in Security
Maggi et al. [33] introduce a web application intrusion detection system, which is able to learn about
changes made to the web application. The problem of web application concept drift is addressed by
learning how the web application is accessed by a legitimate user and employing an unsupervised
classiﬁcation algorithm. Features include, for example, a sequence corresponding to the order in
which websites are accessed or howweb page parameters are distributed. The presented technique is
orthogonal toDelta: Themain goal is not to ﬁnd new infection campaigns or to protect the visitor of
a website, but rather to protect the integrity of the web application. Protecting a normal, wandering
user would require intrusion detection and protection of all websites the user visits, since the access
pattern, onwhich the system is based, depend on the underlying architecture of thewebsite. A global
deployment to protect users, although possible theoretically, is practically impossible.
Davanzi et al. [76] study a similar approach for detecting the impact of web dynamics. They in-
troduce a system to detect if changes made to a website are defacements, which might cause serious
harm to the organization, monetary or reputation-wise, or if they are legitimate, officially approved
content changes. However, they explicitly point out that their approach does not work with mali-
cious modiﬁcations because their approach detects changes that are visible to the end-user, which is
the exact opposite of how malicious infection vectors are placed in practice. In detail, they employ
anomaly detection to regularly visit and monitor a set of 300 websites actively and detect if changes
made to the website constitute a defacement or not.
Delta, on the other hand, leverages web dynamics to derive additional information from ob-
served changes across a large number of websites, primarily a change in behavior (i.e., introducing
maliciousness), but also the impact and scale of changes, and commonalities in the operation of the
websites. This information then guides a human analyst or analysis tool to more quickly determine
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the root cause for a website being attacked and turning malicious, and, thus, facilitates removal of
the malicious behavior.
6.5 DNS Security
The domain name system (DNS) is a critical service in the Internet ecosystem and prior work has
studied DNS security extensively. Bell and Britton hold a patent in which they describe how a host
can be taken over by assigning the same IP address to a virtual interface on another system [230].
Yadav et al. report on domain-ﬂux practices in botnets, a technique in which a domain generation
algorithm is used to generate many domains, of which the operator only needs to control one to re-
main in control of her botnet [231]. However, to some degree as the dual of exploiting stale DNS
records, one can register a single or multiple of those domains to take over a botnet, and it has been
done successfully by Stone et al. [232]. Liu et al. conducted a study similar to our problem analysis
for Cloud Strife [233]. However, methodological challenges and limitations of their datasets lead
them to an under-estimation of the impact of stale DNS records in cloud scenarios. Indeed, contrary
to them, we ﬁnd that the problem of stale DNS records is ampliﬁed by multiple orders of magni-
tude. We further systematically analyze the practicality of acquiring the previously-used cloud IP
addresses, discover use-after-free attacks based on DNS caches, and we propose a usable mitigation
technique to automatically validate certiﬁcate issuance.
Instead of relying on correct DNS responses, bit-squatting exploits random bit-ﬂips in DNS re-
quests to lure clients tomalicious or phishingwebsites [234]. Different fromour attack, bit-squatting
relies on integrity errors that occur at random and thus is not as targeted as our attack. Furthermore,
exploiting integrity errors, it can be mitigated easily via hardware and software, for example, by
adopting DNSSEC and leveraging its integrity guarantees. Similar to our technique, typo squat-
ting can be used to lure clients on malicious websites [235, 236, 237]. It remains important to note
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that in a typo-squatting attack, the attacker needs to register a new domain and hope that users visit
that domain. For our attack, although the window of opportunity might be shorter, the attack is
signiﬁcantly more severe: It is impossible for users to tell whether they are in fact being attacked,
as domains and IP addresses have residual trust, and any connection might be marked trusted by
the browser due to domain-validated TLS certiﬁcates. Indeed, Zdrnja et al. demonstrated an ap-
proach to detect typo-squatting attacks from mined DNS data [238]. Different from prior work,
our study focuses on the vulnerabilities of stale DNS records pointing to cloud IP addresses, we
conduct comprehensive measurements, and we propose a mitigation to retain the convenience of
domain-validation for certiﬁcate issuance.
6.6 IP Address Squatting and Takeover Attacks
Taking over IP addresses is a well-known security problem. Themost common andwell discussed at-
tack method aims to take over entire network preﬁxes using BGP, which can be easily observed and
will be scrutinized quickly [239]. Wählisch et al. demonstrated amethod to detect such takeovers us-
ing RPKI [240]. Ballani et al. conducted a study investigating preﬁx hijacking in 2007 [241], while
Zhang et al. developed ﬁrst defense methods against such attacks [242]. In 2015, Gavrichenkov
demonstrated that modern domain-validated TLS certiﬁcates (and thereby HTTPS) can be broken
using preﬁx hijacking [157]. Attackers with more powerful capabilities on the network path be-
tween a client requesting a certiﬁcate and a CA do not even have to perform preﬁx hijacking, but
instead can easily exploit IP address squatting, as they are already on the path. Cloud Strife, on the
other hand, details a new attack vector to conduct IP address squatting, which is practical, and time-
and cost-efficient to launch.
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6.7 Certiﬁcate Validation Security
The security threats we studied in Chapter 4 tie in with modern, domain-based, certiﬁcate authori-
ties and their surrounding security challenges. Various efforts currently track the adoption of Let’s
Encrypt [243, 244]. In general, the security implications of domain-based certiﬁcate validation are
widely accepted. In their analysis of the HTTPS/TLS trust ecosystem, Clark et al. [245] place great
trust inDANE [165] tomitigate this issue. Apart fromDANE,Certiﬁcate Transparency [141, 142] is
considered the ideal reactive mitigation for maliciously and wrongfully obtained certiﬁcates and has
received signiﬁcant attention recently. The DNS certiﬁcate authority authorization (CAA) record
might reduce the impact of IP use-after-free attacks to some degree [164], as it limits the CAs that are
allowed to issue a certiﬁcate for a speciﬁc domain, and, thus, force an attacker to request a certiﬁcate
from these CAs. However, our analysis shows that current domain validation in trust ecosystem
is susceptible to use-after-free attacks regardless of CAA records. In fact, the only way to defend
against use-after-free attacks through CAA is to restrict certiﬁcate issuance in its entirety, which
then raises problems when the certiﬁcate expires while also relying on automatic certiﬁcate renewal
setups, such as those recommended by Let’s Encrypt, in which case automatic DNS zone updates
are required (which become difficult in the presence of DNSSEC). Overall, relying on CAA would
require numerous compromises in terms of certiﬁcate lifetime management and DNS zone main-
tenance, while still providing a potential (small) window of opportunity for an attacker whenever
the CAA record needs to be relaxed to allow certiﬁcate renewal. We introduced a mitigation that
incorporates existing trust of a name into the validation process and can protect against these attacks.
6.8 Cloud Security
Concurrent with the increasing adopting of cloud services, cloud security has drawn more research
attention. Chen et al. provided a contemporary summary and analysis of cloud security issues [246],
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and indicated problems of shared resources. Similarly, Subashini and Kavitha provided a compre-
hensive analysis of security challenges in cloud scenarios [247]. Their analysis of IaaS platforms only
includes similar issues to those approached by Ristenpart et al. [122]. Speciﬁcally, Ristenpart et al.
exploit shared resources in IaaS environments to facilitate cross-VM side-channel attacks. However,
they focus on physical computing resources and they do not investigate issues induced by logical re-
source sharing, for example, access to the same IP address pool. Jensen et al. focus on classical web
attacks, especially in SaaS (Software-as-a-Service) scenarios [248]. Takabi et al. discuss the over-
all issue of IP squatting that is related to secure handling of provisioning and multi-domain cloud
platforms with shared resource pools [249]. Zhang et al. investigate access control and trust man-
agement in the context of multi-tenant environments [250]. Cloud Strife is orthogonal to prior
cloud security research, and it focuses on the certiﬁcate ecosystem vulnerabilities as it is being used
in combination with cloud services.
6.9 IPv4 Security Scanning
Internet-wide scans have become an important tool for applied security research. They are impera-
tive to identify and understand the impact of new vulnerabilities or commonmisconﬁgurations, like
Heartbleed or DROWN. Heninger et al. scanned the IPv4 address space for weak cryptographic
keys used by TLS and SSH servers [207]. Alarmingly, they discovered shared secret keys due to a
lack of entropy during key generation, and they were even able to recover secret keys. Aviram et
al. discovered DROWN, a new attack that exploits ﬂaws in SSLv2. To determine its practical im-
pact, they scanned the entire IPv4 address space and identiﬁed that 33% of all HTTPS servers were
vulnerable [251].
These discoveries have been made possible by various advances around Internet-wide scanning.
Heidemann et al. performed one of the ﬁrst Internet-wide scans by sending ICMP messages to all
163
Related Work Chapter 6
allocated IPv4 addresses to identify reachable hosts [252]. Although enumerating all reachable hosts
took multiple months to complete, the study clearly indicated the potential and beneﬁts of large-
scale probing. In 2013, Durumeric et al. developed ZMap [177], a fast scanning tool that can scan
the entire IPv4 address space in under ﬁve minutes given the right conditions. They further discuss
guidelines and best practices in using this tool to perform Internet-wide scans. We support their
guidelines and took similar precautions to minimize the impact of our measurements.
6.10 Enumerating and Scanning IPv6 Addresses
While Internet-wide scans have become a common tool in the IPv4 world, measurements for IPv6
are still lagging behind. Speciﬁcally, three distinct research directions have been pursued: preﬁx-
based measurements, studies based on client-centric vantage points, and, the most neglected, server-
centric and security motivated studies.
Monitoring and measuring the IPv6 deployment has been of growing interest ever since the
IPv6 standard was introduced. Large service providers and vendors, such as Cisco or Google, have
since been tracking the use of IPv6 [253, 181, 189]. Similarly, Dhamdhere et al. analyzed historical
BGP data to determine IPv6 deployment at the autonomous system (AS) level, for which they were
able to determine that it was lagging behind at edge networks [254]. While some publicly accessible
resources exist about the allocated IPv6 preﬁxes, for example, preﬁx assignments from IANA [255],
those resources only provide a high-level view and do not allow exact measurements. Furthermore,
considering that the smallest recommended end-user allocation for IPv6 networks is a /64 network
(232 times the size of the entire IPv4 address space), it is impossible to tell which part of an announced
preﬁx is allocated or in active use. Therefore, it is impossible to provide insights into IPv6 address
utilization from preﬁx information alone, and efficiently enumerating active IPv6 addresses remains
a challenge.
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To characterize IPv6 adoption by end-user systems, Colitti et al. included web resources from a
dual-stack host and from an IPv4-only host on the Google landing page, so that its visitors’ browsers
would attempt to access the dual-stack hosted resources via IPv6 ﬁrst [256]. Due to possible browser
or DNS incompatibilities in respect to IPv6 however, the reported numbers are lower bounds.
Plonka and Berger passively measured which and how clients connected to a large content de-
livery network’s IPv6-capable servers and inferred patterns from it, like the stability and density of
active IPv6 addresses [186]. Foremski et al. develop Entropy/IP, which is an approach that lever-
ages machine learning to predict likely active IPv6 addresses, based on a seed set of active addresses
observed in the past [257]. Murdock et al. introduced a more generic approach (6Gen) to determine
potential IPv6 addresses from seed sets [184]. In both cases, addresses that are not in use might be
generated, and, hence, the generated addresses are subjected to subsequent liveness veriﬁcation. Un-
fortunately, these prior studies depend on existing and comprehensive seed sets, which are difficult
to collect without the visibility that a network vantage point provides, such as a large Internet ser-
vice provider or network operator. However, due to their inherent privacy concerns, these vantage
points are heavily guarded and generally not accessible to third parties, such as academic researchers.
In contrast, in Chapter 5, we introduced an approach to enumerate an assigned part of the IPv6 In-
ternet that does not depend on a privileged network position. Furthermore, network vantage points
can miss certain hosts. For example, for the content delivery networks hosts that do not initiate any
connections to it, for example, servers, are missed. These hosts, however, are still discovered by our
approach (see Section 5.5). Ultimately, the dataset that our approach collects can be readily used as
input for generative algorithms, such as Entropy/IP [257] or 6Gen [184].
Czyz et al. aim to evaluate the general ﬁltering policy applied to dual-stack servers (IPv6 and
IPv4; less than 20 ports) [37]. As a source for dual-stack hosts they rely on hostnames with both A
and AAAA records in the Rapid7 DNS ANY dataset [258]. Consequently, the security posture of
IPv6-only hosts is not evaluated, a gap we ﬁll in Chapter 5. As our ﬁndings conﬁrm, their results
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indicate that dual-stack enabled servers have more permissive IPv6 ﬁrewall policies compared to
IPv4, for example, SSH, Telnet, and SNMP are more than twice as open for IPv6-capable routers
as they are for their IPv4 counterparts. However, their work exhibits limitations that our technique
does not have. Speciﬁcally, due to their focus on dual-stack hosts Czyz et al. have missed IPv6-only
hosts as well as systems lacking forward-zone A or AAAA records. We overcome these limitations
by presenting a technique to identify active IPv6 hosts in speciﬁc networks instead of relying on
network vantage points or public, possibly stale, datasets. Hence, we can survey so-far neglected
IPv6-only systems, which exhibit critical security issues. Furthermore, contrary to Czyz et al., we
pinpoint a possible root cause of the differences in ﬁrewall policing between IPv4 and IPv6: Stateless
address autoconﬁguration (SLAAC).
Fiebig et al. also utilize reverse DNS entries to obtain a view on assigned IPv6 addresses [9].
Speciﬁcally, they exploit semantic differences in the type of the response of a nameserver [259] to
enumerate reverse zones. However, their work does not include a security evaluation of the iden-
tiﬁed hosts. We leverage their work as a baseline for our evaluation and we ﬁnd that our technique
performs better for large preﬁxes, due to the already high deployment rate of DNSSEC in their re-
spective reverse zones. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the usefulness of their technique has limitations.
After Fiebig et al. presented their ﬁndings in late 2016 [188], mitigation technique have been adopted
by network operators. Furthermore, their technique generates a signiﬁcant request volume, which
can be mitigated similarly. In contrast, mitigations for our enumeration technique require signiﬁ-
cant changes to the DNSSEC standard, which we hypothesize industry is unlikely going to adopt in
the near future due to deployment concerns (see Section 5.6). Furthermore, our technique is more
economical in generated requests, putting less strain on networks and rendering network-based de-
tection more difficult.
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6.11 DNSSEC Privacy Issues
DNSSEC-signed zones that leverage NSEC-based denial of existence are known to be vulnerable
to zone enumeration attacks [201]. Although NSEC3 renders it more difficult, as a hash-based ap-
proach, it remains possible to enumerate the zone through a brute-force attack. Goldberg et al. pre-
sented variants of NSEC3 and showed that the modiﬁed schemes would still be vulnerable to zone
enumeration through brute-force attacks [203]. To break the hashed names, Wander et al. lever-
aged a GPU to launch a dictionary attack against the “.com” zone and successfully unblinded 64%
of the zone [260]. We discussed prior work related to preventing zone-walking attacks on DNSSEC
in Section 5.6, which is why we omit it here in the pursuit of brevity.
Previous work hints at the potential of information leakage through reverse DNS zones [261,
262, 263]. However, they only provide preliminary insight, and do not discuss or leverage any
information leaks (e.g., resource record types and their meaning for IPv6 reverse zones) nor do they
conduct any empirical study on the real-world signiﬁcance of such leaks. Contrary to prior work,
our approach transfers the challenge of unblinding NSEC3 into a new domain. There, we leverage
various intricate details, which have not yet received any attention, to considerably reduce the effort
to unblind IPv6 addresses from the NSEC3 chain. Speciﬁcally, we utilize the way reverse zones are
organized, thewell-deﬁned structure of IPv6, and the insight thatNSEC3 still leaks the record types,
which have a speciﬁc meaning for reverse zones.
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Summary
In this dissertation, we investigated abuse on the Internet, which has become an ever-present and
ever-evolving threat for users with the increasing reliance on Internet-based services in daily life, be-
cause the software and protocols implementing these services’ functionality are often vulnerable to
attacks. Without carefully navigating these threats, miscreants can violate the users’ security, pri-
vacy, and trust by stealing and monetizing their private data, or by scamming, defrauding, or mis-
leading them. However, to enable users to steer clear of such abuse, we need to be able to analyze
and understand it ﬁrst. We contributed to conquering the problem of Internet abuse from three
interconnected angles: identiﬁcation, to address occurring abuse (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3); preven-
tion, to mitigate existing abuse and abuse potential (Chapter 4); and discovery, to reduce future abuse
potential (Chapter 5).
To identify large-scale abuse that is occurring on the Internet, we examined two current web-
based threats in depth: website defacements and malware infection campaigns.
To tackle defacements attacks, we introducedMeerkat, which is an automated detection system
that utilizes a novel approach based on the look and feel of a website to determine if the website has
been defaced. It leverages stacked autoencoders to automatically learn features of how website de-
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facements look, and it uses a feed-forward neural network with dropout to classify them accurately.
We have demonstrated that Meerkat signiﬁcantly outperforms state-of-the-art defacement detec-
tion systems on the largest dataset to date, spanning over 10 million defacements across 16 years.
Contrary to prior work, Meerkat does not require feature engineering based on a priori domain
knowledge, and, thus, it can tackle web evolution and evasions more gracefully. Since its inception
in 2015, Meerkat has already inspired companies and similar systems are now being offered as online
services against defacement attacks.
We then developed Delta, a light-weight system that extracts and analyzes the changes made to
websites, to determine if they introduce a change in behavior, such as a website being compromised
by an attacker and turning malicious. Delta leverages a novel fuzzy tree difference algorithm to ex-
tract only relevant changes, which it then clusters to distinguish stand-alone changes from groups
of changes. Based on the identiﬁed groups, it establishes the scale and impact of malware infection
campaigns, generates an identifying signature for easier detection, and facilitates root cause analysis
by establishing commonalities across a campaign’s websites. Aiding root cause analysis is crucial in
defending against Internet abuse, because we must not only detect the presence of web-based mal-
ware, but we must also identify known and unknown campaigns, to understand how they are being
launched. Indeed, Delta ﬁnds previously unknownweb-basedmalware infection campaigns at scale,
which we have shown by example of a campaign redirecting to the Cool Exploit Kit. Furthermore,
as a result of its design, Delta can identify malicious behavior even if it is currently inactive.
In order to prevent existing abuse and abuse potential, we presented Cloud Strife, a new miti-
gation for IP address takeover attacks for TLS-based services. Although these attacks were thought
to be difficult to launch and easy to detect, we discovered a new variant, called IP address use-after-
free, that we conﬁrm is practical, time-efficient, and cost-efficient for attackers to launch. This is
the case because of how current online services are deployed, that is, their cloud-based ephemeral
character and the cloud’s underlying elasticity. Worse yet, attacks based on this new variant are im-
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perceptible to its victim, as they are indistinguishable from normal system maintenance or service
migration. Speciﬁcally, to mitigate these attacks against TLS-based services, Cloud Strife increases
the security of the HTTP-based TLS certiﬁcate issuance process at the certiﬁcate authority level, by
enforcing a chain of trust to the legitimate owner and preventing certiﬁcates to be issued without a
strong proof of ownership. In turn, an attacker who is launching an IP address takeover attack, in-
cluding but not limited to IP address use-after-free vulnerabilities, will not be able to obtain a valid
certiﬁcate, which severely reduces her capabilities, and which downgrades her attack from a full im-
personation attack to a simple denial-of-service attack. Finally, our mitigation is practical and can
be deployed readily under strict real-world performance and usability requirements, because it has
negligible operational overhead and only requires intervention in disaster-recovery scenarios.
In our fourth contribution, we introduce a novel technique to discover future abuse potential
by enabling Internet-wide security measurements for IPv6. Speciﬁcally, our technique enumerates
active IPv6 addresses from the IPv6 reverse zone. To do so, it leverages the DNSSEC zone enumer-
ation attack, which we make practical even in the face of the zone enumeration defense NSEC3 by
exploiting previously ignored subtleties and intricate details in the organization of the IPv6 reverse
zone. Contrary to prior work, our technique discovers active IPv6-reachable hosts without requir-
ing a network vantage point to observe IPv6 traffic. It also discovers hosts that previous approaches
miss because they do not initiate connections that could be observed, such as those of routers or
servers, and it can be directed at speciﬁc networks more easily. Based on our technique, we have
then shown that IPv6 security posture is lagging behind its IPv4 counterpart for ﬁve networks of
varying scale and managed by various operators, which we conjecture is the case because of unin-
tended IPv6 connectivity, possibly through stateless address autoconﬁguration (SLAAC).
In summary, in this dissertation, we made contributions to identifying, preventing, and discover-
ing current Internet abuse and future abuse potential. Due the adversarial nature of Internet abuse,
however, some issues remain, and future work should investigate more closely how we can address
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them at their core. For example, we need to better understand how IPv6 deployment impacts se-
curity posture, what the abuse potential of newly IPv6-reachable devices is, and how evolution in
protocols and usage pattern impacts security.
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Mitigating the Risks of Takeover Attacks
and Domain-Validated Certiﬁcates
A.1 Takeover Attack Proof of Concept
For our proof of concept experiment (see Section 4.3.5), we obtained a valid certiﬁcate for the do-
main “cloudstrife.seclab.cs.ucsb.edu.” The obtained certiﬁcate is shown in Listing A.2. The respec-
tive entry in the certiﬁcate transparency log can be found at https://crt.sh/?id=250959196.
We revoked the certiﬁcate after it has propagated to certiﬁcate transparency logs, that is, shortly
after issuance. In face of often ignored revocation checks, we opt not to publish the private key.
Instead, we prove ownership of the certiﬁcate by signing a unique message (see Listing A.3 and List-
ing A.4). We did not use the certiﬁcate for any purpose besides signing themessage. It can be veriﬁed
as follows (lines starting with # denote comments, and lines starting with $ denote commands):
# Copy Listing A.2 to certificate.pem and Listing A.4 to message.txt.dgst.b64
# Create message.txt
$ echo  n "Cloud Strife: Mitigating the Security Risks of Domain Validated \
Certificates" > message.txt
# Convert the full certificate to raw PEM
$ openssl x509  pubkey  noout  in certificate.pem > certificate_raw.pem
# Decode the signature
$ base64  d message.txt.dgst.b64 > message.txt.dgst
# Verify the message
$ openssl dgst  sha256  verify certificate_raw.pem  signature message.txt.dsgt \
message.txt
Listing A.1: Instructions to verify the signature
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     BEGIN CERTIFICATE          END CERTIFICATE     
Listing A.2: Proof of concept certiﬁcate, signed by Let’s Encrypt
Cloud Strife: Mitigating the Security Risks of Domain Validated Certificates
Listing A.3: Proof of concept message
Bc99Sl5FwjqYLJl/jS1gPC9fyI9XiS/ex7QVg+zIFZpJ+aPCYcsGm4fGkJxathte
w4i0p3q3lSmnkukRoRNVSvMJdfJRm5QvRQr43HsC6iT+N2xZI/QLcH0nMGUftpR2
HuEiY8LwIalNuxOOjTZJwfTTSRM+NdCjSa39RDpqQLU5LGKjBpSTT/jfg0RwrX0w
MhDnq+iqqrW0kDg08bxARWUfY7tHUAvPpiyyEhnfyThliHFkrKUjAGtH6f+6fKFe
8pZO0XJHRoMuhq4OXMjOWKJZYu7XwQXn3GDoo1bwIwykwmIpUu9wGAjlimtTY5eW
uM0tg2PkmbuZi3JaGsczuQ==
Listing A.4: Signature for the proof of concept message
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Copyright
The copyright of the following material is owned by their respective authors:
• The “Fetch website” icon in Figure 3.1 is from the collection “SEO and online marketing
Elements” by Freepik, courtesy of Flaticon.
• The “Client” icon in Figure 4.3 and Figure 5.1 is based on an icon from the collection “Little
People” by jacksonfox, courtesy of Graffletopia.
• The “example.comWebserver” icon in Figure 4.3 is from the collection “MonotoneServers”
by tugboat, courtesy of Graffletopia.
• The “ACME CA” icon in Figure 4.3 is based on an icon from the collection “Monotone-
Servers” by tugboat, courtesy of Graffletopia, and an icon from the collection “Typicons” by
Stephen Hutching, courtesy of Iconﬁnder.
• The “CT Logs” icon in Figure 4.3 is based on an icon from the collection “MonotoneIcons”
by tugboat, courtesy of Graffletopia.
• The “Nameserver” icon in Figure 5.1 is from the collection is from the collection “Monotone-
Servers” by tugboat, courtesy of Graffletopia.
All other rights reserved. Copyright © 2018 by Kevin Borgolte.
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